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Abstract 
Since the spring of 1997, the Forestry Program at IIASA has been engaged in a study 
called “Institutions and the Emergence of Markets―Transition in the Russian Forest 
Sector”. The IIASA research group has looked at problems related to the institutions 
governing the Russian forest sector. In its first phase (1998–2001) the study sought to 
identify institutional problems hampering the further development of the Russian forest 
sector. Case studies were performed in eight Russian regions. In its second phase 
(2000–2002), so-called policy exercise workshops were held in four of the eight case 
study regions. In these workshops the findings of the case studies were presented to the 
stakeholders in the respective regions and a discussion was initiated about future 
regional forest policies. In a third phase, starting in 2003, after the in-house research 
activity was over, the study has been continued outside the institute by a member of the 
previous IIASA team. A follow-up study of the behavior of forest sector enterprises in 
one of the previous case study regions (Arkhangelsk Oblast) has been conducted with 
the purpose of assessing the recent development of the institutional set-up 
characterizing the so-called virtual economy. The present report presents the findings of 
this assessment.  
The report should be possible to read independently of earlier published reports from 
IIASA’s study of Russian forest institutions. All reports from the study published so far 
are listed in Appendix B.  
On behalf of Professor Sten Nilsson, Deputy Director and Leader of IIASA’s Forestry 
Program, I would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Mikhail Y. Varakin, Arkhangelsk 
State Technical University, Arkhangelsk. Without his dedicated work this report would 
not have been possible.  
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Is the Russian Virtual Economy Coming 
to an End?  Institutional Change in the 
Arkhangelsk Forest Sector  
Mats-Olov Olsson 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Nature of the Problem 
The dramatic developments in Russia and other east European countries during the last 10–15 
years have attracted intense attention from many scholars all over the world. There are many 
good reasons for this interest. The period saw the fall of one of the dominating world powers 
of the 20th century. The disintegration of the Soviet Union triggered a whole chain of events 
also in other east European countries. In fact, the overthrow of the communist governments 
came earlier in some of these countries than it did in the Soviet Union. However, it can be 
argued that ultimately it was the political changes in the Soviet Union that allowed transition 
to unfold in the so-called communist satellite states. The significance of these changes could 
hardly be overestimated. Through the disintegration of the Soviet Union the entire existing 
geo-political situation, with its specific cleavage of the world in two main adversary powers, 
was radically altered. In this perspective the east European transformation could be seen as an 
integral part of the broader transition movement through which authoritarian governments 
were replaced by governments of a more democratic inclination and where the previously 
existing all-encompassing state control of economic life gave way to a system in which the 
market mechanism was allowed to guide actors’ economic operations.  
In the spectacular change process that unfolded in the years following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, it soon became evident that severe rigidities hampered the profound 
reorganization of society necessary to make it comply with the kind of institutional order that 
a modern market economy needs. Not only had the entire legislation governing the behavior 
of all Russian citizens and organizations to be reconstructed, but much of people’s 
internalized informal norms and rules of conduct also had to change radically. In short, the 
Russian society was forced to enter a fundamental institutional reconfiguration.  
The formal dismantling of the Soviet command economy produced a drastic reduction in 
production volumes, while simultaneously demonstrating the great difficulties that had to be 
overcome in order to change the economic mechanism hitherto in operation, replacing the 
“visible hand” of the central planning system with a system of rules that would allow the 
economy to self-organize to become capable of making use of the benefits that might follow 
from market based resource allocation. Clearly, the country’s rich resource endowments― 
Russia possesses both ample natural resources and a well-educated workforce―open great 
prospects for a positive economic development. The provision is that an institutional 
framework conducive to an efficient market based economy can be established.  
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Thus, it is hardly surprising that the situation staged in Russia and other east European 
countries by the unfolding transition process would attract the interest of social scientists 
engaged in the study of institutional change. The institutional change processes displayed here 
were of a previously unknown character both in terms of depth and speed. And, in contrast to 
the closed Soviet system, the new Russian government was not opposed to scientists 
(domestic as well as foreign) engaging in advanced studies of the often strange phenomena 
emerging in the course of the transition. Developments in Eastern Europe offered a unique 
chance of gaining a better understanding of social change, of its prerequisites as well as its 
unfolding and ensuing results. Consequently, these last few years have seen a rapidly growing 
volume of publications discussing the results of various transition oriented research 
endeavors. And still the process of rapid change is far from over, it might even go on for 
decades yet. This should caution us that all results of “transition research” produced to this 
day must in fact be regarded as highly preliminary. Much of what might seem to be solid 
knowledge today regarding the transition phenomena may actually have to be radically 
reconsidered in the light of future events and analyses.  
This is the rather distressing context in which we now have to frame some issues that seem 
highly relevant given our (preliminary) approach to the study of Russian regional forest sector 
institutions. The topic of this paper is highly dependent upon the results of previous research 
conducted with the purpose of identifying the most serious institutional problems hampering 
the development of the regional forest sector in the emerging Russian market economy. A 
brief outline of this research is thus necessary.  
1.2 Previous Research 
In a four-year study of the rules governing actors’ behavior in the forest sector of eight 
Russian regions it was found that, despite the quite varying prerequisites in the respective 
regions in terms of raw materials, climatic conditions, economic structure, etc., very similar 
institutional problems hampered the development of their respective forest sector operations 
(cf. Carlsson et al., 2001).1 The design of the study was informed by the so-called 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Professor Elinor 
Ostrom and her colleagues (cf., for instance, Ostrom, 2005). The study focused on the “timber 
procurement arena” in the eight regions and, in accordance with the IAD framework, 
emphasis was laid on an analysis of the characteristics of the resource, the society and the 
rules-in-use (or institutions) governing actors’ behavior in the forest sector. Interviews with 
representatives (mostly CEOs) of 25–35 forest enterprises in each of the eight regions were 
also made in the course of the study. The interviews captured company management’s 
attitudes to enterprise restructuring to become better able to meet the demands raised by the 
emerging Russian market economy.  
It turned out that the behavior displayed by many of the forest enterprises in the eight studied 
regions largely conformed to what could be anticipated on the basis of the virtual economy 
theory launched and popularized in the late 1990s by the American scholars Clifford G. 
                                                 
1
 The study “Institutions and the Emergence of Markets―Transition in the Russian Forest Sector” was mainly 
conducted in the period 1997–2001 by a small team of researchers at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. The results of the study were published in a series of IIASA Interim 
Reports and various journal articles. (See http://www.didaktekon.se/mats/ii-publ.htm for a complete listing of 
publications from the study.) Information about IIASA can be obtained from the institute’s website at 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at. 
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Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes (cf., for instance, Gaddy and Ickes, 2002). This is a theory 
explaining why it has been so difficult to make Russian enterprises modify their behavior to 
better suit the demands of the emerging market economy.2 A largely outmoded production 
capital and a serious lack of market economic competence were the main ingredients of the 
legacy of the Soviet era that the system change in Russia was supposed to overcome. The 
problems were of a magnitude that threatened many (if not most) Russian enterprises with 
bankruptcy if they were suddenly forced to cover their factor costs by product sales at prices 
established on truly competitive markets. The situation that emerged in Russia as a 
consequence of the far-reaching economic reforms that were mainly introduced in the first 
half of the 1990s―the privatization of state owned enterprises being perhaps the most 
important individual measure taken―did not entirely correspond with the outcome expected 
by the reformers. A large share of the newly privatized enterprises chose to withdraw from 
market based exchange and revert to barter trade at negotiated prices. Their behavior also 
displayed a number of other characteristics that would seem odd in a market context, such as 
seeking to obtain privileges from public authorities (like tax exemption or so-called tax 
offsets) rather than making investments in modern technology and competence to improve 
their competitive capacity. With large numbers of enterprises adopting a similar behavior, a 
special enclave―a virtual economy with its very specific institutions―was established in the 
emerging Russian market system. More about this will be said below.  
1.3 Objectives and Approach 
The data on which the previous IIASA study was based were mainly compiled during 1998–
1999. There is evidence (see, e.g., Hanson, 2002, 2003a; Gaddy and Ickes, 2001, 2005) 
indicating that many of the characteristic traits of the virtual economy survived the 1998 
financial crisis (when the devaluation of the ruble improved the conditions for domestic 
production) and that it is too early to dismiss the influence that this large special enclave has 
on Russia’s economic performance. On the other hand, there is also some evidence (see, e.g., 
Hanson, 2003a; Åslund and Jenish, 2006) indicating that developments in Russia these last 6–
7 years have opened up opportunities and created positive incentives for many enterprises to 
move over from operating in the virtual economy to face the competition from firms operating 
in the emerging Russian market economy. Given the opportunity, it was therefore decided to 
go back to (a selection of) the enterprises that took part in the survey performed in the 
previous case study of institutional problems hampering developments in the Arkhangelsk 
forest sector (reported in Carlsson et al., 1999) in order to obtain information that would allow 
an analysis of the current behavior and performance of the regional forest enterprises.  
The purpose of this report is to assess the degree to which actors’ behavior in the Arkhangelsk 
forest sector is still guided by the specific institutional set-up that characterizes the virtual 
economy. It is hypothesized that, since the end of the 1990s, forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk 
Oblast tend to leave the virtual economy and increasingly act in accordance with rules 
governing business behavior in a market economy. If the current tendency can be maintained, 
this would in fact mean that the Russian virtual economy will eventually vanish.  
                                                 
2
 If indeed the emerging system can be characterized as a market economy. Ericson (2002), for instance, points 
to a number of factors affecting economic behavior in Russia that are badly adapted to the needs of a normally 
functioning market economy. In fact, Ericson (2000; 2002) argues that Russia under Yeltsin was actually 
“feudal” in character rather than based on institutions governing market behavior.  
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The assessment is based on a review of recent studies of the on-going institutional change 
process in Russia and, in particular, the effects of these changes on the regional forest sector. 
In addition to the information obtained through recent studies, the assessment will also use 
indicators describing the development of several structural features of the economy as well as 
indicators describing the behavior of economic actors (enterprises and managers). Structural 
changes in the economy are important in that they condition the behavior of economic actors. 
Thus, such changes might either facilitate or impede enterprises’ efforts to improve their 
market efficiency.3 
To the degree possible, the changes depicted through these indicators of economic structure 
and the behavior of economic actors will be specified for three levels of aggregation, the 
national, the regional and the enterprise level. The indicators will be constructed on the basis 
of data obtainable in official statistical sources as well as through a recent survey among 
managers of fifteen forest sector enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast.  
More about the selection of indicators to be used in the assessment of the development of the 
Russian virtual economy will be said in Section 3. But first it is necessary to give an overview 
of the characteristics of the virtual economy, as conceived by Gaddy and Ickes (2002) and 
interpreted in our previous studies. Subsequent sections of the report are devoted to a review 
of official data depicting the development of the specific aspects of the Russian transition 
described through the selected indicators (Section 4) and an analysis of the data obtained 
through the two surveys of fifteen forest sector enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast (Section 5). 
Finally (in Section 6), based on the review of the selected indicators and the results of the 
analysis of the enterprise survey, an assessment is attempted of the recent development of the 
Russian virtual economy. The section ends with some tentative conclusions and policy 
implications.  
2 Main Characteristics of the Virtual Economy 
In a series of articles and research memoranda mainly issued between 1998 and 2001, the two 
American scholars Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes launched a theory explaining the 
failure of Russian enterprises to restructure their activities to become market viable. Gaddy 
and Ickes eventually summarized their theory in a book called Russia’s Virtual Economy 
published in 2002.4 In one of their first articles on the subject (1998b)5 the authors listed a 
number of observable features of the Russian economy that would be considered quite 
abnormal should they be encountered in a well-developed market economy. Several of these 
features will be further discussed below. Gaddy and Ickes have been credited for labeling the 
peculiar kind of economic system found in the new Russia the “virtual economy.” However, 
their inspiration came from the conclusions of a Russian government commission (the so-
                                                 
3
 In the longer term the opposite is also true of course; actors’ behavior can modify the economic structure. 
These change processes are in fact interdependent, with the purpose to increase the functional compatibility 
between the economic structure and the behavior of economic actors. 
4
 However, the book was preceded by a number of papers and research memoranda by the same authors (cf., for 
instance, Gaddy and Ickes (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2001) and other authors discussing their 
theory (see, e.g., Phillips, 1999; Åslund, 1999; Ericson 1999; Slay, 1999; Chang, 1999; Tompson, 1999; 
Woodruff, 1999; Gaddy et al., 2000; Carlsson et al., 2001). 
5
 Gaddy and Ickes’ unpublished article “Beyond a Bailout” (June 1998) is used here. A slightly edited version of 
this article appeared in the September/October 1998 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs (Vol. 77, Issue 5).  
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called Karpov commission), where the functioning of the economy was characterized in the 
following way (as citied in Gaddy and Ickes, 1998b:36):  
An economy is emerging where prices are charged which no one pays in cash; where no one pays 
anything on time; where huge mutual debts are created that also can’t be paid off in reasonable periods 
of time; where wages are declared and not paid; and so on. […] [This creates] illusory, or virtual 
earnings, which in turn lead to unpaid, or virtual fiscal obligations, [with business conducted at] 
nonmarket, or virtual prices.  
In two often cited paragraphs, Gaddy and Ickes (1998b:1) state their main conclusion 
concerning the emerging Russian economic system right at the outset of their article:  
In fact, most of the Russian economy has not been making progress toward the market, nor even 
marking time. It is actively moving away from the market. Over the past six years of “radical reform,” 
Russian companies, especially those in the core manufacturing sectors, have indeed changed the way 
they operate. Only, they have not done so in order to join the market but rather to protect themselves 
against it. What has emerged in Russia is something that arguably qualifies as a new type of economic 
system with its own rules of behavior and criteria for success and failure.  
We call the new system Russia’s “Virtual Economy,” because it is based on illusion, or pretense, about 
almost every important parameter of the economy: prices, sales, wages, taxes, and budgets. At its heart 
is the ultimate pretense that the Russian economy is larger than it really is. It is this pretense that 
allows for larger government, and larger expenditures, than Russia can afford. It is the cause of the 
web of non-payments and fiscal crisis from which Russia seemingly cannot emerge.  
The authors also distinguish what they see as the fundamental cause of the Russian Virtual 
Economy (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998b:3): 
The roots of the Virtual Economy lay in the largely unreformed industrial sector inherited from the 
Soviet period. At the heart of the phenomenon are the large number of enterprises that still produce 
goods but destroy value. This is a sector of the economy that has survived six years of market reform. 
The reasons are complex, but the most important is that in Russia today enterprises can operate without 
paying their bills. This is possible because value is redistributed to them from other sectors of the 
economy. One way this is done is through tax arrears, which are in effect the continuation of budget 
subsidies in a different form. More important, however, is direct redistribution of value to value-
subtractors from the value-producing sectors of the economy, primarily the resources sector.  
The theory seeks to explain how so many inefficient old Soviet firms have managed to 
survive privatization and avoid subsequent reform measures designed to stimulate enterprise 
restructuring. In a way it seems that the Soviet command economy was never really properly 
dismantled―somehow many Soviet enterprises with their old leaders managed to survive the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union without significantly changing their behavior.  
The rapid privatization of state enterprises, which was mainly achieved in the first half of the 
1990s, could perhaps be seen as a revolutionary change―a great historical discontinuity―in 
that it immediately removed formal ownership of the means of production from the hands of 
the state. On the other hand, state control over the use of these means of production had 
largely vanished already long before that.7 In reality, central economic planning hardly 
                                                 
6
 Gaddy and Ickes give the source of the citation as “Report of the Inter-Agency Balance-Sheet Commission, 
P.A. Karpov, Chairman, Moscow, December 1997”.  
7
 Desai and Goldberg (2000) note that property rights over enterprises had already been allocated de facto during 
the Soviet era. (See, e.g., Cox (1996) for a more detailed description of how property rights gradually changed 
during the Gorbachev period.) With federal state power weakened regional governments were able to strengthen 
their grip over enterprises: “The regional governments, knowing that the taxable revenue of the firm will have 
been reduced as a result of cash-flow diversion, respond by collecting revenues in kind and enacting policies that 
force firms to maintain employment levels. These regional governments, then, are as “vested” in maintaining the 
status quo as are enterprise insiders, and will willingly shield insiders from takeover attempts, obstruct the 
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functioned at all in the late 1980s (cf., for instance, Braguinsky and Yavlinsky, 2000). Instead 
a parallel “informal” economy had emerged that interacted with the officially recognized 
economy and solved many of its rigidity problems. Thus, the changes in enterprise behavior 
that were introduced as a consequence of the overthrow of the Soviet system were not, after 
all, particularly dramatic. In terms of enterprise managers’ behavior, at least initially, the new 
privatized economy largely meant continued business as usual.  
It is impossible to understand Gaddy and Ickes’ notion of a virtual economy without fully 
appreciating the social and economic consequences of the command economy system that 
ruled Russia for more than 70 years until the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the 
beginning of the 1990s.  
2.1 The Importance of Initial Conditions 
In their writings, Gaddy and Ickes (cf., for instance, the citations at the beginning of this 
section) have emphasized two spectacular consequences of the workings of the virtual 
economy: (a) the impression created by the workings of the system (the “pretense” in the 
parlance of Gaddy and Ickes) that the Russian economy is larger than it actually is, and (b) the 
odd fact that enterprises operating in the Russian virtual economy “produce goods but destroy 
value”. Here we will not look very closely at these issues, since they are not central for our 
present investigation. However, understanding these two issues has one important merit in 
that it emphasizes the importance of initial conditions, i.e., the production structure that had 
emerged as a result of Soviet central economic planning. It is when the virtual economy is 
compared to a functioning market system that the size pretense and value destruction are 
observed to be substantial. This is simply an indication of the degree to which the structure 
and the functioning of the Soviet economy had come to deviate from that of a market system 
after over seventy years of central economic planning.  
By basing all decisions concerning production and investments in society (the issues of what, 
how, and where to produce) on the goals expressed in the long-term economic plans―plans 
that were, furthermore, elaborated in a highly non-transparent and undemocratic way without 
much consideration of supply and demand relations that are of decisive importance for such 
decisions in a market economy―the Soviet Union developed a huge integrated economic 
system with highly interdependent production units dispersed over the country’s large 
territory. Regarded in a market economic perspective, the Soviet system evolved into an 
extremely inefficient production structure characterized by overly large and rigid production 
units often located in remote and climatically harsh areas with prohibitively long distances to 
suppliers as well as final users.8 With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the entire 
economic system with its well-established delivery networks encompassing all fifteen Soviet 
republics suddenly ceased to exist with nothing to take its place.9  
                                                                                                                                                        
enforcement of outsider’s property rights, and perpetuate the enterprise as a source of private benefits for the 
manager, and as a source of social and political benefits for the region” (Desai and Goldberg, 2000:2f.). 
8
 A recent analysis of the post-war development of the Soviet economy has been published by Philip Hanson 
(2003b). The functioning of the Soviet command economy was thoroughly analyzed by the late Alec Nove in 
recurring updates of his book “The Soviet Economic System” (latest edition 1986) 
9
 The significance of this shock has been emphasized by, for instance, Alexander Granberg (2000), a former 
economic advisor to Boris Yeltsin.  
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The economic structure that the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union in 1991 
turned out to be highly inefficient in the new emerging market economic environment (cf. for 
instance, Ericson, 2002). The system was not able to produce what customers demanded and, 
when it did, product quality was often greatly inferior to the imported consumer goods that 
were increasingly becoming available on the Russian market. One could distinguish several 
reasons for this inability to swiftly restructure the system. The specific production orientation 
(what was produced), the location and organization of the often very large enterprises 
inherited from the Soviet Union made it impossible to accomplish a fast reorientation and 
reorganization (restructuring) of production that would be required to avoid bankruptcy, 
should existing enterprises have to expose their products to uninhibited market competition. 
Moving into the virtual economy could be seen as the means for a market inefficient Russian 
enterprise to secure a continued existence in the emerging market economic context. Major 
reorganizations entailing massive labor lay-offs and enterprise close-downs would otherwise 
be an unavoidable consequence of the transition to a market system. Ideally, such a 
development would be part of the “creative destruction” out of which new and more efficient 
production might subsequently emerge.  
As it turned out the rapid restructuring that many (foreign) economic advisors had expected as 
a consequence of the transitional reform measures in Russia did not materialize. Instead a 
kind of self-organizing process intervened, a process whereby enterprises were shielded off 
from being directly exposed to a market competition that would have immediately exposed 
their inefficiency. How could this happen? Why would enterprises want to avoid 
restructuring? Obviously, a successful restructuring would be beneficial for the whole Russian 
economy. Conspiratory explanations assuming malevolent intent on the part of enterprise 
directors are close at hand.  
One merit of Gaddy and Ickes’ virtual economy theory is that it advances a rational 
explanation of this development. Given the circumstances, managers and owners of inefficient 
enterprises display a perfectly rational, if not always a socially optimal, behavior. First of all, 
at the level of the individual, it is not realistic to expect that enterprise managers and owners 
would opt for societal benefits at the expense of the survival of their own companies. Second, 
at the societal/political level, the economic structure inherited from Soviet times provides a 
prominent reason for avoiding company close-downs. Many cities and towns all over Russia 
were established to cater for the needs of the employees of a single large company often 
exploiting a natural resource found in a location where population centers would not 
otherwise have been constructed. These locations were once found to meet many essential 
requirements and the construction of towns and factories was therefore decided by the Soviet 
central planning machinery. In principle, the rationale of such a location could only be 
assessed within the context of the entire Soviet economic system.  
Today, however, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, products are increasingly being 
supplied in competitive markets. There should be no surprise then that economic activities in 
many locations of the inherited production system should prove unprofitable and thereby 
threaten enterprises with immediate bankruptcy should they be exposed to market 
competition. But, and this is the fundamental structural reason for the emergence of the virtual 
economy, under these circumstances bankruptcy and company close-downs were non-feasible 
solutions. In the existing Russian economy such a development would not automatically bring 
about any of the positive effects that might follow from a “creative destruction” taking place 
in a developed capitalist system. Instead, numerous bankruptcies would create massive 
unemployment and in practice ruin the economic foundation of entire communities. In fact, 
 8 
the close-down of a “town-forming” factory would be a veritable catastrophe for the whole 
community and might provoke social unrest of unknown proportions.  
To determine whether the Russian virtual economy is gaining increasing dominance or 
whether it is (slowly) giving way to rules of behavior that are typical of a market economy we 
need to know a bit more about the behavior constituting the system. In the following section 
we ask ourselves how so many Russian enterprises could manage to insulate themselves from 
market competition and how they could maintain this behavior.  
2.2 The Institutional Set-up Defining the Virtual Economy 
The privatization of state owned enterprises in Russia often meant a (more or less legal) take-
over by company managers, in many cases supported by the company’s employees. Such 
insider privatization became widespread because it was de facto favored by the rules 
governing the privatization process (cf., for instance, Boycko et al., 1995). The speed of the 
process contributed to the outcome. We can assume that company managers were aware of 
the unfavorable competitive situation in their firms, but since they already commanded a fair 
share of so-called relational capital―that is, well-established relations with other business 
actors and people in the political-administrative system―and wanted to capitalize on their 
assets, the possibility to do so required them to stay in control of their companies and keep 
them alive for a sufficiently long time to allow either the stripping of their assets or the 
conversion of their activities to make them more market competitive (Gaddy and Ickes, 
2002:57 ff.).  
Since managers, and especially the directors of large “town-forming” enterprises, in practice 
also belonged to the local/regional political-administrative elite, it might perhaps also be 
assumed that their determination to keep their companies alive could be regarded as a 
contribution to the preservation of the local community simply by avoiding for the time being 
the extreme social pressure that would be the unavoidable consequence of company close-
downs.  
By resorting to the specific behavior characterizing the virtual economy company directors 
managed to preserve many Russian enterprises despite their obvious market insufficiency. 
Gaddy and Ickes (2002:65 ff.) have characterized the institutional set-up constituting the 
virtual economy by deducting what they call “Igor’s Rules”. Igor is said to be “the director of 
a large (approximately 10,000 employees) enterprise in the Urals”. Gaddy and Ickes’ 
summary of these by-now famous rules (institutions) that are assumed to govern the behavior 
of company mangers in the Russian virtual economy are worth quoting in full: 
Rule 1: “Sell something to the federal government so you can offset your federal taxes”. 
The point of this rule is to use the federal government’s debt to the enterprise that results from these 
sales as a way to offset the enterprise’s federal tax bill. The smart enterprise manager does not even 
expect to be paid for his government contracts; he counts on the offset possibility. That means, 
however, that it makes little sense to deliver too much to the government. Enterprises following this 
rule are the explanation for the federal government’s collecting only about 60–65 percent of its taxes in 
cash in 1996 and 1997 […]. The rest of the taxes were offsets.  
Rule 2: “Be able to provide some services to the local government so you can offset your local 
taxes”. 
Igor’s reasoning here is similar to rule 1, but applied to regional and local government levels. In fact, 
rule 2 is even more important than rule 1. Local governments are in general more inclined than the 
federal government to accept noncash tax payments. Moreover, since Russia’s central government 
remains constantly behind in its transfers to the regions, the federal government itself can give the 
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green light for an enterprise to deliver goods or services to the local government and be credited for 
payment of federal tax obligations.  
Rule 3: “Produce some goods for barter with the gas and electricity companies”. 
Here, Igor is referring to the “Three Fat Boys”―Gazprom, UES, and the Railways Ministry.  
Rule 4: “Export something to a hard currency market to get cash for essential needs”. 
Although one might infer from rules 1–3 that Igor is suggesting that enterprises can survive entirely 
without cash, this rule acknowledges that every enterprise needs some cash for its operations. Wage 
payments to workers are an obvious example. Another (not mentioned by Igor) is cash for bribes to 
government officials. (Footnote: One way to think of cash bribes, then, is to view them as investments 
in relational capital, r.) 
Igor’s Final Injunction: “Never make a profit!” 
Of course what Igor really means is do not make a profit that can be observed.  
What sort of enterprise can best follow Igor’s Rules? The ideal would be a large, diversified, 
integrated, paternalistic enterprise with good relations with both federal and local authorities. […]  
Not every enterprise is as ideally suited to follow all of Igor’s Rules as Igor himself is. What is 
important, though, is that almost all of them follow some of the rules. Clearly, the extent to which the 
director concentrates on one or two and ignores the others will depend on his initial conditions. 
Enterprises that inherited a relationship with the federal government―as suppliers for a ministry, 
say―will tend to preserve that status. Other enterprises that lack a business relationship with the 
central government will instead nurture their relations with local governments. And so on. [Footnote: 
It should be noted that Igor’s first three rules represent three separate and distinct causes of barter in 
the Russian economy. This suggests an empirical approach to measure the relative importance of 
various causes of barter.] 
The most important implication―and perhaps most disturbing for Russia’s future―is that Igor himself 
(or any other enterprise director who followed something like Igor’s Rules) could produce more 
marketable output, but he does not. He could restructure, but he does not. Why? Because […] cash 
sales and the profits they bring can be costly to the enterprise and its manager. 
By perverting the company’s fiscal relations with the federal, regional and local governments 
in the way indicated in the citation above, and by extensively using barter trade with 
companies in a similar predicament, the typical virtual economy enterprise manages to 
insulate itself from competition with (new) enterprises in the emerging Russian market 
economy.  
The seriously distorted price formation system is the key factor that forced (as well as 
allowed) many Russian enterprises to enter the virtual economy (cf. Tompson, 1999). This 
distortion has its roots in the Soviet resource allocation mechanism, where the geographical 
allocation of investments was decided in accordance with principles governing central 
economic planning. These principles had very little to do with what governs resource 
allocation in market economies. In the Soviet Union, security considerations broadly 
conceived exerted the greatest influence on allocation of resources and, thus, on the 
geographical distribution of production. Over the years Soviet central planning gave rise to an 
industrial location pattern that would seem very odd judged from a market economic 
perspective (Heleniak, 2001). The Soviet economy might be thought of as a gigantic (state 
owned) concern engaged in economic activities all over the country’s vast territory―a 
concern that was, furthermore, expected to provide for the nation’s total needs in terms of 
goods and services and to do this entirely relying on domestic capacities. Defense 
considerations and the need to rely entirely on domestic raw materials supplies forced the 
establishment of many population centers in close proximity to large raw material deposits. 
Such centers were often constructed in very remote and climatically unfavorable areas of the 
country without any regard for development or transportation costs (see, e.g., Round, 2005). 
In this system, decisions about production of goods and services (what to produce, how much 
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and where) as well as output distribution were taken by the planning system with the goal of 
satisfying predetermined socioeconomic development targets. Nominal prices of goods and 
services were determined and successively adjusted (in an ad-hoc manner) by special 
authorities. In principle, given the set targets for all production units in the economy, so-called 
shadow prices reflecting commodity scarcities could be established in the planning process. 
But, since economic plans in the Soviet Union were never really elaborated in a democratic 
fashion, such prices in effect only reflected the preferences of the planners and influential 
members of the Communist Party, who ultimately were the ones who determined planning 
targets. Thus, in comparison with a situation (an ideal market economy), where resource 
allocation is determined by manifested demands of various actors (individuals, households, 
enterprises), the Soviet economy was biased in several important respects:  
• Planning targets did not reflect agents’ real demand for goods and services. (This is 
ultimately a problem of democracy. But even with planning goals elaborated in a 
perfectly functioning democracy central planning would anyway have run into 
problems.) 
• Central planning was also faced with a technical problem. It is basically impossible to 
calculate consistent production and delivery targets for the multitude of products and 
producers that comprise an advanced economy.  
• The intended workings of the Soviet command economy was furthermore seriously 
disturbed by obstruction from practically every citizen in society trying to satisfy 
his/her own personal goals, which often had a detrimental effect on social plan 
fulfillment.  
• With time, the built-in inefficiency of the Soviet command economy tended to grow. 
Due to the investment policy (that did not fully account for all costs, and often 
overemphasized benefits) a production system emerged that was increasingly unable 
to match the economic performance of the surrounding (capitalist) world. A probably 
significant part of this problem was the fact that the Soviet Union had to deploy an 
increasing share of investment and production resources in the defense sector, thereby 
withdrawing investment resources from other sectors of the economy and, hence, 
contributing to a deterioration of living standards.  
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of central economic planning, 
which effectively broke up the old inter-enterprise delivery relations, the prices of all (final as 
well as intermediary) goods and services, and even wages, were suddenly to be established in 
the market through the free interplay of supply and demand. It now became evident how far 
the previous Soviet resource allocation mechanism had moved the economy from market 
equilibrium. In a market perspective, it was immediately obvious that the entire production 
system that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union was severely skewed. If goods and 
services were now to be sold on markets where prices reflected their relative scarcities, a 
totally different profitability pattern would have emerged. Since the costs of many inputs that 
had previously been “hidden” (e.g., through implicit transport subsidies) now had to be 
accounted for in full, and since final demand for certain commodities changed (as a result of 
competition with other commodities) new cost-price relations emerged sometimes making 
previously profitable products entirely unprofitable. Faced with such radically changed cost-
price relations many Russian enterprises resorted to barter trade at negotiated prices bearing 
little or no resemblance to the prices that would have emerged in a normal market setting. 
This is also what has made the accounts of the Russian economy seem larger than they should 
be if market prices were used. It also explains the fact that Russian enterprises operating in the 
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virtual economy can go on producing goods and destroying value, i.e., producing goods that 
would be unprofitable should market prices have been used to evaluate inputs and outputs.  
Thus, in effect, the emergence of the virtual economy could be interpreted as the autonomous 
self-organizing response of the Russian socioeconomic system to a situation that threatened 
the survival of the entire country. Without such a response it is very likely that a large part of 
the Russian production capacity would have crumbled when faced with market profitability 
requirements. Russia’s virtual economy could be seen as an adaptive response ensuring the 
survival (in certain respects) of the disintegrating Soviet economy. It is a response based on 
the specific form of economic planning that had formed the peculiar Soviet production system 
with its specific orientation and location pattern. This means that the virtual economy, as 
outlined by Gaddy and Ickes and others, is not really an independent type of economic 
system. It is rather a specific system emanating in the Russian transition from central 
economic planning to a market based economy.  
2.3 What Determines the Future of the Russian Virtual Economy? 
The virtual economy to a large extent determines business behavior in Russia today, but it is 
essential to note that it is not all-encompassing (Tompson, 1999). After the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, numerous new enterprises have been established in Russia. These 
enterprises were set up to cater for the market demand for various products and services by 
Russian individuals, households and enterprises. Thus, all such enterprises that are in 
operation today have met with, and survived, market competition from their very beginning. It 
is also obvious that the market based enterprise sector is thriving and expanding in Russia (cf. 
Shestoperovyi, 2005; Ahrend and Tompson, 2005) and it operates by offering products and 
services at market set prices―prices that cover production costs and leave a profit for 
enterprise owners. Clearly, transaction costs are considerably lower for enterprises operating 
in the market sector compared to what they are for enterprises operating in the virtual 
economy sector.  
If this description of the Russian development is correct one can imagine several features that 
will eventually make the virtual economy sector diminish and ultimately disappear. In fact, it 
is not any more a question of whether the sector will disappear, but rather of how fast this will 
happen. Changing the behavior of Russian virtual economy enterprises to make it comply 
with, and contribute to, the advancement of the emerging market economic principles is 
fundamentally a question of creating a suitable incentive structure. Incentives are perceived 
opportunities. As such, they are amenable to manipulation by public authorities―in Russia 
ultimately the government and the president. Enterprises’ assessment of their opportunities is 
also dependent upon more “subjective” factors, like management competence, general moral 
views, ideology, opinions about the future, etc. This means that enterprises’ behavior can 
change both as a result of policy measures affecting business opportunities (the incentive 
structure) taken by the political sphere (such as changes in various legislative acts and other 
regulations by government agencies at various levels) and as a consequence of changes in 
management’s interpretation and assessment of current opportunities. These two avenues of 
change are furthermore highly interdependent.  
An enterprise’s investment policy is the crucial factor affecting its future development. 
Whether a virtual economy enterprise is going to become more market competitive or whether 
it is going to stay―and perhaps even improve its position―within the virtual economy is 
largely determined by its choice to favor investments in reducing its “distance to the market” 
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(d) or in “relational capital” (r), that is, investing in modern production equipment and 
competence or in exploring its relations with the political power (Gaddy and Ickes, 2002:65). 
Thus, the question is what determines the owners’ or managers’ decisions to invest in either d 
or r. A decisive factor is, first of all, the enterprises’ initial resource endowments or, in other 
words, where the enterprise is located in the “r–d space.” More precisely, it depends on what 
pay-off structure the individual enterprise faces. For enterprises with a large stock of r it 
might pay off to continue investing in r. For enterprises with a short distance to the market 
(i.e., enterprises having a fairly modern production capital) investments in d might be most 
profitable. 
This means of course that, if the goal is to force Russian enterprises to become viably market 
competitive, such measures have to be taken that support and stimulate investments in d, 
“distance reduction.” Numerous policy measures that could affect enterprises’ investment 
behavior can be envisaged. Previous research has pointed out several areas where public 
intervention might contribute to improving enterprises’ market behavior (cf., for instance, 
Gaddy and Ickes, 2002; 2005; Carlsson et al., 2001). So, for instance, there seems to be a 
wide scope for improving Russian economic policy in the following respects:  
• Market entry and exit should be facilitated (e.g., bankruptcy legislation should be 
improved as well as implementation procedures; support for small business);  
• Public policies facilitating geographical production factor relocation should be 
elaborated and implemented―policies that would gradually correct the suboptimal (in 
a market economic perspective) locational decisions of the Soviet era.  
• Business contract legislation and enforcement could be improved (e.g., the work of 
arbitration courts);  
• Corporate legislation should be improved (the rights of shareholders should be 
secured, obstacles for foreign investments should be removed, accounting principles 
made to conform to international standards); 
• The functioning of banks and the capital market might be improved (more advanced 
financial institutions capable of providing necessary risk capital to businesses and 
securing the investments of the emerging Russian middle class);  
• Taxation system: tax laws should be simplified, the tax code should be consistent and 
transparent, law enforcement should not punish those who run an honest business;  
• The education system might be improved in certain respects (e.g., modern 
management training should be made more widely available). 
It should be noted that the problem is not only to improve the legislation. It is also a matter of 
enforcing existing laws and making economic actors behave in accordance with the 
legislator’s intentions.  
In a recent article Gaddy and Ickes (2005) outline the several existing transparent and non-
transparent routes for redistributing the profits produced in the Russian oil and gas industries 
and argue that the virtual economy will not―and, in fact, cannot―be abandoned until the 
redistribution of these natural resource rents have become entirely transparent. Enterprises 
operating in the virtual economy are partly being sustained through informal rent sharing by 
the large oil and gas producers (that allow some customers to pay lower than world market 
prices for purchased oil and gas). Thus, the oil and gas companies have in effect taken over 
the task previously performed by the state of subsidizing unprofitable enterprises. This way 
such enterprises are not faced with the hard budget constraints that would force them to 
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restructure their activities to become market viable, instead they are allowed a continued 
existence in the virtual economy. The reason for the oil and gas companies to go along with 
this practice is the fact that property rights in Russia are still not sufficiently secure. By 
performing this task they hope to attain a trade-off sparing them even more prominent state 
interference in their activities. The sheer magnitude of the oil and gas industries, their large 
contribution to the entire Russian economy (in 2005 estimated to 25 percent of GDP), brings 
them a power that constitutes a threat to the Russian state. This, in combination with a 
resource extraction ideology largely inherited from Soviet times, seeing rents of natural 
resources as a “gift of nature” to be employed for the benefit of the whole economy, makes 
the state try to maintain a strong influence over the resource sector, which in turn prevents a 
behavior of the resource extractive industries guided by normal market based rules. According 
to this line of reasoning, there cannot be a sustainable market based economic development 
(and abandoning of the virtual economy) in Russia until there has been a thorough 
reorganization of the energy sector (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005:578):  
This would mean a sector open to new entrants, both Russian and foreign. The old and new companies 
would be free to compete (and be subject to the discipline of competition). They would be unburdened 
by the demands of onerous and opaque rent-sharing schemes. They would have secure property rights.  
3 Analyzing Recent Developments of the Virtual 
Economy―Identifying Suitable Indicators 
As noted in the previous section, the origin of the Russian virtual economy lies in the very 
special production structure (in terms of what was produced, how and where) inherited from 
Soviet times. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the emerging market system proved 
this structure to be highly inefficient and unsustainable. Despite the inherent dynamics of the 
emerging market economy and a powerful socioeconomic reform package designed to rapidly 
transform the Soviet command economy into a modern market based system, many features 
of the old system nevertheless survived in the form of the virtual economy, a business 
organizational form that allowed market inefficient enterprises to survive without 
restructuring their operations to become better equipped to meet market competition. It was 
suggested that the virtual economy could be seen as a self-organizing “rescue scheme” 
preserving the Russian economy and the entire society from total collapse.  
If this account of the events is correct, it should also be evident that the restructuring problem 
is of huge dimensions requiring changes in the geographical location of production, in the 
output mix (what goods and services to produce), as well as in the production technology and 
management. It should come as no surprise then that such a profound economic restructuring 
will most likely take a long time to accomplish. In our previous study of the institutional 
transformation of the Russian forest sector (see, for instance, Carlsson et al., 2001) it was 
found that the rules characterizing the virtual economy to a significant extent were governing 
economic behavior in Russia in the late 1990s.  
The remainder of this section will be devoted to a presentation of the method that will be used 
to assess to what extent actors in the Russian economy are still guided by the institutional set-
up constituting the virtual economy.  
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3.1 Methods of Investigation 
Turning now to an analysis of recent developments of the Russian virtual economy, there are 
evidently certain features of the economy and the behavior of economic actors that deserve 
closer attention. First of all, it is necessary to appreciate the fact that economic actors (e.g. 
business enterprises) at any specific moment in time operate in a given and largely fixed 
business environment. This environment is to a significant extent (but not entirely) the result 
of previous behavioral decisions by political as well as economic actors.10 Recognizing the 
relevance of the existing business environment for the current behavior of economic actors 
suggests a distinction between two kinds of indicators, (I) indicators describing changes in the 
business environment (or in the structure of the economic system), and (II) indicators 
describing changes in the behavior of the actors. Here a number of indicators belonging to 
either one of the two kinds will be identified. The indicators will be selected for their ability 
to disclose features of relevance for the assessment of our hypothesis that the virtual economy 
is losing ground and that the rules guiding a normal market economy are increasingly being 
adopted by economic actors in Russia.  
Even if the conceptual distinction between indicators describing changes in the economic 
structure and those that describe the behavior of economic actors can be quite clearly made, it 
is not always easy (or even possible) to unambiguously refer an indicator to one or the other 
category. In principle, a “structural indicator” is one that describes a quality of the economic 
system that the actor has to take as a given when deciding upon future actions. Such an 
indicator restricts the scope of options between which an actor can choose. The actor cannot 
(immediately) influence the value of such a structural indicator. A “behavioral indicator” 
describes the decisions taken by economic actors about future action. In practice, however, 
such indicators rather describe the actual result of behavioral decisions.  
For example, a structural indicator like “available transport capacity” describes existing 
restrictions for the choice of transport mode (and route) available to an economic actor, while 
a behavioral indicator like “volume of goods transported by rail” shows the implementation 
(the result) of actors’ decisions to send goods by rail (rather than by any other available mode 
of transport). The example also illustrates that even if the actor has no possibility to 
immediately affect the value of “available transport capacity” (the structural indicator) he 
could in fact contribute to changing its value in the somewhat longer term and this change 
might obviously affect his subsequent decision to use a particular mode of transport, which 
might eventually be recorded in changed values of “volume of goods transported by rail” (the 
behavioral indicator).  
Finally, it should be mentioned that, while it is in principle possible to distinguish an almost 
unlimited number of indicators of economic structure and behavior, in actual empirical 
research one is forced to use indicators for which it is possible to find a reasonable 
operationalization and for which data are available that can be used to measure something of 
the quality that the indicator is supposed to capture. For practical purposes it is also necessary 
to limit the number of indicators used so that necessary data compilation and analyses can be 
performed within the time and with the effort that available resources allow.  
                                                 
10
 By a political and an economic actor is meant―depending on context and level of analysis―either 
organizations like political parties, enterprises, and households or individual politicians, enterprise managers or 
citizens/voters. 
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In the remainder of this section the indicators selected to be used in the assessment of the 
recent development of the Russian virtual economy are briefly presented, their capacity to 
describe various (limited) aspects of the virtual economy is discussed, and the criteria used to 
assess the meaning of changes described by the respective indicators are stated.  
3.2  Selection of Indicators for the Assessment 
3.2.1 Indicators Depicting Change in the Economic Structure 
People―A Basic Economic Resource. The population of a country or a region―its size and 
age composition―is an indicator describing some fundamental qualities of the environment in 
which economic actors operate. First of all, the population development restrains the 
development of human capital, which is a fundamental production factor in any economy. 
Other characteristics of the population development, such as infant mortality, life expectancy, 
etc., describe qualities that contribute to the standard of living, which broadly conceived is the 
ultimate “goal variable” for the economic activity of a society. Since total population is 
decreasing in a region like Arkhangelsk, due both to changes in demographic variables and 
transitional changes in the economy (Heleniak, 2001), population changes per se cannot tell 
us much about the development of the virtual economy. A decreasing infant mortality and an 
increasing life expectancy, on the other hand, could be interpreted as a result (partially and 
indirectly) of a restructuring of the enterprises improving their economic efficiency.  
Education―Investments in Human Capital. The quality of human capital can be improved 
through education. Investments in education could be seen as an attempt to increase efficiency 
in the economy. Decisions to make investments in education could be taken at the societal 
level (government decisions to provide educational facilities) as well at the 
group/organization level (enterprises and households) or at the level of the individual. All 
these levels are of interest in the present context when we try to assess what is happening to 
the Russian virtual economy. Increased investments in education leading to improved 
workforce competence could be seen as the result of society’s strive to modernize the 
economy, to improve the business environment thus providing better conditions for raising 
enterprises’ economic efficiency.  
Enterprises―Ownership―Entrepreneurship. A prominent feature of the legacy of the 
Soviet command economy was an economic structure with comparatively few (but typically 
large) enterprises, where decisions about production orientation were not issues to be decided 
by the company management in accordance with business criteria. Instead, such issues were 
decided within the planning apparatus with a view to socioeconomic criteria. This system 
produced decisions that more often than not were sub-optimal for individual enterprises. With 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 the principles governing the command 
economy were (formally) abolished. Hereafter company management would take all decisions 
affecting the enterprise’s operations. And enterprises were to compete with one another. To 
secure and increase competition with the purpose of enhancing economic efficiency 
previously existing obstacles for enterprises’ market entry and exit were to be eliminated. As 
a consequence the number of enterprises could be expected to increase significantly. It goes 
without saying that most of this increase would be due to newly established small private 
enterprises.  
An increasing (relative) number of enterprises (mainly new, small, private) could be seen as 
an indicator of a change in the environment of all Russian enterprises sharpening competition 
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thus making the economy more market oriented. Such a development could be seen as a 
structural change favoring market economic behavior.  
Inflation and Demonetization of the Economy. An extremely high inflation rate was a 
characteristic feature of the turmoil that resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. This no doubt contributed to the “barterization” of a large part of the economy. When 
prices skyrocketed and money was a scarce commodity many enterprises sought to avoid 
monetary transactions and resorted instead to barter trade with other enterprises in the same 
predicament. Enterprises’ tendency to delay (or entirely cancel) payments of deliveries and 
wages was another consequence of this situation. This was a typical behavior among 
enterprises operating in the virtual economy. Decreasing inflation rates and a re-monetization 
of the economy could be expected to affect enterprises’ behavior leading to a decrease in the 
share of barter transactions and wage and payment arrears. Thus, here we might see changes 
in structural indicators, like inflation and re-monetization, leading to changes in (causally 
related) behavioral indicators, like barter trade and wage and payment arrears.  
Banks and Credit Supply. Banks mushroomed in the early transition period in Russia (see, 
e.g., Bernstam and Sitnikov, 2001). But the main activity of these banks was not to provide 
risk capital for enterprises’ investments. Conditions for borrowing in the banks were entirely 
prohibitive with astronomically high interest rates. Banks in the early transition were rather 
engaged in financial speculations to generate maximum short-term profits for their owners. A 
change in banks’ behavior making them more interested in supplying risk capital to finance 
enterprises’ investments would be a sign of a structural change in the Russian economy 
making it more conducive to a market oriented behavior on the part of Russian enterprises.  
3.2.2 Indicators Depicting Change in the Behavior of Economic Actors  
Output and Capacity Utilization. An unexpectedly deep and long production slump 
characterized developments in Russia during the years following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Presumably the slump had to do with the sudden disruption of the 
delivery relations that had existed among enterprises during Soviet times (Granberg, 2000). 
The output volumes of enterprises’ production could be expected to recover as soon as they 
could reestablish relations to input suppliers and customers. At the aggregate level (for Russia 
at large and for the regions) increased production volumes would indicate a behavior typical 
for a prosperous market economy. Increased capacity utilization would mean the same. For 
individual enterprises, however, an increased production does not per se allow the conclusion 
that the company is operating in accordance with market economic principles. Without further 
information there is nothing telling us that such a company is not producing more of an 
unprofitable product or, in the parlance of Gaddy and Ickes, that the company is not actually 
destroying value in the production of this commodity.  
Investments. Investments are a characteristic feature of a well-functioning market economy. 
An enterprise operating in such an economy is forced to make investments in new (efficiency 
increasing) capital in order to maintain and improve its competitive position on the markets 
for its products. Competing enterprises (making investments) will otherwise win increasing 
market shares at the expense of enterprises that do not invest. Enterprises operating in the 
Russian virtual economy did not necessarily make investments in new capital equipment. The 
decisive reason for this behavior was the fact that enterprises were not able to finance 
purchases of new technology since banks did not provide risk capital at affordable costs. In 
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addition, incentives to make investments were also low (or entirely absent) due to the fact that 
investments were actually not required for survival in the virtual economy.  
Data showing that enterprises actually make capital investments and that they are able to 
finance those investments through bank credits would be a sign that the economy is 
increasingly functioning in accordance with market economic principles. 
Employment, income, and productivity. Enterprise managers’ decisions to recruit new or 
dismiss existing employees cannot per se tell us anything with certainty about the 
development of the virtual economy. As outlined above, an enterprise operating according to 
the rules-in-use characterizing the virtual economy might keep (or even increase) its 
workforce despite a deteriorating demand for its products, a behavior that would be highly 
irrational in a normal market economy. Changes in employment (and unemployment), 
therefore, have to be assessed in conjunction with changes in productivity and production 
volumes. Increased employment (decreased unemployment) combined with increased 
productivity and output volumes could be seen as an indication of a behavior compatible with 
that of an enterprise operating according to market economic principles.  
In a properly functioning market economy, where the fundamental driving force is the strive 
to maximize profits, an enterprise operating with decreasing labor productivity (increasing 
value of labor per unit of output) would soon be forced either to close down or to restructure 
its activity with the purpose of increasing its productivity. In the first half of the 1990s, when 
production volumes tended to decrease, it was not uncommon that enterprises nevertheless 
kept their workforce or did not reduce it sufficiently to maintain its productivity. This 
behavior was possible for an enterprise operating in the virtual economy. Looking at the 
productivity development in conjunction with the development of production and 
employment will tell us whether or not enterprises are still operating in the virtual economy or 
if they are rather living by the rules characterizing a market economy.  
Barter trade, wage and payment arrears. Enterprises operating in the virtual economy tend to 
refrain from monetary transactions and instead rely on barter trade. The share of all 
transactions between enterprises based on barter increased steadily during the early phase of 
transition, eventually reaching a level of 80–90 percent, according to one “pessimistic” 
estimate (see Makarov and Kleiner, 2000). It should be noted, however, that use of barter is 
not the only―or even the most important―criterion for whether or not an enterprise operates 
in the virtual economy. Another typical behavior of enterprises operating in the virtual 
economy was the tendency to delay their payments of production inputs, both labor (wages) 
and intermediary products. Data showing a decreased use of barter trade and shorter wage and 
payment arrears among the Russian enterprises would indicate that the economy is adapting to 
a market oriented behavior.  
Bankruptcies. A profound economic transformation like that currently taking place in Russia, 
changing from a system where market entry and exit as well as resource allocation were 
decided in the planning hierarchy to a system where these issues are all decided by the actors 
themselves interacting in the market, will, not surprisingly, have to cope with a certain 
“friction” before the new system attains a smooth operation. Through the introduction of 
market principles to guide the operation of Russian enterprises so-called hard budget 
constraints will increasingly be enforced making it impossible for unprofitable enterprises to 
continue without either (if the opportunity is given) restructuring their operation to become 
market efficient or taking the ultimate consequence of its insolvency by going bankrupt. The 
virtual economy offered an opportunity for insolvent enterprises to avoid bankruptcy. 
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Consequently, initially during transition, bankruptcies were not occurring as frequently as 
observers had expected. Given a well-functioning bankruptcy institution an increase in the 
frequency of bankruptcies could be interpreted as a sign that enterprises are leaving the virtual 
economy and are increasingly facing the consequences of their insolvency in the manner 
required by the rules governing a market economy.  
The Gaddy-Ickes Index―a Comprehensive Indicator of Enterprises’ Investment Behavior. 
At the enterprise level we can also compare estimates of the so-called Gaddy-Ickes Index (cf. 
Carlsson et al., 2001) calculated for 15 forest sector enterprises in Arkhangelsk. The index is 
calculated on the basis of the answers to 20 questions posed to the representatives of 15 forest 
enterprises in 1998 and in 2005. The questions are supposed to capture the propensity of 
enterprise management to invest in modern production capital vs. so-called relational capital. 
The former type of investment (typically investments in modern production technology) seeks 
to improve the market competitive position of the enterprise, to reduce its “distance to the 
market” (d). Investments in relational capital (r) refer to management’s efforts at cultivating 
relations with people in public administration in order to extract future benefits for the 
company.  
3.3 A Note on Data Collection and Quality 
In 1998, IIASA made a survey among a total of 221 forest enterprise representatives (mostly 
CEOs) in eight Russian regions. Seven years later, in the spring of 2005, new interviews were 
made with representatives of 15 of the 25 forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk that took part in 
our 1998 survey.11 To allow comparison over time the same questionnaire form was used for 
the 2005 interviews as in the previous survey of 1998. Some new questions were added with 
the purpose of providing additional information about the development of the Russian virtual 
economy.  
In our previous study we did not find any significant regional differences in the degree to 
which business behavior was guided by the specific rules-in-use constituting the Russian 
virtual economy (cf. Carlsson et al., 2001) and we could therefore regard the information 
gained through the new Arkhangelsk survey as indicative (at least to some extent) of the 
situation in the country at large. And, conversely, information about developments in the 
Russian economy reflecting the pervasiveness of the rules-in-use characterizing the virtual 
economy should allow us to expect a similar situation to prevail in the Arkhangelsk region.  
The database describing the situation in the Arkhangelsk forest sector and the behavior and 
opinions of its actors consists of an encoding of the answers to the questions in both the 1998 
and the 2005 surveys. Most of the variables found in the database describe the situation for 
the 15 respondents (enterprises) in these two years. The questions used in the 1998 survey 
also provided information about some aspects of the situation in 1988 and 1993. All in all, the 
new dataset contains 210 variables describing (a) some basic facts (like size, type of 
company, production profile, ownership, social commitments, etc.) for each of the 15 
surveyed enterprises, (b) some aspects of the enterprises’ input (purchases) and (c) output 
(sales) situation, as well as (d) some institutional factors restraining managers’ behavior.  
                                                 
11
 More details about the selection of these 15 enterprises is given in Section 5. 
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In addition to the data generated through the two surveys of fifteen forest enterprises in 
Arkhangelsk other official statistical data have been used in the operationalization and 
measurement of the selected indicators described above.12  
It is now time to turn to an account of the operationalization of our selected indicators and an 
assessment of the changes in economic structure and behavior that these indicators describe.  
4 The Russian Virtual Economy―Recent Development Trends 
In general, our previous research concerning the institutional changes in the Russian forest 
sector showed that the behavior displayed by Russian forest enterprises was largely 
conforming to what the theory of the virtual economy predicted (cf. Carlsson et al., 1999; 
2001).  
In this section an assessment will be made of the recent development of the Russian virtual 
economy. Specifically, an attempt will be made to refute the hypothesis stated initially that, 
since the end of the 1990s, forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast tend to leave the virtual 
economy and increasingly act in accordance with rules governing business behavior in a 
market economy. While the focus in this paper is on the behavior of enterprises in the 
Arkhangelsk forest sector, information about the situation in the Russian economy at large 
and in other sectors of the Arkhangelsk economy will also be briefly analyzed. 
The assessment will be made on the basis of an analysis of the indicators describing different 
aspects of the economic structure and the behavior of economic actors that were selected in 
the previous section. Such an analysis entails an operationalization of the selected indicators 
resulting in numerical variables describing (limited aspects of) the quality of what the 
indicator is designed to capture. Tendencies that can be distinguished in the compiled data for 
the period 1990 through 2005 (or as close to 2005 as data is available) will then be analyzed. 
Before looking closer at the selected indicators it might be useful with a brief overview of the 
place of the Arkhangelsk forest sector in the regional economy and in the Russian economy at 
large.  
4.1 The Arkhangelsk Forest Sector in the Regional and National Economy 
The territory of Arkhangelsk Oblast is almost as large as that of France. Despite its 
considerable size it only accounts for 3.4 percent of the total Russian territory and it houses 
about one percent of the total Russian population. The region’s contribution to the national 
Russian economy is comparatively small. At the beginning of the 2000s it accounted for 0.9 
                                                 
12
 Much has been said about the quality of Russian official statistical data. An initiated short discussion about the 
reliability of Russian official statistics can be found in Ericson (2002). While it is true that official statistics still 
misrepresents Russian economic reality, it nevertheless seems clear that data (and especially the processing of 
data) have been gradually improving in the years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Anyway, the 
official Russian statistical data is what is available and commonly used for the description of Russian economic 
development. (Furthermore, these data are often the basis for western statistical compilations describing the 
development of the Russian economy.) But, of course, one should be aware that the picture of Russian economic 
development that emerges from analyses of official Russian statistical data might be (and probably is) biased to a 
certain―and sometimes even significant―extent. One can only hope that future improvements of the Russian 
system of official statistics will eventually make the picture more accurate.  
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percent of Russia’s GDP and industrial production, and it held 1.2 percent of the country’s 
total production capital. Its share of Russia’s total capital investments and exports was 1.1 and 
0.7 percent, respectively.  
In terms of economic structure the Arkhangelsk economy differs markedly from the Russian 
average. So, for instance, according to official statistical data for 2003, industry in 
Arkhangelsk accounts for close to 40 percent of GRP (Gross Regional Product), while the 
corresponding share for Russia is slightly below 30 percent. Agriculture and trade, which 
respectively accounted for 5.6 and 20 percent of the Russian Gross Domestic Product, only 
contributed about 2 and 12 percent respectively to the Arkhangelsk GRP. On the other hand, 
Construction and Transport contributed somewhat larger shares to the regional gross product 
than they do for Russia at large.  
If we look at the structure of industrial production we also find significant differences 
between the situation in Arkhangelsk and that of the Russian Federation. The most pertinent 
difference is the huge size of the Arkhangelsk forest industry compared to Russia. Wood, 
Woodworking and Pulp and Paper account for nearly half (44.5%) of total industrial 
production in the region, while the corresponding share for the entire country is barely 5 
percent (cf. Figure 1). In terms of employment the Arkhangelsk forest sector accounts for 42 
percent of total industrial employment. The corresponding share for the country at large is 
around 6 percent.13  
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Figure 1: The contribution of various industrial branches to total industrial production in 
Arkhangelsk and the Russian Federation in 2002. Percent. Source: Calculation 
based on data from Goskomstat Rossii (2004).  
                                                 
13
 Data on total number of industrial workers (in 2004) from Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/ 
brus05/IssWWW.exe/Stg/06-03.htm) and number of workers in the forest industrial complex (as of 2005) from 
Minpromenergo (2005). 
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As could be expected, the large forest industry in Arkhangelsk Oblast contributes significantly 
to the forest industrial production of the Russian Federation. For instance, in the year 2002, 
the region contributed a third of the total Russian production of pulp, close to a third (27.8%) 
of the production of cardboard, about 10 percent respectively of the country’s production of 
commercial wood and lumber. Its share of the total production of paper and plywood was 
more modest, 9 and 3.6 percent, respectively.  
Looking at the internal structure of the Arkhangelsk forest industry we find, not unexpectedly, 
that the production of pulp and paper accounts for almost a third (27.8% in 2002) of the total 
regional forest industrial production. Harvesting accounted for 5.6 percent and woodworking 
for slightly more than 11 percent. (Sawmilling alone contributed over 85 percent of total 
woodworking.)  
The Russian forest sector still only makes a small contribution (around 4 percent) to the total 
Russian export value. However, about a tenth of the total forest sector exports from Russia 
originate from Arkhangelsk. Only Irkutsk Oblast contributes more (close to 20 percent) to 
total Russian exports of forest commodities. In terms of its share of total regional exports the 
Arkhangelsk forest sector is extremely important contributing around 75 percent to the total 
regional export value.14 The large export share is another indicator of the importance of the 
forest sector for the regional economy. 
4.2 Structural Indicators 
4.2.1 People―A Basic Economic Resource 
Arkhangelsk Oblast belongs to a group of 13 of the 89 Russian regions (or Subjects of the 
Federation) that lost 15 percent or more of their respective populations between 1990 and 
2005. Three other regions in Russia’s north-west (the Komi Republic, the Nenets 
Autonomous District, and Murmansk Oblast) also belong to this group.15  
Looking at official data for 1990–2005 describing the development of demographic variables, 
like working age population, natural population growth (births and deaths), life expectancy 
and infant mortality, we cannot find much evidence that the population structure has changed 
in a direction that is favorable for the business environment. The situation is similar in both 
Arkhangelsk and the country at large. In Russia, the working age population increased slightly 
both in absolute and relative terms (percent of total population). In Arkhangelsk, however, the 
size of the working age population tends to decrease. (Due to the rapid total population 
decrease the relative size of the working population has, however, increased.) Natural 
population growth, life expectancy and infant mortality, which are demographic variables that 
are ultimately dependent upon general economic development, present a rather gloomy 
picture. The natural population growth (net population increase excluding migration) has been 
negative during the whole period both in Arkhangelsk and Russia at large, the decrease has 
become somewhat smaller after the year 2000, but it is still quite sizeable (-6.3 and -5.6 per 
                                                 
14
 Sources for the export data are: Goskomstat Rossii (2004); Arkhangelsk Oblast Administration, data on 
foreign trade retrieved on 14 February 2006, from http://www.arkhadm.gov.ru/economy/foreign.asp; data on the 
commodity structure of exports and imports 2003 and 2004 retrieved on 14 February  2006, from Rosstat at 
http://www.gks.ru/ bgd/regl/brus05/IssWWW.exe/Stg/25-04.htm, and Minpromenergo (2005).  
15
 Six of the remaining nine regions are to be found in Russia’s Far East, three of which―the Koriakski Aut. 
Okrug, Magadan Oblast and Chukotka―lost 40 percent or more of their respective populations. 
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1,000 inhabitants, respectively). Life expectancy (both male and female), which was 
comparatively low already at the beginning of the period, has continued to decrease. In 2003, 
a boy born in Arkhangelsk might on average expect to live until he barely reaches the age of 
56, a girl until she is about 70 years old. (Figures for Russia were somewhat higher―58.9 and 
72.3, respectively). Infant mortality is the only indicator for which values have been 
improving somewhat during the observed period. But numbers are still quite high. In 2003, 
according to official statistics, 12.4 babies per 1,000 live births died within their first year of 
life in Arkhangelsk, the corresponding figure for Russia at large is 11.6.  
Comparing these figures for Russia and Arkhangelsk with corresponding numbers for a well-
developed west European country like Sweden indicates the large scope for improvements 
that still exists, improvements that a positive economic development should ultimately be able 
to achieve. In 2005, male life expectancy in Sweden was 78.4 years―female 82.8. In 1996 
infant mortality was 3.8.16  
4.2.2 Education―Investments in Human Capital 
Education improves the quality of human capital, and exerts a positive influence on the 
behavior of all actors in the economic system. Changes in the performance of the educational 
system should thus be indicative of the potential for economic development. Here we take the 
education level in a region to reflect a potential resource for economic efficiency 
improvements and economic structural change. Higher general and professional education is 
of special importance in this respect.  
The share of the total population with a higher professional education can be seen as an 
important indicator of the quality of the human capital. In 1989, not long before the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, there were 44 specialists with higher education per 1,000 
inhabitants in Arkhangelsk Oblast. The corresponding number for the country as a whole was 
56. By the year 2000, these shares had increased to 93 and 94, respectively. Arkhangelsk had 
improved its position significantly in relation to the national average (and also relative to the 
neighboring regions Murmansk and Karelia). However, according to an estimate for 2002, the 
share for Arkhangelsk was down to 76 specialists per 1,000 inhabitants, while the 
corresponding country average was 103. Presumably the decrease in the relative number of 
specialists in Arkhangelsk has to do with the increased out-migration from the region.  
Looking at two other indicators―the relative number of students engaged in higher education 
and the relative number of students graduating each year from higher educational 
institutions―it is obvious that Arkhangelsk Oblast has been making substantial investments 
in human capital. Especially after 1995, the region has displayed a fast increase in the relative 
number of students, starting from a low level in 1990 when there were 92 students per 10,000 
inhabitants―the average for the country was 190. In 1995, the numbers had changed only 
moderately (to 105 vs. 179). However, by 2000, the share of students had increased 
significantly (to 208 vs. 294), reaching 330 (407) by 2004.17 Thus, since 1995, the share of the 
                                                 
16
 For 2003, the respective figures were 77.9, 80.2 and 3.1, according to OECD statistics. 
17
 The data presented here were obtained from Statistics of Russian Education, a website created in 2002 as part 
of the Federal Program for the development of education. The compilations of data obtainable from this site (at 
http://stat.edu.ru/) is said to be based on information from Rosstat, the Ministry of Education and Science, a large 
volume of socioeconomic and demographic information characterizing the functioning and development of the 
educational systems at the regional and national levels, as well as on data and results of special statistical 
investigations.  
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total population of Arkhangelsk Oblast engaged in higher education has increased more than 
threefold.  
While the share of students engaged in higher education in a sense reflects the size of 
investments made in human capital, the relative number of students graduating from higher 
educational institutions might be said to reflect the result of these investments. The number of 
students graduating from higher education can be seen as an indicator of the yearly addition to 
workforce competence. The pictures we get looking at these data is similar but with an even 
more marked tendency compared to that of students engaged in higher education (see Figure 
2).  
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Figure 2:  Yearly additions to workforce competence. Yearly number of specialists 
graduating from state higher educational institutions, 1990–2004.  Source: Russia 
in Figures (2003); Statistics of Russian Education.  
The growth in the number of students per 10,000 inhabitants graduating from higher 
educational institutions was especially large in Arkhangelsk after 2000 with a yearly growth 
rate of close to 21 percent (the growth rate for the country at large was 12.5 percent). In the 
period since 1990, Arkhangelsk significantly improved the value of this indicator relative to 
the Russian average, from a level slightly below half at the start of the period to over 80 
percent of the country average by 2004.  
Transition gradually introduced a radically different incentive structure into the Russian 
economy. The goal of enterprises’ production activity was no longer to satisfy planning 
targets, but rather to realize profits for the new owners. While engineering skills previously 
were most essential for enterprise managers, modern business management skills could now 
be expected to be an increasingly required quality of managers, something that potentially 
could decide if their companies would be able to survive in the emerging market environment. 
This new situation created a demand for more and better education in business administration. 
Available data on course enrollment and graduations show that the share of the total number 
of students in higher education engaged in (and graduating from) the study of courses 
belonging to the discipline “Economics and Management” increased significantly between 
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1998 and 2003.18 In 1998, 12.8 percent of students in higher education studied economics and 
management―in 2003 the share had increased to 22.2 percent. (Corresponding numbers for 
the country at large were 20.4 and 26 percent for the respective years.)  
Previous research (see, e.g., Olsson, 2006) has shown that actors in the Russian forest sector 
are dissatisfied with the inadequate supply of qualified personnel for operating modern forest 
machines, etc. Despite this unsatisfied demand from forest enterprises for people with forest 
related education, data indicate that the share of all students in higher education engaged in 
the study of forest related topics19 was low and even decreasing between 1998 and 2003. (In 
Arkhangelsk the share decreased from slightly over 10 to less than 8 percent in the period 
indicated.) This decreasing interest in forest related education might reflect the unfavorable 
conditions meeting forest professionals in the labor market, the most important feature of 
which is the comparatively low wage level.  
4.2.3 Enterprises―Ownership―Entrepreneurship 
Enterprise structure.  The Soviet economy had produced an enterprise structure characterized 
by a relatively small number, but mostly very large production units, whose activities were 
locked into highly inflexible delivery networks. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
this structure underwent a rapid transformation. The number of enterprises in Russia has 
increased dramatically after 1990, indicating that entry barriers are being dismantled. In 
Arkhangelsk, the number of enterprises increased from slightly over 3,000 in 1990 to close to 
23,000 in 2004 (which is a 7.6 fold increase). For Russia, the number of enterprises increased 
more than 13 times, from close to 290 thousand to 3.8 million in the same period. In relative 
terms for Arkhangelsk this meant increases from less than five enterprises per 1,000 
inhabitants in working age in 1990 to slightly over 23 in 2002. (In 1990, the level for Russia 
at large was very similar to that of Arkhangelsk but by 2002 the share had increased to 
43.5.)20   
Privatization and new enterprises. A number of public reform measures have been 
implemented during the transition period in Russia. While the combined result of these 
measures was not able to prevent the establishment of the virtual economy in the early 1990s, 
it should, however, be noted that some of the reforms produced a number of positive effects 
stimulating the subsequent emergence of a growing segment of the Russian economy 
operating according to market economic principles. Thus, for instance, the privatization of 
state enterprises was an intensive process that deeply affected Russian society, converting an 
economy that had long been entirely dominated by state ownership into a system basically 
characterized by private ownership.21 True, in the process, several original goals of the 
                                                 
18
 Data were retrieved (on 25 February 2006) from Statistics of Russian Education, a web portal available on the 
Internet at http://www.edu.ru/. 
19
 The total percentage referred to here was calculated as the sum of all students (and graduates) of the sub-
disciplines constituting “260000-Reproduction and Processing of Forest Resources” as it is labeled in official 
Russian statistics (the source of the data is stated in the previous footnote), as well as the following sub-
disciplines “170400-Machines and Equipment for the Forest Complex”, “553700-“Technology and Equipment 
for Forest Harvesting and Processing”, and “560900-Forestry”. 
20
 Still, these are comparatively low numbers. In old market systems like, for instance, that of northern Sweden, 
the “enterprise density” is much larger. During all of the 1990’s there were about 50–52 enterprises per 1,000 
inhabitants in working age. Data for these calculations were obtained from Russia in Figures (2003), Goskomstat 
Rossii (2004) and Facts and Perspectives (2003). 
21
 “When the voucher phase [of privatization] ended in mid-1994, the state’s average holding had fallen to 38 
percent across all industrial firms (including those not privatized at all to mid-1994) and an average of just 15 
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transformation were modified. Privatization was intended to stimulate new efficient behavior 
on the part of enterprise management and owners (improved corporate governance). However, 
for political reasons the rules governing the Russian privatization process were modified to 
favor enterprise insiders (managers and employees) who became the dominating category of 
new owners in the first round of voucher privatization. The new owners often put higher 
priority on preservation of privileges and jobs than on making the operation of their 
enterprises more efficient. The failure of the authorities to strictly impose hard budget 
constraints on the enterprises also allowed many unprofitable firms to survive without 
restructuring (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005). These were all factors that unintentionally 
encouraged an enterprise behavior characteristic of the virtual economy.  
By 2002, as much as 63 percent of all Russian employees worked in private enterprises and, 
according to an estimate by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the 
private sector accounted for 70 percent of GDP (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005).  
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Figure 3  Number of enterprises and employment by forms of ownership 1995, 2000, and 
2004 (2002) for Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Russian Federation. Percent.22  
Comparing Arkhangelsk with Russia at large we find that the private sector, measured as the 
number of privately owned enterprises, had already reached a completely dominant position 
by the mid 1990s (cf. Figure 3). Merely 18 percent of all enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast 
were owned by the state (including municipalities); the share for the whole country was in 
fact somewhat larger (23 percent). In Arkhangelsk the share of state owned enterprises still 
remained the same in 2004, while for the Federation as a whole the share had decreased to 10 
percent already by 2002. However, looking instead at how many people the various types of 
enterprises employed, we find that even by 2004 the state sector was still dominating the 
scene in Arkhangelsk with 49 percent of total employment. The average relative state 
                                                                                                                                                        
percent in privatized enterprises. According to Goskomstat data, 57.9 per cent of the workforce (including 76 
percent of the industrial workforce) was employed in privatized or new private firms. Over 70 percent of small-
scale enterprises had been transferred to private ownership” (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005:7). 
22
 Source: Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (1996, 2004); Goskomstat Rossii (1996a, 2004); data retrieved on 31 March 
2006, from Rosstat at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/brus05/ IssWWW.exe/Stg/06-03.htm and http://www.gks.ru/ 
free_doc/2005/b05_13/05-05.htm. 
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employment for Russia at large was smaller but the difference compared to the relative 
number of state enterprises was anyway striking. In 1995, the state sector had 42 percent of 
total employment; in 2002 the share had decreased to 37 percent.  
The fraction of all enterprises owned by public organizations was very small throughout the 
period (growing from 5 to 10 percent) and their share of total employment was insignificant. 
However, an important shift in the enterprise-employment configuration characterizing the 
period after 1995 was the fact that enterprises with mixed state-private ownership (including 
joint ventures) lost much of their importance as employers. In 1995, these enterprises 
employed around 25 percent of all employed in Arkhangelsk, in 2004 the share was down to 
10 percent. The development for Russia at large was very similar (23 percent in 1995, 12 
percent in 2002). This development indicates a decreasing need for state support of recently 
privatized enterprises in the latter half of the 1990s. The interpretation would be that many 
privatized enterprises actually became gradually more competitive in the emerging market 
environment, being able to increasingly rely on their own resources. The development could 
possibly also be seen as an indicator of a progressing decrease in the size of the virtual 
economy, with its characteristic reliance on “relational capital.”  
Joint ventures.  The relative number of employees in foreign and joint venture enterprises 
was expected to grow as a consequence of the transitional reforms in Russia. Even if the 
number of foreign and joint venture enterprises in Russia increased by almost 28 percent 
between 1998 and 2002, their share of the total number of enterprises in the country had still 
only reached 0.3 percent. In Arkhangelsk Oblast the number of such enterprises increased by 
more than 56 percent, but by 2002 the share had still only reached the level of the country at 
large (0.3 percent). However, in terms of employment the foreign and joint venture capital 
made a much greater impact. Between 1995 and 2002, the foreign and joint venture 
enterprises’ share of total employment in Arkhangelsk Oblast increased from 0.5 to 6.4 
percent. (For Russia the corresponding numbers were 0.6 and 3.1 percent, respectively.). The 
importance of foreign and joint venture enterprises for Russian economic development is 
illustrated by their contribution to total capital investments. These enterprises’ share of total 
capital investments is much higher than what is indicated by their share of total employment. 
For Russia at large this share increased from close to 7 percent in 1998 to over 14 percent in 
2002 (and close to 16 percent one year later).  
Small enterprises.  Finally we must also note the feature of the new market economy that 
probably is the most important for Russian citizens: the emergence of a large number of small 
enterprises. The small enterprise sector is important in several respects. While various 
measures have been introduced by the government to stimulate the establishment of new 
small enterprises, in their daily activity these firms have been forced to meet and cope with 
the competition that has been introduced through the emerging Russian market economy. 
Thus, in general, small enterprises do not operate in the virtual economy. By their engagement 
in these enterprises (as employees or customers) people will automatically learn an adequate 
market economic behavior. Thus, the emergence of new small private enterprises has made an 
important contribution to changing the (now obsolete) “mental models” (North, 2005) that 
produced the institutional framework governing the behavior of homo sovieticus and that to a 
significant extent survived in the form of the virtual economy after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union.  
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Available data suggest that small enterprises in Arkhangelsk comprised slightly over 22 
percent of the total number of enterprises in 2002.23 If this number is related to the total 
number of private enterprises we find that the share is over one third. What ever measure is 
used, it is clear that the emergence of small enterprises has meant quite a change for a country 
where only 15 years earlier there were practically no such enterprises. However, the number 
of small enterprises is no certain indicator of their importance for the economy at large. Data 
also clearly show that the comparatively large number of private small enterprises together 
only employ a fairly small number of people. In 2002, the small enterprises of Arkhangelsk 
Oblast only employed six percent of the total number of people employed in the regional 
economy. (While the share of small enterprises in Russia at large was the same as for 
Arkhangelsk, their share of total employment was much higher, 11 percent.)  
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Figure 4: Number of small enterprises and value of production by type of economic activity 
in Arkhangelsk and Russia, 2002. Percent. Source: Based on data from 
Goskomstat Rossii (2004). 
As can be seen in Figure 4, in 2002, around half of all small enterprises in Arkhangelsk were 
to be found in the trade and catering sector―for Russia this share was 59 percent. A quarter 
of the small enterprise sector consisted of industrial enterprises while a somewhat smaller 
number (17 percent) of all small enterprises were engaged in construction activities.24 (For 
Russia at large the corresponding shares were 17 and 16 percent, respectively.) On the other 
hand, if we look at the value of production, these proportions are almost “reversed” so that the 
comparatively few industrial enterprises account for a significantly larger proportion of the 
total value produced by the small enterprise sector. For small trading enterprises the situation 
is the opposite―a large number of companies producing a relatively smaller value share of 
total output.  
                                                 
23
 Data from Goskomstat Rossii (2004).  
24
 In the previous IIASA case studies it was clearly shown that very few small enterprises were active in the 
forest sector. Furthermore, it was often claimed by small forest company managers that the establishment of 
small forest enterprises was actively opposed by the “forest establishment.” The registration in 2003 of an 
Association of small and medium sized forest sector enterprises (Assotsiatsiia malogo i srednego biznesa 
lesopromyshlennogo kompleksa) in Arkhangelsk may perhaps be seen as a sign that this attitude from the “forest 
establishment” is being relaxed. (Information Agency “REGNUM,” 22 August 2003, http:www.regnum.ru/ 
allnews/148151.html.) 
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Holding companies. The 1998 financial crisis triggered several important changes in the 
Russian economy. The emergence and growth of large holding companies based on natural 
resource extraction and industrial production is a prominent feature affecting the structure and 
organization of the Russian enterprise sector. While originally these financial-industrial 
groups (FIGs) had been controlled by banks with a primary interest in making money on 
speculation they successively developed into holding companies with a widely diversified 
production orientation. After the 1998 financial crisis, which made it more difficult for 
enterprises to profit from financial operations, it seems that these holdings have restructured 
their activities and become modern production oriented corporations. Today, three kinds of 
corporations dominate the scene (Clarke, 2004): vertically integrated holding companies 
striving to control several links in a production chain (large oil holdings are the typical 
example), horizontally integrated holding companies striving to establish dominance in 
regional or national markets, and diversified holding companies (or industrial groups 
comprising a number of relatively independent vertically and horizontally integrated holding 
companies) oriented towards maximizing the profits of their subsidiaries.  
To some observers this trend represents proof of the fact that the Russian economy is now 
leaving the stage of initial privatization of state property and entering a phase of 
consolidation, when property (production facilities, capital) is redistributed and in the process 
rearranged to produce more market efficient enterprises. Thus, the process could be seen to 
indicate that Russian enterprises and managers are becoming better adapted to the demands of 
a normal market system. However, other observers have noted that these holding companies 
often acquire property for purposes other than improving current and future profitability and 
with consequences for the operations of subsidiaries that seem far from what is normal in a 
well-developed market system. For instance, Barnes (2003) argues that “leading economic 
actors […] are still engaged in a complex struggle for property that transcends simple 
processes of privatization or consolidation and shows no sign of abating.” Controlling 
property is important since it brings a certain amount of safety in terms of secure input 
supplies and as a source of wealth that can be of help in the event of hostile take over 
attempts, etc. Property is ultimately also a source of political power. Clarke (2004:419), 
reporting on a case study of management style in Russian holding companies, notes that 
management practices in the holdings still display a “high degree of continuity with, or even a 
reversion to, Soviet traditions.” Managers of subsidiaries are thus allowed to keep their 
“production orientation” while leaving questions of profit making to the senior managers of 
the holding company.  
Thus, it seems that, while the concentration of capital to large business groups in Russia to 
some extent is made for reasons that are similar to those encountered in a well-developed 
market economy, there are often other prominent reasons for the strive to acquire property, 
reasons that would not be considered important or even relevant in a market system.  
Clarke (2004) notes that, irrespective of the dominating reason for an acquisition, holding 
companies are likely to invest in the modernization of production or the development of new 
products of their acquired subsidiaries in order to improve their productivity and profitability. 
Due to the non-transparency and the high speed of the property redistribution process that has 
contributed to a dramatic concentration of capital and economic power in Russia after 1998, 
there are no reliable data available that describe the process in more detail. Some estimates 
have been made by various scholars and institutes both in Russia and in the West (see, e.g., 
Dynkin, 2003; Barnes, 2003; Guriev and Rachinsky, 2004; Clarke, 2004; World Bank, 2005) 
indicating that the large financial-industrial groups today account for a significant share of 
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total industrial output in Russia. According to a World Bank (2005) report, 22 FIGs accounted 
for 38.8 percent of total sales and 20.2 percent of employment in 32 subsectors of the Russian 
industry.25  
The results also indicate that FIGs’ control of the country’s pulp and paper industry is around 
30 percent in terms of both employment and sales. Their control of the timber industry is, 
however, very much smaller: less than five percent in terms of sales and about two percent in 
terms of employment. According to information in the media vertically integrated holding 
companies have become very important for the development of the forest sector of 
Arkhangelsk Oblast. For instance, in the first five months of 2005, close to 70 percent of total 
timber harvesting in Arkhangelsk was made by enterprises belonging to four large holding 
companies (OOO IlimSeverLes, GK Solombal’skii LDK and Lesozavod No. 3, GK Titan, and 
PLO Onegales).26  
4.2.4 Inflation and Demonetization of the Economy 
As is well known, the Russian economy was beset with an extremely high inflation after 
prices were liberalized in 1992―the inflation rate reached an astounding 2,509 percent that 
same year (Klein and Pomer, 2001:441). Prices of goods and services obtaining before 1992 
were the result of repeated administrative adjustments ultimately reflecting the preferences 
and intentions of the Soviet planning authorities. Price liberalization immediately revealed the 
large gap between the production structure of the planned economy and the structure that 
would be able to meet Russian citizens’ and enterprises’ market demand for goods and 
services. It revealed how much actual supply in the Soviet economy deviated from real 
demand in the (emerging) “new Russia.” When attractive commodities and services in great 
demand were offered in insufficient quantities, their prices increased dramatically.  
Since the rapid inflation was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in wages the result 
was that citizens and enterprises alike soon found themselves without enough cash to pay for 
the goods and services they wanted to buy. Makarov and Kleiner (2000) suggest that using so-
called non-monetary exchange27 offered a natural solution to the problem―“natural” since all 
actors in the new Russian economy already had an “in-kind” perception of economic 
exchange. They suggest (p. 55) that:  
Essentially, today’s bartering arose on the basis of the former system of in-kind perception, 
accounting, and distribution of industrial products, from which the new reality has eliminated: (a) the 
system of hierarchical subordination of enterprises to ministries and interministerial bodies; and (b) 
the restrictions on direct business ties between enterprises.  
                                                 
25
 The estimate was made on the basis of a survey investigation performed during 2003. (The sampled 
enterprises together accounted for 86 percent of total sales and 43 percent of total employment in the 32 
subsectors of industry to which they belonged.) More about this analysis can be found in Guriev and Rachinsky 
(2004).  
26
 Data given in Lesnye Novosti, summarized in a press survey of Arkhangelsk Oblast published by the 
information agency REGNUM on 17 June 2005 (retrieved 25 January 2006, from http://www.regnum.ru/ 
news/471838.html). The ownership of three of these four holding companies has been mapped out in a World 
Bank survey of ownership concentration in Russia as of 2004 (see World Bank, 2005, and the CEM database 
accessible via Internet at http://ns.worldbank.org.ru/cem/eng/setcriteria.asp). 
27
 Non-monetary exchange or non-monetary transactions is shorthand for a whole set of exchange types, such as 
barter, (direct and “pure” or channeled via intermediaries), offsets (sachety) where debts are paid for by goods or 
services, money surrogates such as promissory notes (vekseli) issued by enterprises, banks or government, and 
debt swaps and cross-cancellations of debt. In this paper “barter” denotes all of the enumerated types of non-
monetary transactions.  
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In this view, the emergence of barter in Russia was really a path-dependent phenomenon 
offering a familiar solution to a problem that would otherwise be difficult to cope with. 
(Goldman (1998), has also noted the long tradition that barter has in Russia.) Polterovich 
(2001) has labeled the barter solution an institutional trap, by which he seems to mean what 
others (cf., for instance, Carlsson et al., 2001) have called an institutional deadlock, 
emphasizing the fact that several simultaneous institutional changes are required in order to 
force the economy to switch to a monetized system of exchange that is more transparent and 
easy to monitor and that ultimately is more efficient in that it reduces transaction costs.  
In a very general vein and much in agreement with the implications of the virtual economy 
hypothesis advanced by Gaddy and Ickes (1998b), Hendley et al. (1998:101) have argued 
that:  
… demonetization has occurred largely as a consequence of two important legacies of socialism―a 
legal culture in which neither public officials nor private firms routinely obey the law and an industrial 
structure replete with firms on the edge of survival. These two features work together to give rise to a 
set of institutions whose weaknesses provide incentives for non-monetary exchange, including a 
government that routinely fails to pay for its purchases from enterprises, a tax system that lacks 
legitimacy, a bankruptcy system in which creditors have little incentive to file against debtors, a 
system of corporate governance in which outside owners are not able to exercise effective control, and 
a legal system that cannot effectively support the enforcement of contracts. [footnote omitted] Under 
these circumstances, profitmakers and lossmakers alike use barter and other forms of non-monetary 
exchange to evade taxes and hide income from outside owners, and to mitigate the probability that 
contracts will not be enforced. 
As can be seen in Figure 5, the inflation rate decreased rapidly in the years following its peak 
in 1992. After 2000 the rate has stayed below 20 percent, approaching 10 percent in 2004–
2005. The regional price changes in Arkhangelsk have been quite similar to that of the 
country at large.  
More will be said later about the behavioral consequences (the increase of non-monetary 
transactions, and of wage and payment arrears) that resulted from the structural changes in the 
economy leading to the rapid inflation in the first years of the 1990s.  
Inflation rate for Russia and Arkhangelsk, 1993-2005
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Figure 5: Inflation rate in Russia and Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1993–2005. Percent. (Changes in 
Consumer Price Index from December to December the previous year.) Source: 
Klein and Pomer (2001:441); Goskomstat Rossii (2004); Rosstat (http://www.gks. 
ru); Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (2004:115).  
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4.2.5 Banks and Credit Supply 
Financial intermediation, as the credit providing functions of banks and other financial 
institutions, such as financial markets, and the insurance sector is often called, is severely 
underdeveloped in Russia (cf., for instance, Ahrend and Tompson, 2005). Efficient financial 
intermediation is highly beneficial for enterprises since it reduces their (transaction) costs of 
financing necessary input purchases and capital investments (Tompson, 2000). The existence 
of well-developed financial intermediation is also an important growth factor in the economy 
(Ahrend and Tompson, 2005; Chowdhury, 2003; Tompson, 2000). While the functioning of 
banks, financial markets, and the insurance sector are all important for the quality of financial 
intermediation, it could be argued that establishing a well-functioning banking system must 
precede financial market development (Tompson, 2000).  
Banking has been malfunctioning in Russia during the whole transition period. In fact, as 
Tompson (2000:605) has remarked referring to a number of studies of the Russian banking 
sector,  
… for all the diversity of their interests and activities, Russian banks do not actually bank very 
much―that is, they engage in very little financial intermediation. [Footnote omitted.] Indeed, on the 
conventional Western definition, most Russian banks are not banks at all, for it is financial 
intermediation―the provision of deposit and loan products―that distinguishes banks from other types 
of financial institutions. Banks attract funds from households and firms (including other banks) and 
lend them on to other borrowers. 
In the course of privatization of state enterprises, several so-called Financial-Industrial 
Groups (FIGs) were established in Russia. Banks were often incorporated into FIGs in a 
subordinate function of providing financial services to the large natural resource extracting 
companies dominating these organizations. Many banks are still in such a position, being so-
called “pocket banks” (Chowdhury, 2003; Okhmatovskiy, 2005; Tompson, 2000). At the 
beginning of the transition period the Russian banking sector developed fast and its 
development was basically unrestrained by any regulatory system. This was a time when it 
was possible to make large profits on speculation in financial markets (Chowdhury, 2003).  
The crisis of 1998 was a severe blow to the existing banking sector in Russia. The number of 
banks and local bank offices was dramatically reduced. In 1998, there were 8,050 banks and 
local bank offices in Russia. By 2000, this number had been reduced by a third, and the 
number continued to decrease. By 2005, 1,299 banks and 3,238 local bank offices remained in 
all of Russia.28 (In Arkhangelsk Oblast there were 6 banks and 39 local bank offices in 1999; 
at the end of 2005, the respective numbers were down to 4 and 32.29) After the 1998 crisis the 
state-owned Sberbank is the dominating bank in Russia with a market share of 69.1 
percent―Alfa Bank comes on second place with a market share of 2.3 percent (Chowdhury, 
2003).  
Russian banks were always rather small by international standards. Even the biggest Russian 
bank (the state-owned Sberbank) was ranked 155th in the world (by tier-1 capital) in 2003 
(Tompson, 2004a). Despite a rapid growth in the Russian banking sector, its total assets only 
reached 42.1 percent of GDP at the end of 2003 and loans to the non-financial sector 
amounted to a mere 17 percent. (Corresponding shares for the EU countries were 280 and 
over 100 percent of GDP, respectively.) The ability of banks to mobilize and channel savings 
                                                 
28
 Data obtained on 22 May 2006, from the Rosstat website at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2005/b05_13/20-
26.htm.  
29
 Data for 1999 from Goskomstat Rossii (2004), data for 2005 from CBRF (2006). 
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to investments is important for economic growth. In Russia, slightly less than five percent of 
corporate investments was financed by bank loans in 2003 (Tompson, 2004a). The poor 
capacity of the banking system to provide credits for enterprises’ investments is especially 
serious for SMEs, since they are unable to use retained earnings to finance investments.30 
With access to bank credits SMEs might become the motor of Russian economic growth like 
they have been in other transition countries (Chowdhury, 2003).  
Observers agree that profound reforms of the Russian banking sector are necessary to make it 
better able to perform its market supporting functions. It has been noted that even if a well-
designed banking reform package could be implemented right away (which it cannot in 
practice) it would anyway take a long time for the reforms to produce the intended effects. 
The reason is that the reforms entail institutional changes affecting also several other policy 
areas and that all such changes must be carefully designed to be found legitimate and adopted 
as guidance of actors’ behavior.  
Since 2002–2003, there is an ongoing reform of the Russian banking sector. The major 
ingredients in this reform program are measures that have already been suggested by several 
western observers of the Russian banking sector (see, for instance, Chowdhury, 2003, 
Tompson, 2000, 2004a).31 To increase public confidence in the banking sector and increase 
the volume of household savings a deposit insurance has been introduced―a measure that 
will “level the playing field” between state-owned and private banks (since previously only 
the former could guarantee depositors’ money). The Bank of Russia (CBR―the Central Bank 
of Russia) has started changing its supervision of Russian banks emphasizing “substance-
over-form,” which is a highly demanding task, entailing revisions of a complex system of 
regulations. As noted by Tompson (2004a:16) the goal is to “reduce the opportunities and the 
incentives for banks to manipulate their accounts in order to meet prudential ratios.” The 
reform also envisages a phasing in of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). As 
of January 2006, the use of IFRS rules is supposed to have replaced the Russian Accounting 
Standards (RAS) and form the actual basis for bank supervision. The effect of this change is 
still uncertain. As a measure to improve transparency the Bank of Russia supervision reform 
also strives to disclose bank ownership. Information about ownership has hitherto been 
possible for banks to hide and this has decreased public confidence in the whole financial 
intermediation system.  
Provisionally assessing the first consequences of the reform measures, Tompson (2004a:25) 
concludes:  
Overall, the design of Russia’s reform strategy reflects an awareness of the need for a ‘good fit’ 
between its major elements, and the main lines of the reform address some of the principal 
problems of the sector. It reflects an understanding of both ‘international best practice’ and the 
peculiarities of Russia’s institutional environment. The emphasis current policies place on 
transparency is especially welcome, as greater openness will facilitate greater monitoring of banks 
by private-sector agents. The major lacuna in the strategy concerns the future of state-owned 
banks. Despite a long-standing official commitment to reducing the role of the state―and of the 
CBR in particular―in the ownership of credit institutions, there is still a need for a much more 
clearly defined policy in this area. 
The real test of Russian banking reform efforts, however, will be in implementation. The reforms 
challenge numerous vested interests and their successful realization will require considerable 
political will as well as the development of regulatory capacities of a very high order. 
                                                 
30
 Ivanter (2005) discusses the results of a survey investigation of the problems facing small business in Russia. 
The lack of credits for investments was considered a difficult obstacle for business development.  
31
 The condensed account of the reform measures given here largely follows Tompson (2004a).  
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The author is, however, concerned by the authorities’ handling of the May–July 2004 
“turbulence” in the Russian banking sector, where several decisions that were at odds with the 
principles of the recently initiated reform program were taken. The state interfered in the 
market in a way that “suggested that key executive branch institutions viewed the sector’s 
problems rather differently and raised questions about whether the CBR really could count on 
the political and administrative support needed to press ahead with reform” (Tompson, 
2004a:25).  
Recent speculations about future developments of the Russian banking sector seem to 
underline Tompson’s concern in this respect. Rozhinskiy (2006), who is himself a banker, 
predicts that “oligarchic banks,” (i.e., the “pocket banks” of large FIGs) will be up for sale, 
since the banking business today is much less profitable than oil and metals, compared to the 
situation in the 1990s. If the Russian government wants to preserve most national banking in 
Russian hands, Rozhinskiy finds the most likely outcome to be that since the “non-oligarchic 
banks” will not be able to match foreign banks’ bids for the oligarchic banks this will prompt 
the state to intervene by having state-owned banks issuing competing bids. Rozhinskiy’s 
forecast is that “oligarchic banks as well as some non-oligarchic banks may well be 
‘distributed’ among state-owned and foreign acquirers. As a medium-term projection, the 
share of state-owned banks in Russia may constitute 60 percent of total banking assets, while 
the foreign share may climb to around 25 percent.” Only in February 2006, the first Russian 
bank (Impexbank) was sold to a foreign bank (the Austrian Raiffeisenbank). Increased foreign 
ownership of Russian banks might raise the competence of banks to assess the prospects for 
borrowers’ investments and might lead to better (less risky) decisions about lending. 
“Importing” foreign bank’s experiences in this way might shorten the fairly long time it 
would take for Russian banks to accumulate the necessary risk assessment competence 
(Tompson, 2000).  
4.3 Behavioral Indicators 
4.3.1 Output and Capacity Utilization 
The immediate―and unexpected (at least for many western observers) ―response of the 
Russian economy to the transitional reforms at the beginning of the 1990s was a dramatic 
general output decline. Output levels started to recover in the second half of the decade, but 
still by 2004 total industrial production in Russia had only reached 70 percent of its 1990 
level. The decline was even more serious in the forest sector, where output of the wood, 
woodworking and pulp and paper industries in the second half of the decade was down at 
about 45 percent of its 1990 level, only to slowly recover after the year 2000 reaching 50 
percent by 2004. In Arkhangelsk Oblast, industrial production decrease was less pronounced 
and by 2003 industrial output was again above its 1990 level. The reasons for this slump are 
not (yet) well understood, neither are the reasons for the subsequent recovery. There is also 
great concern whether the present high annual growth rates will actually be sustainable. 
Ahrend (2006:2) argues that the high growth rate is mainly “driven by the output and exports 
of the natural resource sector, and especially by privately owned Russian oil companies” and 
that it may be possible to maintain the high growth “provided there is at least some progress 
with respect to gas sector reform, increased pipeline construction, greater respect of property 
rights on the part of the authorities, and a limit on the extent of state interference in the oil 
sector in particular.”  
It is not clear, however, whether the strong economic growth in Russia observed in recent 
years can be regarded as a sign that enterprises are in fact improving their efficiency and 
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leaving the virtual economy, exposing themselves to the competition of the market. Analysts 
of the Russian transition, like Gaddy and Ickes (2005) and Ahrend (2006), draw attention to 
the still ongoing “covert” redistribution of value (rents) from the natural resource sectors 
(mainly oil and gas) to other sectors of the Russian economy, a practice with roots in the 
Soviet system. This way the very large profits made in the resource extraction sectors are in 
effect propping up the performance reports of enterprises in other sectors of the economy, a 
behavior that could make us believe that the influence of the virtual economy is vanishing, 
while it actually might be quite the opposite (at least for some enterprises). In this perspective, 
as advocated by many observers (e.g., Gaddy and Ickes, 2005; Ahrend and Tompson, 2005; 
Tompson, 2005; Ahrend, 2006), a genuine change of behavior among Russian economic 
actors, forcing them to comply with the demands of the market economy rather than live by 
the rules defining the virtual economy, requires a reformation of the Russian oil and gas 
sectors, securing property rights and putting an end to the highly non-transparent rent transfer 
practices currently used in the economy. 
Figure 6 illustrates the dramatic decrease in production of all forest products that took place in 
Arkhangelsk Oblast between 1990 and 1995/6. A similar development was to be seen in the 
whole country (and in the whole economy). However, after 1995/96 production recovered and 
output levels of most forest commodities started to increase. For some commodities, like 
commercial wood, round timber and lumber, output levels increased only moderately (in 2004 
output volumes still had not reached half of their 1990 level). For other commodities, like 
fiberboard, paper, and pulp, volumes exceeded 80 percent of their respective 1990 levels. For 
only two commodities, cardboard and plywood, output levels by 2001 had climbed above 
their 1990 levels. Especially plywood production has displayed a striking development after 
1996.  
 
Figure 6: Production of certain forest products in Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1990–2004. Relative 
volume change (1990=100).32  
                                                 
32
 Source: Goskomstat Rossii (1996b, 2004); Arkhangelsk Oblast (1997); Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (1997:59, 
2003:15, 2004:77); Komistat (2000); Russia in Figures (2003); data retrieved (2 February 2006) from 
Arkhangelsk Oblast Administration at http://www.dvinaland.ru/economy/timber.asp?; data retrieved (13 March 
2006) from Arkhangelskstat at http://www.arkhadm.gov.ru/economy/timber.asp. 
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Since the beginning of the transition period the Russian industry has worked at only a fraction 
of its full capacity. The forest sector is no exception. For most forest products, however, the 
Arkhangelsk forest sector has displayed a higher capacity use than the Russian average. In 
general, capacity utilization in the production of most industrial commodities has increased 
since the mid 1990s and especially since 2000, sometimes from very low levels. Despite huge 
reductions in capacity use the forest industry worked more intensively than many other 
industrial branches. In Arkhangelsk Oblast capacity utilization in the production of most 
forest commodities was higher than the Russian average throughout the period. Table 1 shows 
the development of capacity utilization in the production of certain forest products for 
Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Russian Federation. 
Table 1: Capacity use in the production of certain forest products 1995–2004. Percent. 
1995/6 2000 2004 
 
Russia Arkhangelsk Russia Arkhangelsk Russia Arkhangelsk
Harvesting ? 58.1 ?      83.5 ?    106.6 
Lumber  31 32.9 39      60.8 47      83.8 
Plywood 52 53.1 82 100 93 100 
Paper  57 53.5 79      82.6 86      99.7 
Cardboard 41 50.7 63   95 79      99.6 
Fiber board ? 59.3 ?      86.2 ?      85.7 
Pulp ? 46.9 ?      88.1 ?      98.7 
Source: Data retrieved on 15 February 2006 from Rosstat (Internet: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/brus05/IssWWW 
.exe/Stg/14-04.htm); Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (2003); calculation based on data retrieved on 2 February 2006, 
from Arkhangelsk Oblast Administration (Internet: http://www.dvinaland.ru/economy/timber.asp). 
4.3.2 Investments 
Investments in the Russian economy decreased dramatically in the first half of the 1990s. By 
1998 they were down at a mere fifth of their 1990 level―in Arkhangelsk Oblast the level was 
even lower, about 14 percent. However, after 1998 investments started to recover. As can be 
seen in Figure 7 the dynamics of investments in Arkhangelsk Oblast resembles that the 
country at large, even if growth rates were higher in Arkhangelsk in the period 1999–2003. 
Despite their increasing volume after 1998 total investments in Russia were still, by 2004, 
below 40 percent of their level in 1990 (the corresponding figure for Arkhangelsk Oblast was 
slightly over 50 percent).  
Total investments in Russia have always been very unevenly distributed between the various 
sectors of the economy with Industry always receiving the main share. In the mid 1990s, 
slightly over one third of total investments in the Russian economy were made in industry. 
The share was about the same in the Arkhangelsk economy. But while the share for Russia 
increased moderately and reached just over 40 percent in 2002, in Arkhangelsk industry’s 
share of total regional investments grew to nearly 60 percent in 2000 and reached close to 78 
percent in 2002. Transport and housing were the only other sectors of the economy with 
significant investment shares. About one fifth of total investments in Russia has been 
allocated to transport in the period since 2000. Housing, which received around 20 percent of 
total investments in Russia by the mid 1990s, had by 2002 decreased its share to just under 10 
percent. The corresponding figures for Arkhangelsk Oblast were for transport close to 25 
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percent by the mid 1990s, dropping to just over 10 percent by 2002. For housing the share of 
total regional investments was significantly lower, around 14 percent by the mid 1990s, down 
to a mere 1–2 percent in the 2000s.  
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Figure 7: Investments, physical volume, 1990–2004. Index 1990 = 100. Source: Data from 
Rosstat retrieved on 2 February 2006 from the Internet at http://www.gks.ru/scripts 
/db_inet/ dbinet.cgi. 
While the share of industrial investments that has been allocated to the forest sector has 
remained around 1–1.5 percent for Russia at large throughout the period 1990–2004, the 
forest sector has dominated regional industrial investments in Arkhangelsk, accounting for 
shares varying between 22 (2002) to 68 percent (1999) of total industrial investments. Over 
two thirds of these investments were made in the pulp and paper industry.  
Previous research (cf., for instance, Carlsson et al., 1999) has drawn attention to the fact that a 
further expansion of the forest industry based on domestic timber would require harvesting of 
forest areas that are quite inaccessible today due to a lack of infrastructure, primarily forest 
roads. The problem has also been duly discussed in the press where, for instance, it has been 
noted that the length of roads per thousand hectares of the Russian forest fund is merely 1.2 
km, compared to 10 km in the USA, 36 in Austria, and 45 in Germany (Smol’yakova, 2005). 
On the huge territory of Arkhangelsk Oblast timber has been intensively harvested mainly 
along existing roads and railroads. The result has been overexploitation of such accessibly 
located forests. Today, many forest harvesting companies (lespromkhozy) in the region can 
only operate during 6–7 months of the year due to a lack of hardcover roads. Thus, there is a 
need for significant investments in forest roads in order to invigorate the forest sector, the 
contribution of which to total industrial production in the region is otherwise expected to 
decrease from 56 to 42 percent in 2006.33  
                                                 
33
 As reported on 1 November 2005, by the news agency REGNUM (http://www.regnum.ru/news/537690.html) 
Evgenii Mikhailovskii, director of the economic department of the Arkhangelsk regional administration, gave 
this information in a regional duma hearing. The forecast was made on the basis of the following negative 
tendencies: raw material supply in locations with transport infrastructure is vanishing, production facilities have 
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Resources for road construction are currently being allocated. It is interesting to note that the 
process leading to the recent investment decisions has been hampered by some of the 
institutional hurdles (path dependency, institutional deadlock) identified in our previous 
research (Carlsson et al., 1999, 2001). In Soviet times, a region’s need for forest road 
construction was decided by the central forest authorities. In the new Russia, such decisions 
are expected to be taken by the actors in the forest sector themselves, by the enterprises. 
Regional administrations are by law prohibited to support the interests of commercial 
enterprises and they have therefore hesitated to support forest road construction with 
resources from the budget―funds could only be used for the construction of roads for 
“general use,” roads that might also obviously be used for timber transport. The problem is 
that constructing “general use” roads is five times as expensive compared to the construction 
of “forest roads,” even if such roads are often of good quality (Sholomitskaya, 2005). Branch 
organizations, like the “Pomor Industrialists,” representing a number of large regional forest 
enterprises,34 have argued for a more creative use of public funding for road construction and 
they have also advocated the elaboration of a special regional short-term program for the 
construction of forest roads, despite previous meager results of such endeavors (Grevtsov, 
2005). Federal organs (the Ministry of Natural Resources and Roleskhoz) have suggested a 
co-financing scheme according to which the federal and the regional authorities equally 
divide the costs for road construction. There are also suggestions to include private business 
in the funding of infrastructural projects. As a matter of fact the large forest enterprises are 
already investing in road construction in order to be able to procure the timber they need. 
Arkhangelsk Oblast may be one of the testing grounds for these co-financing projects 
(Smol’yakova, 2005). It is expected that such road construction projects will bring benefits 
not only to the forest sector, but also to other sectors of the economy as well as to ordinary 
citizens who can use the roads to reach previously inaccessible forest areas to collect wild 
berries and mushrooms, activities that significantly contribute to many households’ budgets.  
The impression produced by these press accounts of the discussion of the road investment 
problem in Arkhangelsk is that by engaging in public discussion and lobbying the members of 
the regional duma and the bureaucrats of the forest authorities, the actors of the forest sector 
have indeed managed to put the issue of forest road construction on the agenda, and also 
contributed to the resolution of an existing institutional deadlock.  
4.3.3 Employment, Income, and Productivity 
Changes in employment per se are an inherently ambiguous indicator of the development of 
the Russian virtual economy. Improving the efficiency of the Russian economy entails 
fundamental changes affecting the structure and functioning of the whole system that was 
inherited from the Soviet Union. Thus, changes are required in a large number of parameters, 
such as the location of production, the selection, quality and quantity of all commodities and 
services produced, the maintenance and renewal of production facilities (capital investments), 
and the establishment of an incentive system promoting productivity improvements. A region 
                                                                                                                                                        
been practically overused, forests are drying, and the warm weather is a hurdle for winter harvesting. Assessing 
all these circumstances, it was found that construction of forest roads allowing year around use is a necessary 
requirement for the further development of the regional forest sector.  
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 The organization “Pomor Industrialists” was founded in 1999 and engages in lobbying the regional 
administration and the regional duma trying to promote the interests of its members. It could be noted that in our 
previous study of the Arkhangelsk forest sector (cf. Carlsson et al., 1999) we found that the actors of the sector 
would benefit from establishing branch organizations to lobby for improved business conditions and to elaborate 
proposals for measures that could be taken to stimulate a sound business behavior.  
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like Arkhangelsk Oblast, located in the north and largely dependent upon resource extraction, 
must expect to meet with a dramatic “transitional change pressure” with demands for a larger 
and more diversified market for consumer goods and services and with an intensified market 
competition forcing industrial enterprises to improve their efficiency in order to survive. For 
employment, this “change pressure” might mean different things.  
• An increased demand for labor to work in the production of consumer goods and services 
could be expected.  
• If the resource extraction industries are able to improve efficiency through capital 
investments, employment in these industries might decrease at least initially.  
• If, on the other hand, in a somewhat longer perspective the achieved efficiency 
improvements are sufficiently large the output of these enterprises might become more 
competitive resulting in an increased demand for the products produced, leading to an 
expansion of (efficient) production, an expansion that might require more labor.  
These aspects must all be taken into consideration when assessing the meaning of the changes 
in employment that have taken place in Arkhangelsk Oblast in the transition period.  
As for the development of unemployment, it was also to be expected that it would grow 
rapidly in the first phase of the transition when enterprises in their restructuring efforts would 
lay off labor. If the restructuring were successful in producing market efficient enterprises, 
this might mean that they would eventually increase their production, which would raise the 
demand for labor and thus decrease unemployment.  
Economic efficiency gains are ultimately dependent upon improved labor productivity, i.e., 
the relation between the amount of labor used in the production process and the volume of 
output produced. A successful restructuring of inefficient Russian enterprises would naturally 
entail productivity improvements and would most likely lead to improvements in real incomes 
as well.  
Employment. Total Russian employment decreased between 1990 and 1998 by slightly over 
15 percent. After 1998 total employment increased again but by 2004 it was still 13 percent 
below its 1990 level. Industrial employment decreased by 38 percent 1990–1998, by 2004 it 
still remained at approximately the same level. These figures indicate a shift in the relative 
size of the various branches of the economy. While Industry’s share of total employment 
decreased from 30 percent in 1990 to around 21.5 in 2004, the employment share for Trade 
increased from close to 8 to over 17 percent in the same period.  
Total employment in the Arkhangelsk regional economy decreased between 1990 and 1998 
by more than 25 percent (from 765 to 567 thousand) after which it increased again to reach, 
by 2003, 82 percent (612 thousand) of its 1990 level. Industrial employment, which has 
accounted for 25–33 percent of total regional employment in the period after 1990, decreased 
by about as much as 40 percent between 1990 and 1997/8 only to increase somewhat again 
reaching two thirds of its 1990 level by 2003. The figures indicate a structural shift in 
employment similar to that of Russia at large.  
Looking at the regional forest sector employment we find that its share of total industrial 
employment has varied between 40 and 50 percent throughout most of the period. In 1995, the 
Arkhangelsk forest sector employed close to 81 thousand people, in 2004 the number was 
down to 65 thousand.  
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The largest share of the regional forest sector employment is found in harvesting, where close 
to 50 percent of all forest sector employees worked in the mid 1990s. By 2002, this share had 
decreased to slightly over 40 percent. Instead, pulp and paper had increased its share of total 
forest sector employment from about 25 to close to 30 percent in the same period. 
Woodworking―more than 80 percent of which is made up of sawmilling―accounted for 
around 30 percent of forest sector employment throughout the period. 
Unemployment. As is clearly illustrated in Figure 8, in 1993, unemployment in Murmansk, 
Karelia and Arkhangelsk was similar to the average Russian level of around five percent of 
the economically active population. By and large, the unemployment level in all three regions 
and in Russia at large continued to increase until 1997–1999, reaching 13 and 15 percent of 
the economically active population for Russia and Arkhangelsk Oblast, respectively. By 2002, 
however, the unemployment level had been significantly reduced to eight percent for Russia 
as well as for Arkhangelsk Oblast.  
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Figure 8: Estimated total unemployment in Russia, Karelia, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk, 
1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2002. Source: Goskomstat Rossii (2004). 
The rapid increase in unemployment from comparatively low levels at the beginning of the 
1990s depicted in Figure 8 is due to many possible reasons. Transition brought open 
unemployment on a scale never previously experienced in the country. At first, it is likely that 
people who lost their jobs were not even aware of the services offered by the employment 
agencies or they did not bother to register, which was often a cumbersome and costly 
procedure, especially for people living in remote areas) to obtain the meager benefits that 
were offered (Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999; Piipponen, 1999). The increase in unemployment 
until the end of the decade must be regarded as a consequence partly of improved registration 
and partly of the increasing competition facing enterprises in the emerging market 
economy―a process that forced them to lay off labor. The fact that unemployment numbers 
were not even higher, which might have been expected knowing the Soviet legacy of high 
labor intensity with accompanying low labor productivity, may be due to the workings of the 
virtual economy that often seems to have led enterprise managers to hoard labor. Still, 
unemployment numbers reported by the official statistical agency can be expected to 
underestimate real unemployment levels (Carlsson et al., 1999). But at the same time, the 
numbers also hide the fact that many unemployed are anyway gainfully occupied in the 
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“shadow economy,” since people are forced to perform some work in this large unofficial 
sector in order to survive (Ivanova and Nygaard, 1999).  
Labor productivity. Despite the many shortcomings of the Russian privatization process there 
is evidence indicating that privatization has indeed improved enterprise performance (Ahrend 
and Tompson, 2005:32 ff.).35 The 1998 financial crisis stimulated domestic production in 
Russia and the emerging large corporations seem to have initiated a restructuring of their 
subsidiaries making them more market competitive. After a recovery period in 1999–2001, 
enterprises eventually started to invest in new equipment and processes. Figure 9 illustrates 
the overall productivity change in the regional economies of Karelia, Arkhangelsk, and 
Murmansk as well as Russia at large. In the period 1997–2004, real Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) per employee annually increased by about 5.4 percent in Arkhangelsk, the average for 
Russia being 5 percent per year.  
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Figure 9: Productivity change in Russia, Karelia, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk 1997–2003. 
Change in total GRP production related to change in total employment. Index 
(1997 = 100). Source: Calculation based on data from Rosstat (http://www.gks. 
ru); Goskomstat Rossii (2004).  
Industrial labor productivity displayed improvements in the order of eight percent per year 
between 1997 and 2003 (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005:19–20). The Russian pulp and paper 
industry yearly gained around 12 percent in productivity, while the gain was about 4 percent 
per year for the woodworking industry.  
Real incomes. Figure 10 illustrates the fact that real per-capita incomes display a similar 
development pattern as most other economic indicators that we have looked at so far. Per-
                                                 
35
 At the same time, the methods of privatization caused serious legitimacy problems (Ahrend and Tompson, 
2005:33): “Many criticisms of the process are clearly valid, not least those which focus on the way in which the 
chaotic and often corrupt privatization processes of the 1990s have made it difficult to secure and legitimate the 
post-privatization property settlement. [footnote omitted] There is little doubt that the continuing insecurity of 
property rights in Russia today is partly the result of past privatization processes, and that this has hurt economic 
performance. There is also good reason to believe that renewed insecurity about property rights contributed 
significantly to the slowdown in fixed investment and in the growth of a number of key industrial sectors, 
including oil, during 2004.” 
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capita incomes decreased moderately between 1993 and 1998/99 only to recover at a 
somewhat more rapid pace after 1999. Given the development of the Russian economy 
displayed by the previously discussed indicators and assuming as well that the behavior of 
economic actors in Russia is becoming more adapted to the demands of a market system (that 
some restructuring actually has been achieved), a corresponding development pattern was to 
be expected also for per-capita incomes.  
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Figure 10: Per-capita monthly income in Russia and Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1993–2004. 
Rubles (1993 comparable prices). Source: Calculations based on data obtained 
from the Rosstat website at http://www.gks.ru. 
4.3.4 Barter Trade, Wage and Payment Arrears 
Observers of the barter and payment arrear phenomena in Russia have distinguished several 
features of the system that prevented an efficient exchange of commodities and services, 
inviting, or even forcing, as it were, actors to devise clever (and not always law abiding) ways 
of overcoming the obstacles while simultaneously making handsome profits in the process.36  
Commander et al. (2002:279) lists four categories of causes for the proliferation of barter in 
Russia:  
(1) Liquidity and credit squeeze of the industrial sector, prompted by falling demand, lack of enterprise 
restructuring, monetary tightening, cuts in direct subsidies and directed credit, and a decline in 
bank lending to enterprises, inducing firms to pay suppliers in kind, run up arrears and settle these 
arrears subsequently with off-sets. 
(2) Implicit subsidies and credit channeled to firms in the form of late and non-monetary payments to 
tax authorities and public utilities, reducing pressure for enterprise restructuring. 
(3) Rent seeking by managers and state bureaucrats, made possible by the lack of transparency inherent 
in non-monetary transactions, including tax evasion and over-pricing of goods in procurement, as 
well as distortions in the federal revenue sharing system. 
(4) Network effects arising from the persistence of historical relationships, thick markets in NMTs, as 
well as the mitigation of contractual risk associated with the use of NMTs in a network context.  
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 See, for instance, Goldman (1998); Hendley et al. (1998); Clarke (1998); Guriev and Ickes (2000); Woodruff 
(1999); Desai and Idson (2000); Makarov and Kleiner (2000); Commander et al. (2002); Earle and Sabirianova 
(2002); Javeline (2003); Guriev and Kvassov (2004); Kim and Pirtillä (2004). Yakovlev (2000) reviews various 
forms of barter (including offsets and veksels) that can be found in the Russian economy.  
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Bank lending to enterprises declined in Russia in the course of transition. Banks found it 
easier and more profitable to engage in funding the government’s deficit than extending 
credits to the industrial sector with its weak creditworthiness (Commander et al., 2002). 
Without recourse to bank credits enterprises had to agree on inter-firm trade credits to satisfy 
their needs of working capital. This way large payment arrears were built up between 
enterprises.  
In the study conducted by Commander et al. (2002) of 350 enterprises in 34 regions of Russia 
the primary reason given by the surveyed firms for using non-monetary transactions were 
liquidity problems. By resorting to non-monetary transactions enterprises were able to 
continue their operation despite the lack of cash to pay for inputs, wages, and taxes. 
This way payment arrears grew rapidly both for debts among enterprises and debts to 
government authorities (for tax) and to state owned enterprises (for utilities, such as energy). 
In Figure 11 Commander et al. (2002) have illustrated the correspondence between the 
development of overdue payables to employees (wage arrears), overdue payables to general 
government (e.g., tax arrears), and overdue payables to suppliers (payment arrears to 
enterprises’ trading partners). The authors also note that the overdue payables of enterprises 
increased far more rapidly than overdue receivables, indicating an increase in overdue 
payables to the state. They conclude (p. 283):37 
Notwithstanding the complex nature of arrears between various levels of government and the 
infrastructure monopolies, it is clear that the private sector has run up high net payables to the public 
sector as a whole, including the budgetary entities and the public utilities. This suggests that the 
principal asymmetry at work has been not so much the transfer of liquidity across firms, but the 
transfer of liquidity of the budget and utilities to firms. This points to an infusion of net credit and 
implicit subsidy to the private sector. 
 
Figure 11: Dynamics of payment arrears and barter 1993–1999.  Source: Commander et al. 
(2002:282).  
                                                 
37
 Cf. Gaddy and Ickes (2005).  
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Data published in the Russian Economic Report issued by the World Bank38 indicate that non-
monetary transactions in Russia have continued to rapidly decrease after 1999. In 2000, they 
still accounted for slightly over 30 percent of total sales, only to be further reduced to slightly 
over 10 percent in 2004. (Data for the first half of 2005 indicate that the level will decrease 
even further.)  
The World Bank report also contains data showing that the stock of overdue payables 
(arrears) in Russia is shrinking as well, from about 37 percent of annual sales in 2001 to 
slightly below 15 in 2004. The development of arrears (overdue payables/receivables, tax 
arrears, and wage arrears) in Arkhangelsk Oblast displays a similar pattern as for the country 
at large. The share of overdue payables in Arkhangelsk Oblast was 38 percent of total 
payables in 2001 decreasing to 13 percent in 2005.39 The situation with wage arrears is 
similar. After 1998, various measures of the volume of wage arrears have all gone down 
significantly. So, for instance, the ruble value of total wage arrears in Russia decreased by 
more than 70 percent in the period 2000–2005, for Arkhangelsk the decrease was even 
larger―87 percent. The share of all employed in the Russian economy who were affected by 
wage arrears decreased from 34 percent in 1998 to 9.2 in 2002 and to 4.4 percent in 2004. The 
corresponding share for Arkhangelsk decreased from over 50 percent in 1998 to 8.3 in 2002 
(data for 2004 is missing). Likewise, the volume of wages in arrears as a percentage of the 
total wage fund of enterprises with wage arrears in Russia decreased from 374 percent in 
December 1998 to 190 percent in December 2002. Corresponding numbers for Arkhangelsk 
were 347 and 159 percent for the respective years.40  
For Arkhangelsk the share of tax arrears of total tax debts was close to 90 percent in 1999 
decreasing to around 50 percent in 2005, according to data from Arkhangelskstat.41  
4.3.5 Bankruptcies  
In a well-functioning market economy there should ideally be no barriers for new, law-
abiding enterprises to enter the market (start production) and there should be no barriers for 
mismanaged or unprofitable enterprises to exit the market (to close down). Enterprise start-
ups and close-downs entail a “recycling” and simultaneous redistribution of productive 
resources (both labor and capital) among the actors in an economy with the purpose of 
making the use of these resources more efficient. Both enterprise start-ups and close-downs 
must proceed in an orderly (well-regulated, institutionalized) fashion in order to minimize the 
risk for property rights violations and reduce uncertainty among various claimants to the 
resources that are redistributed in the process. Rules (institutions) guiding such procedures 
must be well-designed, legitimate and efficiently implemented to preserve actors’ trust in the 
system.  
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 Russian Economic Report, No. 11, 2005, p. 7, retrieved on 20 February 2006 from http://ns.worldbank. 
org.ru/files/rer/RER_11_eng.pdf.  
39
 Overdue receivables have decreased in a similar fashion. Data on overdue payables and receivables were 
obtained from the websites of Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) and Arkhangelskstat (http://www.arhangelskstat.ru).  
40
 Data on wage arrears were obtained from Goskomstat Rossii (2004); Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) and 
Arkhangelskstat (http://www.arhangelskstat.ru). Data for Arkhangelsk indicate that the share of wage arrears in 
the wage fund of companies with such arrears had gone down to 135 percent in 2005.  
41
 Data were obtained from Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (2004:110); and the Arkhangelskstat web site at 
http:/www.arhangelskstat.ru/index.php?id=114 (9 February 2006). 
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Clearly, legitimate and well-functioning bankruptcy procedures are extremely important for a 
country like Russia, where transitional reforms (such as price liberalization and hardening 
budget constraints) have revealed the market inefficiency of a significant share of the 
enterprise sector.42  
According to official statistical data a very high proportion of all Russian enterprises are 
unprofitable. Data are based on accounting information submitted by the enterprises 
themselves, which should caution us not to draw too far-reaching conclusions about actual 
enterprise performance. Incentives are strong for concealing facts and manipulating the books 
so as not to disclose too good a result. (This is an example of malfunctioning institutions, 
pushing down the level of trust in society. When enterprises try to conceal the truth about 
their operations transparency decreases and incorrect information about market relations may 
contribute to inefficient resource allocation.)  
The situation depicted by these data nevertheless gives great cause for concern. The share of 
unprofitable enterprises in Russia seems to have peaked by 1996–98, when as much as 50–53 
percent of all organizations in Russia were unprofitable. Among the main branches of the 
economy the highest share of unprofitable enterprises were to be found in Agriculture and 
Municipal Housing. For instance, in Agriculture, the share of loss-making enterprises reached 
84 percent in 1998, after which the share decreased to around 50 percent by 2003. In 
Municipal Housing the corresponding share has remained around 60 percent since 1998. 
Among the various industrial branches there are two, Coal and Wood, Woodworking and Pulp 
and Paper, for which the share of unprofitable enterprises have remained high throughout the 
period after 1996―for the former the share varied between 51 and 67 percent and for the 
latter the share dropped from close to 70 percent in 1997 to 58 percent in 2003.  
Figure 12 compares the share of unprofitable enterprises in the whole Russian economy with 
corresponding shares for Industry as a whole and the Forest industry (Wood, Woodworking 
and Pulp and Paper) for selected years in the period 1992–2004. It could be noted that for 
Arkhangelsk Oblast the relation between these categories were very similar, but the shares 
were even higher. For instance, in 2004, the share of unprofitable enterprises in the 
Arkhangelsk economy was 45.6 percent (compared to 38.1 for Russia at large), for Industry 
the share was 47.2 (40.9) percent and for the Forest industry 55.3 (53.2) percent.  
Thus, the data indicate that, since 1999, as much as 38–43 percent of all Russian 
organizations have been unable to make ends meet despite the improved conditions for 
domestic production resulting from the 1998 financial crisis. The high proportions may, as 
already noted, be due to enterprises’ misreporting their actual situation, it may also reflect the 
fact that many Russian enterprises still operate in the virtual economy, allowing them to keep 
functioning despite their market inefficiency (cf. Section 2), or it may be that the insolvency 
legislation in Russia is not yet sufficiently developed or that implementation falters. 
To date Russia has had three laws regulating insolvency (bankruptcy), the first from 
November 1992, the second from January 1998, and the third from October 2002 (cf. 
Simachev, 2003). The later versions of the law have brought improvements over previous 
ones, but even if the amendments introduced in the 2002 version of the law represent a step 
forward it should be noted that well-functioning bankruptcy procedures also require 
improvements in other rules (institutions) embedding enterprises’ economic behavior 
(Simachev, 2003; Tompson, 2004b; Zhuravskaia and Sonin, 2005).  
                                                 
42
 For an overview of the role and function of insolvency systems and the Russian insolvency practice, see Fuchs 
(2002).  
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Figure 12: Share of unprofitable enterprises in the Russian economy 1992–2004 (Percent). 
Source: Rosstat web site at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2005/b05_13/20-39.htm 
(11 May 2006). 
It seems to be generally agreed that the first (1992) law on bankruptcy in Russia was highly 
inefficient (cf., for instance, Simachev, 2003; Tompson, 2004b; Zhuravskaia and Sonin, 
2005). The second bankruptcy law (from 1998) meant, in principle, an improvement 
compared to the previous law. It meant that it actually became possible to declare insolvent 
companies bankrupt. The number of initiated bankruptcy cases also rapidly increased. In 
January 1998 there were around 4,200 bankruptcy cases open. Two years later the number 
had risen to about 15,200, and by January 2002 there were about 52,500 cases open 
(Simachev, 2003). Such numbers might at first glance be taken to indicate the emergence of 
hardening budget constraints for the Russian enterprises. But, as Zhuravskaia and Sonin 
(2005) notes, such a conclusion is hardly warranted considering the fact that, in 2000, 
bankruptcy cases were brought against very few enterprises (less than 2 percent of all firms), 
while more than half of all Russian firms were unprofitable. However, as Simachev (2003) 
has pointed out, these average numbers hide that fact that there were huge regional variations 
in the number of bankruptcy cases. (For instance, in Moscow and St. Petersburg there were, 
respectively, 0.92 and 0.85 bankruptcy cases per 1,000 enterprises, while the corresponding 
numbers for Altai Republic and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) were 65.9 and 53.1.)  
Furthermore, it soon became clear that the 1998 law offered plenty of opportunities for 
unlawful behavior on the part of all stakeholders affected by an enterprise unable to pay its 
debts on time. For instance, the law has been severely criticized for opening opportunities for 
unlawful maneuvering (Tompson, 2004b:1):  
The number of bankruptcy cases processed in Russia skyrocketed after the new law was adopted, but 
this did not reflect the emergence of a civilized mechanism for protecting creditors’ rights and 
liquidating or rescuing distressed companies. Rather, bankruptcy proceedings quickly became 
notorious for the ease with which they could be manipulated, either to defraud creditors rather than 
protect them―suits are often initiated and controlled by creditor companies that are in fact linked to 
the debtor’s management―or to execute a hostile take-over very cheaply. Bankruptcies ‘to order’ have 
become a major business, often combining strategies for exploiting weaknesses in the law with 
political intervention and outright corruption. The government estimates that at least a third of all 
bankruptcy cases are either hostile takeovers or attacks by firms who have bought up rivals’ debts 
specifically for the purpose of trying to bankrupt them.  
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A bankruptcy process encompasses many stages, such as supervision, financial rehabilitation, 
external administration, liquidation, and voluntary arrangement.43 Comparably few cases lead 
to liquidation of an enterprise―the 1998 law was actually designed to further the 
rehabilitation of enterprises judged to be basically sound businesses rather than liquidating 
them (Tompson, 2004b). The law assigned an important role to arbitration court judges, who 
were to decide on the bankruptcy procedure (which stage to implement) and assign external 
administrators when appropriate.  
The increase in the number of opened bankruptcy cases and the fact that the procedure was 
open to fraudulent attempts constitute a severe strain on the implementation, on the 
infrastructure of applying bankruptcy procedures (Simachev, 2003). Corruption seems to have 
been a prominent ingredient in the implementation of the 1998 law (Barnes, 2003). The 
appointment of external administrators is important and it seems that these administrators 
often favored only one or the other side in bankruptcy proceedings; in some cases they were 
instrumental in hostile takeovers (Simachev, 2003; Tompson, 2004b; Zhuravskaia and Sonin, 
2005). Furthermore, implementation practice might significantly differ between various 
regions of Russia (Simachev, 2003). Bankruptcy procedures were often influenced by the 
regional administrations, especially if the fate of large, so-called town-forming enterprises 
with significant tax debts were at stake (cf. Ericson, 2002). Zhuravskaia and Sonin (2005) 
have elaborated and analyzed an interesting “theory of regional capture” of the bankruptcy 
institute in Russia. Their analysis results in several conclusions, one being that external 
management is more, and liquidations less, common in regions with “strong” governors (vis-
à-vis the federal center) and with enterprises having large federal tax debts. Such bankruptcy 
procedures serve to avoid enterprise liquidations, to maintain employment when shutdowns 
would be politically inexpedient for a governor. 
With the third bankruptcy law from 2002, the government sought to remedy some of the most 
severe problems of the previous law from 1998. The intention has been to prevent the use of 
the bankruptcy legislation for fraudulent initiation of bankruptcy procedures and unlawful 
hostile enterprise takeovers and it strengthens the control of the appointment and activity of 
external administrators. The new law is intended to support financial rehabilitation rather than 
liquidation of an enterprise in distress (Tompson, 2004b). But commentators are not 
convinced that the new law will mean any significant improvements (Simachev, 2003; 
Zhuravskaia and Sonin, 2005). On the basis of their “regional capture theory” Zhuravskaia 
and Sonin (2005) have raised concerns as to the efficiency of the new law (p. 87): 
When the new Bankruptcy Law of 2002 was being drafted, such factors as the strong dependence of 
regional arbitration courts on the governors and the considerable power vested in arbitration court 
judges and external managers were not taken into account. According to Russian law, all arbitration 
judges are under federal jurisdiction and therefore independent of regional authorities. However, 
Russian practice departs markedly from theory. Inadequate federal funding of arbitration courts and 
their remoteness (both politically and geographically) from the federal center makes them highly 
dependent on regional authorities.  
According to recent articles in the press some problems with the 1998 bankruptcy law were 
amended through the new law of 2002, but many pertinent problems still remain unsolved. 
For instance, while the new law seems to have curbed the increase in hostile takeovers, where 
corruption often played a significant role, “corporate raiders” are now increasingly making 
use of corporate law to acquire whole enterprises or some of their property. An especially 
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 A concise yet detailed overview of the stages of Russian bankruptcy proceedings is given in Cuthbert et al. 
(2005).  
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difficult problem is posed by the fact that, despite special provisions in the law, bankruptcy 
procedures have been brought on many so-called town-forming enterprises. During the first 
two years after the adoption of the new law more than 100 such enterprises went bankrupt.44 
Despite recent amendments, the new law has not been able to prevent deliberate (fraudulent) 
opening of bankruptcy procedures, during which enterprise owners can strip the company of 
most of its assets so when time finally comes to pay up the accumulated debts (often 
including years of tax debt) there are not much assets left in the company.45   
As we have already seen, the share of unprofitable enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast is 
considerably higher than for the country at large, and the shares are especially high for 
enterprises in the regional forest sector. The highest share of unprofitable forest sector 
enterprises in Arkhangelsk were to be found among harvesting firms (more than 80 percent in 
2002), while the shares for woodworking and pulp and paper were much lower (66 and 38 
percent, respectively). Thus, insolvency is likely to be most common among harvesting 
enterprises.46 Data about bankruptcies in Arkhangelsk Oblast are hard to come by. According 
to the head of the regional tax authorities bankruptcy procedures were under way for 305 
enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast by 1 January 2006. Of these, 41 were under observation, 
one was under financial rehabilitation, 19 under external administration, and 244 were 
bankrupt and under liquidation.47 The Arkhangelsk regional administration calculated the total 
sum of taxes that were not paid to the regional budget due to intentional (fraudulent) 
bankruptcies of enterprises in the regional forest sector. For three of the four large forest 
holding companies in the region the unpaid tax debt for 2004 totaled more than 600 million 
rubles.48  
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 “More hostile takeovers for Russia”, The Russia Journal, 24 April 2006 (retrieved 1 September 2005, from 
http://www.russiajournal.com/2006/04/24/more-hostile-takeovers-for russia/). Criticizing the law on bankruptcy 
the Chamber of Industry and Commerce President Yevgeny Primakov in a conference address on 24 February 
2004, claimed that in Moscow alone annually more than 200 enterprises were objects of hostile takeover 
attempts (“Chamber President Criticizes New Law on Bankruptcies,” RIA Novosti, 24 February 2004. Retrieved 
1 September 2005 from http://en.rian.ru/business/20040224/39908532.html).  
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 “60% jobs saved during bankruptcy procedures last year,” RIA Novosti, 24 February 2004, (retrieved from 
http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040224/39908545.html). “Changes to Bankruptcy Law Backed,” The Moscow 
Times, 21 January 2005, p. 5 (retrieved 7 March 2006, from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/01/2 
1/043.html).  
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 Information in the press indicates that still by the beginning of 2006 many harvesting enterprises in 
Arkhangelsk Oblast are bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy (cf., for instance, “Lespromkhozy Arkhangelskoi 
oblasti nakhodiatsia na stadii bankrotstva” (Harvesting enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast are in a stage of 
bankruptcy), REGNUM Informatsionnoe agentstvo, 12 April 2006 (retrieved on 31 May 2006 from http://www. 
regnum.ru/news/622405.html).  
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 “305 predpriiatii Arkhangel’skoi oblasti i Nenetskogo AO―v protsedure bankrotstva” (305 enterprises in 
Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Nenets Autonomous Okug are in the process of bankruptcy), REGNUM 
Informatsionnoe agentstvo, 10 March 2006 (retrieved 31 May 2006, from http://www.regnum.ru/news/603714. 
html). 
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 The three holdings were GK Solombal’skii LDK and Lesozavod No. 3, GK Titan, and PLO Onegales (cf. 
Section 4.2). The numbers were given in “Administratsia Arkhangel’skoi oblasti pytaetsia vozdeistvovat’ na 
predprinimatelei” (The Administration of Arkhangelsk Oblast tries to influence the businessmen), REGNUM 
Informatsionnoe agentstvo, 15 February 2005 (retrieved 31 May 2006 from http://www.regnum.ru/news/407538. 
html). The total of 618 million rubles of unpaid taxes withheld as a consequence of intentional bankruptcies 
among enterprises belonging to these three holdings roughly corresponds to 10 percent of the 2004 regional 
budget income generated in the oblast, i.e., excluding federal transfers. (Budget figures for 2004 were retrieved 
on 1 June 2006, from http://www.dvinaland.ru/finance/bud_2005.asp?part=5).  
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5 Assessing the Market Adaptation of Fifteen 
Forest Enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast 
In this section the information collected through two surveys conducted among 
representatives of 15 forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast will be analyzed. The first 
survey was made in the period April–November 1998 and comprised interviews with 25 
forest enterprise representatives. In the second survey, made seven years later, in the period 
April–June 2005, interviews were conducted with representatives of 15 of the 25 forest 
enterprises that took part in the previous survey.49  
The 1998 survey allowed grouping the 25 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises into four categories 
depending upon their command of the two types of capital identified by the virtual economy 
theory (cf., Carlsson et al., 2001; Olsson, 2004a).50 In the selection of 15 of these 25 
enterprises for the 2005 survey the aim was to include a proportional number of enterprises 
from each of the four categories, as well as enterprises representing different production 
profiles (such as forest management, harvesting, woodworking, pulp and paper). After 
suggesting suitable candidates for the 2005 survey based upon the considerations just 
mentioned, it turned out that it was only possible to get access to 10 of our 15 “first choice” 
enterprises, five enterprises, therefore, had to be selected from the remaining 10 “second 
choice” enterprises (reserves). By and large, the distribution of the 15 enterprises that were 
finally included in the 2005 survey met our predetermined requirements. The number of 
enterprises selected for each of the four categories roughly corresponded to the proportions in 
the 1998 survey, and the selected 15 enterprises represented the different production profiles 
of the forest sector with one notable exception―no pulp and paper enterprise could be 
selected since access was not permitted.51  
A word of caution is in order before proceeding to the analysis of the survey. Since the 
selection of the comparatively small number of enterprises that took part in the two surveys in 
Arkhangelsk does not meet the requirements for a proper statistical sampling, the results of 
the analysis can only serve as an illustration of some of the tendencies discussed earlier in this 
report. Getting access to representatives of individual enterprises is a crucial problem when 
conducting a survey investigation in Russia.  
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 The two surveys in Arkhangelsk Oblast were both made by a resident Russian scholar, Dr. Mikhail Yu. 
Varakin of the Arkhangelsk State Technical University. The interviews were based on a questionnaire originally 
constructed by a group of researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) for a 
survey of some 220 forest enterprise representatives in eight Russian regions conducted in the period 1998–
1999. The questionnaire form was further elaborated by the current author before the 2005 round of interviews in 
Arkhangelsk. (An English version of the questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A.) 
50
 For more details on the two types of capital (d “distance reducing capital” and r “relational capital”) identified 
by the virtual economy theory, see Section 2 and the discussion in Section 5.1. The four categories comprised 
enterprises with, respectively, (a) short d “distance to the market”/low r “relational capital”; (b) short d/high r; 
(c) long d/high r; and (d) long d/low r. (From a market economic point of view, enterprises belonging to 
category (a) could be considered in command of the most favorable and those in category (d) the least favorable 
capital mix.) 
51
 Looking at the ten enterprises that took part in the 1998 survey but were not in the end selected for the 2005 
survey, it could be noted that (a) two enterprises no longer existed in 2005 (due to liquidation); (b) one was the 
pulp and paper mill not permitting access, one was a forest management company (leskhoz), three were 
harvesting companies, and three were woodworking enterprises (two sawmills and one furniture producer). In 
terms of r and d capital combination in 1998 (the four categories mentioned in the previous footnote) 3 of the 10 
enterprises not included in the 2005 survey belonged to group a, 1 to group b, 4 to group c, and 2 to group d. 
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The result of the 1998 survey of 25 forest enterprise representatives in Arkhangelsk Oblast 
was reported in Carlsson et al. (1999). An analysis of all surveys conducted in the eight 
Russian regions was reported in Carlsson et al. (2001). The following discussion takes its 
departure in both these earlier reports. The purpose of the present analysis based on both 
rounds of interviews is to assess whether or not in the last seven years the behavior of these 
enterprises has become more adapted to the requirements of a market economy. In other 
words, do these enterprises display a more market efficient behavior today compared to what 
they did in 1998? Are they, as we hypothesized initially, actually leaving the virtual economy 
to be increasingly guided by the rules governing business behavior in a market economy?  
5.1 Investment Behavior Among Fifteen Forest Enterprises in Arkhangelsk 
In their elaboration of the virtual economy theory, Gaddy and Ickes (2002)52 distinguished 
two kinds of investment behavior pursued by business managers in Russia during transition. 
Managers tend to favor one kind over the other depending upon previous investment behavior 
and the estimated net benefits of their available investment options. In general, a Russian firm 
can either invest in capital that will contribute to making the enterprise more market 
competitive (reducing its “distance” to the market), or it may invest in so-called relational 
capital that will help the enterprise to survive despite its market inefficiency. Examples of the 
former kind of capital (that Gaddy and Ickes call “d” for “distance reducing”) are modern 
production equipment or skills that are required to make production more efficient. By 
relational capital (labeled “r” by Gaddy and Ickes) is meant measures that will improve the 
enterprise’s relations with public authority officials, the purpose being to obtain various kinds 
of future benefits.53 In practice, enterprises will invest in both kinds of capital, but the relation 
between the two kinds will differ, with some enterprises favoring d over r and vice versa. In 
the Russian virtual economy, investments in relational capital (r) are typically pursued at the 
expense of investments in modern production capital (d). In a well-functioning market 
economy the opposite behavior predominates. Consequently, investments in d should have 
highest priority for a Russian enterprise striving to leave the virtual economy to engage 
instead in normal market operations. 
Enterprises could be characterized by their command of distance reducing (d) and relational 
capital (r). Thus, in principle, a group of enterprises could be compared by the “amount” of d 
and r capital at their command. Plotting their command of r against their command of d in a 
two-dimensional diagram (“r-d space”) would produce a visual image of the degree to which 
various enterprises are engaged in the virtual economy.  
In the synthesizing report from the 1998/99 survey investigation of forest enterprise behavior 
in eight Russian regions an attempt was made to produce such a diagram (see Carlsson et al., 
2001). Through a crude analysis of enterprise representatives’ answers to a number of survey 
questions it was possible to “measure” their propensity to invest in either r and/or d capital. 
The resulting diagram might be said to show the degree to which the virtual economy 
dominated the Russian forest sector in the eight regions taking part in the survey.  
By going back, in 2005, to 15 of the 25 forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast that took part 
in the previous IIASA survey of 1998/99 and comparing the answers given on the two 
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 For more details on the virtual economy theory, see references listed in footnote 4.  
53
 The notion of distance reducing capital and relational capital is discussed in some detail in Chapter 4 of Gaddy 
and Ickes (2002).  
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occasions by the representatives of the same 15 enterprises it is possible to construct a 
diagram showing how the positions of the respective enterprises in the r–d space have 
changed in the last seven years.  
The measures used to place the respective enterprises in the r–d space were estimated through 
a very simple (unweighted) addition of the “yes answers” to the 20 question listed in Table 2. 
The same 20 questions were used for the assessment on both survey occasions. It could be 
noted that the questions used for the assessment intentionally try to capture some (limited) 
aspects of firms’ actual behavior as well as some (limited) aspects of their managers’ attitudes 
(or “mental models”), which are of great importance for forming the rationale for managers’ 
decisions to comply (or not to comply) with the existing system of rules governing business 
behavior and which ultimately play an important role for institutional change (North, 2005). 
Table 2: Questions used to assess the investment behavior of 15 forest enterprises in 
Arkhangelsk Oblast in 1998 and 2005. 
Relational Capital Orientation 
1. Uses barter in buying arrangements  
2. Uses barter in selling arrangements  
3. Negotiates but does nothing more to enforce broken buying agreements  
4. Negotiates but does nothing more to enforce broken selling agreements  
5. Has (multiple) social responsibilities  
6. Claims lack of privileges to be the most binding restriction for operating the firm  
7. Calls for privileges for the company in question concerning important forest policy 
changes 
8. Wants to become public again after being privatized or calls for ‘state coordination’, i.e., 
a state command economy to be reintroduced in the forest sector  
9. Increasing employment while decreasing productivity  
10. Increasing production while decreasing productivity  
Market Orientation (market distance reducers) 
1. Invests in equipment, buildings or education of the workforce  
2. Has bank relations on the buying side  
3. Has bank relations on the selling side  
4. Is not involved in barter on the buying side  
5. Is not involved in barter on the selling side 
6. Uses arbitration courts to enforce broken buying and/or selling contracts  
7. Regards workforce discipline and lack of entrepreneurial tradition and/or business ethics 
as important obstacles for operating the firm  
8. Identifies poor workforce skill as an important binding restriction for the firm  
9. Calls for efficient business legislation enforcement as a necessary change in policy in 
the forest sector  
10. Operates with constant or increasing productivity  
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Plotting the sum of positive answers to the two sets of questions listed in Table 2 gives every 
enterprise a unique position in the r–d space. The positions in 1998 and in 2005 for 12 of the 
15 surveyed enterprises are plotted in Figure 13. (Three forest management 
enterprises―leskhozy―were dropped from the set, since they are public authorities and as 
such are not allowed to perform commercial operations in the Russian economy.) 
An enterprise located towards the lower left corner of the diagram would indicate a highly 
market relevant investment behavior relying on capital that promotes market efficiency (d) 
without making (much) use of relational capital (r). An enterprise found far out towards the 
upper right corner of the diagram would indicate a behavior favoring relational capital and 
avoiding a restructuring of production activities to become more market efficient―a behavior 
largely guided by the institutional set-up characterizing the virtual economy.  
The general impression that is conveyed by the plot in Figure 13 is that the 12 Arkhangelsk 
forest enterprises have indeed reduced their “distance to the market” in the seven year period 
since 1998. Many of them have also simultaneously reduced their investments in relational 
capital.  
 
Note: Numbers in the plot refer to the individual enterprises that took part in our survey in 1998 and 2005. (For 
2005 enterprises have been marked white text in black squares). Three leskhozy have been excluded, since they 
are, in principle, a public authority. 
Figure 13: Twelve forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast: Change of position in the r–d 
space 1998–2005.  
In order to understand what distinguishes enterprises that display a faster adaptation to the 
requirements of a market economy from those that remain entrenched in the Russian virtual 
economy it might be useful to compare the enterprises that have improved their positions the 
most in the r–d space depicted in Figure 13 with those that have remained in an unfavorable 
position throughout the period of investigation. This is the focus of the next section. In 
subsequent sections focus will be shifted to the behavior of the 15 forest enterprises in our 
two Arkhangelsk surveys and how it relates to the picture that emerged from the previous 
analysis (in Section 4) of the indicators by which the virtual economy might be assessed.  
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But first it might be useful to take a brief look at Table 3 that summarizes some basic 
characteristics of the 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises that took part in our two surveys.  
Table 3: Basic characterization of the 15 surveyed Arkhangelsk forest enterprises. 
Period of Establishment 1881–1931 1943–1948 1964–1972 1985–1991 Total 
Number of enterprises in the survey 
of which: 
4 3 3 5 15 
Size:       
Large (> 343 employees) 3 2 1 0   6 
Medium (55-342) 1 1 0 4   6 
Small (< 55) 0 0 2 1   3 
Ownership:      
State owned 0 2 1 1   4 
Old public―privatized 4 1 2 3 10 
New private 0 0 0 1   1 
Joint venture 1 0 0 1   2 
Type of activity:      
Forest management (leskhoz) 0 1 0 1   2 
Forest 
management/harvesting/sawmilling 0 0 1 0     1
a
 
Harvesting 0 2 1 2   5 
Sawmilling/Processing 4 0 1 1   6 
Harvesting/Sawmilling 0 0 0 1   1 
a
 This is an agricultural leskhoz, a forest management unit sorting under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
(Agricultural leskhozy are allowed to perform certain operations in the market.)  
The table shows that the largest enterprises in our survey were also the oldest―one 
established already in the late 19th century―and they were all sawmills or wood processing 
enterprises. All of them were privatized and one is today a joint venture. Four of the 15 
enterprises in our group are state owned (three of them are forest management enterprises, 
leskhozy, and one is an old harvesting enterprise). There is only one new private enterprise in 
the group. In terms of type of activity we find five harvesting companies (lespromkhozy), six 
sawmilling/processing, and one harvesting/sawmilling company in the surveyed group. It 
could be noted that there is no pulp and paper company among the 15 enterprises in our 
group.54  
Figure 14 illustrates some aspects of the structural and behavioral changes that have taken 
place among the surveyed forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast in the seven year period 
since 1998. The general picture conveyed in the figure supports the impression given in 
Figure 13 showing enterprises’ changed positions in the r–d space. The number of surveyed 
enterprises displaying a market oriented behavior has increased between 1998 and 2005. 
However, the figure also reveals some seemingly contradictory evidence. So, for instance, it 
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 Two pulp and paper enterprises took part in our 1998 survey. In the 2005 survey, it was not possible to gain 
access to any such enterprise at all.  
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could be noticed that the number of joint ventures decreased, as did the number of enterprises 
that made investments. The number of enterprises that exported part of their production was 
the same in 2005 as in 1998.  
At the time of the survey the enterprise ...
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
… was a joint venture
… was a subs idiary to a holding com pany
… had changed director in the las t few years
… had increased employment in the las t five years
… had increased production in the las t five years
… had increas ing labor productivity in the las t five years
… was m aking inves tm ents  
… exported som e of its  production
… could purchase enough raw materials  (wood)
… had no problem s with purchase agreem ents
… had no problem s with sales  agreem ents
… saw financial problems as  the m ost serious  res triction
… called for an improved regional fores t policy
Num ber of enterprises
1998 2005
 
Figure 14: Some results of the surveys made among representatives of forest enterprises in 
Arkhangelsk Oblast in 1998 and 2005.  
5.2 Characterizing Enterprises Displaying a Strong vs. Enterprises 
Displaying a Weak Market Adaptation in the Period 1998–2005 
In order to identify features of importance for an enterprise’s adaptation to a more market 
efficient behavior it should be useful to compare what characterizes an enterprise that has 
moved farthest away in the r–d space from an unfavorable to a favorable position in the 
period 1998–2005. In Figure 13, two or three such enterprises can easily be found. The most 
obvious case is Enterprise no. 12 that moved (in both the r and d dimensions) from the 
“worst” position to one of the best. Another possible candidate is Enterprise no. 13 that 
moved (in the d dimension only) from a middle position in 1998 to the best position in 2005. 
The third candidate would be Enterprise no. 3 that moved (also in the d dimension only) from 
a very bad position to a middle position.  
Many of the questions posed in the two rounds of surveys aimed at finding out how the 
enterprises behaved when confronted with an issue of importance for its market 
competitiveness. By comparing the answers to 23 questions offered by the respondents 
representing the three enterprises that improved their positions in r–d space the most between 
1998 and 2005 (Enterprises no. 12, 13, and 3) with the three that remained in a comparatively 
unfavorable position also at the end of the period (Enterprises no. 15, 2, and 1) we can 
identify a number of features that characterize a Russian forest enterprise capable of adapting 
to the demands of a market economy.  
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Let us first compare the answers to these 23 questions given by Enterprise no. 12―the 
enterprise that improved its position in the r–d space most dramatically from one of the least 
favorable positions (in the market sense) in 1998 to one of the most favorable in 2005―with 
the answers given by Enterprise no. 15―an enterprise that was in a comparatively 
unfavorable position in 1998 and moved to an even more unfavorable position in 2005. 
Assessing the answers given to the questions as either positive or negative from a market 
economic point of view it was found that, in 1998, when both enterprises were in an 
unfavorable position, the two enterprises gave “market positive” answers to merely 7 and 8 of 
the 23 questions, respectively. In 2005, Enterprise 12 displaying the most positive 
improvement of position in the r–d space gave “market positive” answers to 19 of the same 
23 questions (an increase by 2.7 times), while Enterprise no. 15 remaining in a highly 
unfavorable position in the r–d space, gave “market positive” answers only to 12 questions 
(an increase of 1.5 times).  
A comparison of the three enterprises having improved their position in the r–d space the 
most (“market adapting” or “MA” enterprises) with the three that remained in an unfavorable 
position (“non-adapting” or “NMA” enterprises) indicates that MA enterprises are privately 
owned, have passed the stage of “insider ownership” and are owned by “other companies or 
juridical persons,” have changed their managements in recent years, make capital 
investments, and use long-term contracts when acquiring raw material (timber).  
In 2005, no significant differences between the three MA and the three NMA enterprises 
could be observed with regard to exports (none of the six enterprises sold products to foreign 
customers), social responsibilities (most of them had such responsibilities), use of bank 
credits (none used bank credits), use of other bank services (all used banks for payments), 
input procurement (all could acquire enough raw materials for their production), and 
violations of sales agreements (none reported having such problems).  
In the next section the behavior of the 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises, as it is captured by 
the answers provided by the respondents to our surveys in 1999 and 2005, will be compared 
with the picture that emerged from the previous analysis of the structural and behavioral 
indicators (cf. Section 4).  
5.3 The Forest Enterprises in Our Survey Illustrate Recent Tendencies 
in the Development of Russia’s Market Economy 
In this section we will see to what extent the behavior of the 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises 
that took part in our surveys in 1998 and 2005 conforms to what could be expected on the 
basis of the previous analysis of the current status of the emerging Russian market economy 
(cf. Section 4). The following features will be discussed: (1) enterprise structure, (2) 
production orientation, (3) investments and bank relations, (4) exports, (5) input and output 
situation, (6) employment and productivity, (7) payment arrangements, (8) violation of 
transaction agreements, and (9) social responsibilities.  
(1) Enterprise structure. The structural changes that could be observed among the 15 
Arkhangelsk forest enterprises taking part in our surveys deserve closer attention.  
First we could note that the one enterprise in our survey remaining privately owned 
throughout the period of our investigation (1998–2005) was a small previously state owned 
enterprise [1] engaged for some years in timber processing but resuming again harvesting as 
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its main activity after 2000. As can be seen in Figure 13 this enterprise significantly reduced 
its dependence upon relational capital (r) in the seven year period after 1998. While in 1998, 
six of our 15 enterprises were (partly) owned by “insiders” (managers and/or employees); in 
2005 this number was down to two. In 1998, only one enterprise [2] was owned by one or 
several “companies/juridical persons” (which could be considered the most “advanced” form 
of ownership from a market economic point of view). In 2005, there were six such enterprises 
[6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13], all of them subsidiaries to holding companies.  
As previous studies have shown (cf., for instance, Carlsson et al., 2001), forest enterprises 
with some foreign ownership share (joint ventures) are more likely to invest in their 
production than purely Russian owned enterprises. Among the Arkhangelsk forest enterprises 
that were surveyed in 1998 there were five joint ventures [2, 9, 11, 12, 14]. In the recent 2005 
survey only two of these enterprises remained joint ventures [2, 14]. Three of these previous 
joint ventures [9, 11, 12] had by 2005 been incorporated into holding companies. It can be 
noticed that the increased dominance of holding companies (or FIGs―financial-industrial 
groups) in the Russian economy (cf. Section 4) is reflected in the fact that while there was 
only one of the enterprises [10] in our 1998 survey that belonged to a holding company, by 
2005 as many as seven of our 15 surveyed enterprises belonged to such a company. Two of 
these enterprises [12, 13], both harvesting companies (lespromkhozy), were reregistered after 
bankruptcy some years back. In the process, both enterprises were taken over by a holding 
company led by another enterprise in our survey [10]. A fourth enterprise [6] in our survey, a 
sawmill, also belongs to the same holding. In the Arkhangelsk media the group of enterprises 
brought together in this holding company goes under the name “Solombala LDK and Forest 
Factory No. 3.” Two of the three remaining subsidiaries that took part in our survey [9, 11] 
belong to ArcticLes (which is part of FIG Arctic Technologies). The third holding subsidiary 
[8] belongs to a group locally known as “Severo-Zapad,” which is a management company 
working for Basoviy element (belonging to SibAl).55  
Becoming a subsidiary to a holding company might entail substantial benefits for an 
enterprise (Tushunov, 2005). In Figure 13, we can clearly see how five of the seven 
enterprises belonging to a holding company [6, 9, 11, 12, 13] improved their market 
competitiveness (moved towards the lower left corner in the r–d space diagram) in the period 
1998–2005. One enterprise [8] reduced its dependence on relational capital (r), but somewhat 
increased its distance to the market (d). Another enterprise [10], itself a leading company in 
one of the holding groups, did not decrease its d, but curiously seems to have slightly 
increased its r. This is a comparatively large enterprise and as such it is more likely to have 
better access to relational capital, and be more prone and able to use non-market solutions to 
various problems it has to face (cf. Carlsson et al., 2001).  
Turning now to a review of the behavior of our surveyed enterprises with respect to (some of) 
the behavioral indicators that were discussed in Section 4, we will keep track of the seven 
holding subsidiaries to see if we can discern any differences in the behavior of these 
enterprises compared to the other enterprises in our survey.  
(2) Production orientation. First, we can note that only two of our 15 enterprises [1, 2] 
changed their production orientation in the period 1998–2005. For the first of the two 
                                                 
55
 It is difficult to disentangle the ownership relations between holding companies and their subsidiaries. 
Ownership relations are still highly non-transparent in Russia. The information about ownership that enterprise 
representatives provided in our interviews was only sketchy. The World Bank has made an attempt to map out 
the ownership relations among the Russian FIGs (cf. footnotes 25 and 26).  
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enterprises the change meant a reduction of complexity (changing from lumber to round 
wood), for the second the change went in the opposite direction―from round wood to a mix 
of round wood and lumber.  
(3) Investments and bank relations. Our 1999 survey (as reported in Carlsson et al., 1999) 
indicated that merely seven of 25 enterprises (28 percent) invested to improve their 
production equipment. This low share was all the more surprising considering the fact that the 
efficient operation of most enterprises was hampered by an aging or obsolete capital stock. 
Since traditionally many enterprises were producing a limited number of products, there 
should also be a need for investments in order to enable a more diversified production, 
making enterprises more market competitive.  
Only one of the seven firms that did invest in their businesses in 1999 financed its 
investments through bank loans. Typically, the firms making investments funded their 
investments themselves. In general, as revealed in our 1999 survey, only around 20 percent of 
the Arkhangelsk forest firms had any relations with the banking system. The lack of bank 
relations was said to depend upon security and trust problems.56  
Looking at the enterprises in our 2005 survey we saw already in Figure14 that actually more 
of these 15 enterprises invested in their operations in 1998 than in 2005. While four of the 15 
enterprises [8, 10, 11, 14] made investments in 1998, there were only three (different) 
investors in 2005 [7, 12, 13], one of which [7] was a leskhoz. (The two holding subsidiaries 
[12, 13] attribute their investments to the holding company to which they belong. Investments 
were made in new technology and the construction of forest roads and they contributed to a 
substantial production increase.) None of the enterprises that invested in their business in 
1999 and 2005 used loans from Russian banks to finance their investments. (In 1998, one of 
the 15 enterprises―two in 2005―used banks for short term business credits.) However, 
almost all of our 15 enterprises report having some relations to banks on both survey 
occasions.  
(4) Exports. It could be expected that enterprises displaying a market oriented behavior would 
also sell (part of) their production abroad. Looking at our survey data we find, however, that 
the same three of our 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises [2, 10, 11] on both survey occasions 
reported selling some of their production on export. One of these enterprises [2] was a joint 
venture, one [10] has been a part of a holding company during the whole investigated period, 
and the third [11] was a joint venture in 1998, subsequently bought by a holding group.  
(5) Input and output situation. In our 1999 survey about 60 percent of the Arkhangelsk forest 
enterprises reported a shortage of wood for processing, a somewhat surprising number, 
considering the fact that the region is a major player in the Russian forest sector. Raw material 
supply should really not be a problem. (The situation seemed more aggravated in Arkhangelsk 
compared with the other regions that took part in our survey.) Two thirds of the companies 
experiencing a shortage of wood stated lack of financial resources as the major reason for 
their problems. The situation was seen as an indication of a serious dysfunction in the 
Arkhangelsk forest sector.  
Excluding the three leskhozy and looking at the 12 forest enterprises that took part in both our 
surveys, we find that, while eight of them were hampered by a shortage of raw materials in 
1999, none had such problems in 2005.  
                                                 
56
 For comparison it could be mentioned that 85 percent of the 24 northern Swedish forest firms in our 1999 
survey invested in their businesses. Almost 80 percent of the Swedish forest firms had good relations with banks. 
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As for output development, we can note that nine of the 12 enterprise reported a more or less 
dramatic production decrease for the period 1993–1998, while only three of the 11 enterprises 
that disclosed their production volumes had decreased their production in the period 1998–
2005. The remaining eight enterprises all reported constant or increasing production volumes. 
(Of the seven holding subsidiaries, two [8, 10] reported a constant or moderately decreasing 
production volume, while three [6, 9, 13] reported dramatically increased production volumes 
in the period 1998–2005.) 
(6) Employment and productivity. Despite some uncertainty in the data―Russian enterprises 
are (still) reluctant to disclose exact information about production and employment 
changes―we find that the relation between employment and productivity observed for the 
period 1998–2005 indicates a more market efficient behavior for twelve of our fifteen 
Arkhangelsk forest enterprises, compared to the behavior observed for the previous period 
1993–1998. In the earlier period, nine enterprises operated with a decreasing staff as well as a 
decreasing productivity―only three enterprises [3, 8, 12] increased their productivity while 
simultaneously decreasing their employment. In the later period (1998–2005), as many as six 
enterprises decreased their employment while at the same time increasing their productivity, 
which represents a behavior that might be expected for many enterprises operating in a mature 
market economy. Three enterprises [1, 9, 11] managed to increase their productivity while at 
the same time increasing their employment. In a mature market economy this would represent 
a behavior typical for a rapidly expanding company (see Figure 15). (We can also note that 
four of the six enterprises that increased their productivity while decreasing their employment 
[6, 8, 12, 13] were subsidiaries to holding companies.)  
 
Figure 15: Employment and productivity change for the 15 surveyed Arkhangelsk forest 
enterprises 1993–1998 and 1998–2005. (Based on data obtained through our 
surveys.) 
(7) Payment arrangements. The 1998 survey (cf. Carlsson et al., 1999) also revealed that 
around 50 percent of the 25 forest firms in Arkhangelsk taking part in that study to some 
extent used barter trade when selling their produce. Similar shares were found in all the eight 
regions in our study. (Other studies, such as Aukutsionek (1998) and Makarov and Kleiner 
(2000), have claimed the cash-less economy to be even larger.) There was also a serious 
problem with trust. For instance, in 1998, more than 75 percent of all forest enterprises in our 
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Arkhangelsk survey required their customers to pay for purchased goods before or upon 
delivery. Only two firms accepted payment after delivery.57  
Looking at the 15 of the same 25 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises that took part also in the 
2005 survey we find that, in 1998, six of them used barter to some extent in their sales 
transactions, while merely one of them used it in connection with input purchases. In 2005, 
none of the 15 enterprises in the survey reports using barter in their purchase and sales 
transactions. Furthermore, none of our 15 enterprises reports using in-kind payments or off-
sets to pay for their tax debts.  
By 2005, all enterprises reported using banks for transferring payments in connection with 
their purchase as well as their sales transactions. Both in 1998 and in 2005, in general 
enterprises were required to make payments for purchases on or before delivery. Similarly, for 
their sales, most enterprises required payment from their customers on or before delivery, 
with practices differing somewhat more between the enterprises in 1998 (when barter featured 
more prominently) than in 2005.  
(8) Violation of transaction agreements. As was indicated in Figure 14, in 1998, about half 
of our 15 surveyed enterprises reported having some problems (big or small) with violations 
of purchase and sales agreements. In 2005, only one enterprise reported having such 
problems. The practice of using written contracts for regulating purchase transactions 
increased significantly during the period of investigation. In 1998, seven of our 15 enterprises 
used signed contracts for these transactions. In 2005, eleven enterprises used such a 
procedure. (Contracts seem to have been used throughout the period by most enterprises to 
regulate their sales transactions.) 
(9) Social responsibilities. In 1998, the wide use of non-monetary based transactions reported 
among the Arkhangelsk forest enterprises was also reflected in the fact that around 50 percent 
of the firms provided social services for their employees―typically they provided consumer 
goods, child care and schooling (Carlsson et al., 1999). It was assumed that such provision of 
communal services was often “paid for” by the local municipalities through tax exemptions or 
tax reductions.  
Looking at respondents’ answers in our 2005 survey we find that the practice of providing 
social services for employees is still prominent among the 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises. 
In fact, the number of enterprises in our survey that did not provide any such services 
decreased from nine enterprises in 1998 to seven in 2005. In 1998, the services provided by 
the enterprises were mostly related to procurement of consumer goods and health care. By 
2005, in addition, housing as well as child care and schooling were also mentioned among the 
social responsibilities belonging to the surveyed enterprises. It is difficult not to believe that 
the enterprises would not be compensated in one way or another by the public authorities for 
the provision of these social services (for instance, in the form of tax off-sets).58  
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 This is in sharp contrast to the practice among Swedish forest firms. Here, almost all firms accept payment up 
to 30 days after delivery. 
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 Gaddy and Ickes (2005) report, however, that there seems to be greater transparency lately concerning 
enterprises’ social spending. They mention two large oil companies (Lukoil and Sibneft) that have publicized 
their activities in this field. They now issue their own “annual social report,” which is, as the authors call it, “a 
public account of its informal taxes.” Thus, as of recently, enterprises seem to be looking for ways to capitalize 
on their good-will.  
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5.4 Managers’ Attitudes to and Understanding 
of the Emerging Russian Market System 
The survey contained four questions intended to capture managers’ attitudes and ideas about 
solutions to various problems they perceived as hampering the efficient activity of their 
enterprises. (1) The first question sought to identify formal rules and regulations that 
managers perceived as obstacles to their enterprises’ activities. (2) The second question gave 
the respondents an opportunity to list other problems they saw as obstacles for a successful 
business. (3) The third question aimed at identifying the single most binding restriction on the 
activity of the firm. (4) The fourth question, finally, asked managers to state what they would 
change in the Russian forest sector given the opportunity. The same questions were posed on 
both survey occasions, in 1998 and in 2005.  
Let us briefly look at the answers given by the representatives of our 15 forest enterprises to 
each of these questions.  
(1) Problems with formal rules and regulations. As could be expected, representatives of the 
three forest management enterprises (leskhozy) [4, 5, 7] that took part in our survey saw many 
problems related to the current Russian forest legislation. But five other enterprise 
representatives [1, 6, 10, 11, 12] also saw the forest legislation as a problem in 2005 (in 1999 
only one of these enterprises [1] did so).  
Taxation rules were also mentioned as causing problems by three respondents [4, 5, 7] in 
1999, and by four [2, 4, 7, 8] in 2005. One enterprise [3] mentioned enforcement of the 
existing business legislation―and not the rules as such―as an important obstacle.  
(2) Other problems considered obstacles for business. Among other problems that might 
present an obstacle for enterprises’ business the dominating issue mentioned concerned 
obsolete technology/lack of capital. This was stated as a problem by eight of the 15 
respondents in 1998 and by eleven in 2005. Two enterprise managers [1, 14] mention lack of 
entrepreneurial tradition and management competence as serious obstacles. One respondent 
[3] mentioned problems related to product development and finding new markets and another 
two enterprise representatives [8, 9] mentioned current business practices as a pertinent 
obstacle for a successful business.  
(3) The single most binding restriction on operations. Judging from the answers to both our 
surveys the single most binding restriction on enterprises’ activity was lack of capital, which 
was mentioned by the representatives of six enterprises [1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 15] in 1998. In 2005, 
all in all eight enterprise managers [1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13] saw lack of capital as the single 
most binding restriction on their activity―the number includes two enterprises [2, 8] stating 
“technology” as their single most binding restriction, which might be regarded as essentially a 
problem with lack of capital. The tax legislation was mentioned by two respondents [8, 11] in 
1998, while none of the 15 enterprise representatives mentioned tax legislation as the single 
most binding restriction on their activity in 2005. Two enterprise managers [3, 14] saw 
finding a market as the most binding restriction on their operations in 2005. Lack of privilege 
or state support was mentioned as the most binding restriction in 2005 by the representative 
of one enterprise [15], itself a state owned lespromkhoz.   
(4) Changes required in the Russian forest sector. Stating, in 1998, what they would change 
in the Russian forest sector given the opportunity one enterprise representative [1] mentioned 
that he would prefer his enterprise to become publicly owned again. Three other respondents 
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[2, 9, 15] declared that they wanted to see a better state coordination of the forest sector. One 
enterprise representative [14] would like to improve the forest legislation, while another [10] 
would improve law enforcement.  
In 2005, there were three enterprise representatives [9, 12, 15] calling for better state 
coordination, and four [2, 8, 11, 13] calling for improvements in the forest legislation. One 
respondent [3] called for improved law enforcement.  
5.5 Arkhangelsk Forest Enterprises and Civil Society 
In a situation where state authority is weak and rules governing business activity are being 
elaborated and constantly changed it could be claimed that society does not provide the 
services that economic actors need and are entitled to expect. In such a situation collective 
action by the enterprises themselves might prove instrumental. It would seem that enterprises 
should have much to gain from membership in various kinds of business associations.59 
However, our two surveys among 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises revealed that only very 
few―in 1998 one [10] and in 2005 two [6, 10]―enterprises were members of a business 
association. Some enterprises compared being a subsidiary to a holding company with being a 
member of a business organization. Clearly, there is still a certain reluctance among Russian 
firms to engage in non-governmental organizations, the reason perhaps being―as suggested 
by one respondent to our survey―that there is no suitable organization that might take on and 
do something about the problems facing enterprises in the forest sector.  
Another way of trying to make society improve conditions for business life would be for 
enterprise owners and managers to engage in politics as elected members of a parliamentary 
congregation. In 2005, three of the 15 surveyed enterprises [1, 6, 10] had representatives who 
were members of an elected parliamentary assembly. Leading managers or members of the 
council of directors were members of a city/district council or the regional council (Duma). 
None of the respondents representing these enterprises explained why they had sought this 
membership and whether it had brought them any benefits or general improvements in the 
“social embedding” of the enterprises’ activities.  
With the dismantling of the Soviet mode of production, where workers and managers were 
seen as having an equal and joint interest in the development of their enterprises, and the 
emergence of a Russian market economy, it would seem that various categories of enterprise 
employees should have much to gain from trade union membership. In our 2005 survey 
respondents were asked about how many of the enterprise’s employees were trade union 
members. Answers indicate a very high level of trade union membership―between 90 and 
100 percent in 2000 as well as in 2005. Only three enterprises [1, 9, 14] did not have any 
employees who were trade union members. Eight respondents claim that interaction with 
trade unions has changed character in the last 15 years. More attention is nowadays paid to 
workers’ social problems and rights, much of which is regulated through collective 
agreements.  
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 In a recent article William Pyle (2006) discusses the economic logic of Russian business associations.  
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5.6 How to Improve Enterprises’ Market Efficiency 
In the 2005 survey respondents representing the 15 Arkhangelsk forest enterprises were faced 
with seven suggestions for improving their enterprises’ market efficiency and asked to state 
the degree of importance they attributed to each one of these suggestions. It turned out that 
some of the suggestions found a generally lower support than others. So, for instance, there 
were very few of our 15 respondents who wanted to try to influence politics/politicians in 
order to create a better business environment. Actually only one enterprises [11] gave this 
proposal highest priority. Eleven enterprises did not find it important at all. The proposal to 
influence politics/politicians to acquire special privileges for the enterprise got even less 
support―almost all enterprises (14 out of 15)―thought this to be “not important.”  
The proposal to improve the efficiency of production through investments in new technology 
got high support from ten enterprises, while four enterprises [5, 7, 9, 14] found the proposal 
not particularly interesting―two of these enterprises [5, 7] are leskhozy. (One could note that 
the agricultural leskhoz [4] found this proposal very interesting.) 
Eight enterprises [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15] found the proposal to improve the efficiency of 
production through organizational changes to be very important. (Note that three enterprises 
[4, 5, 7] are leskhozy, forest management enterprises.) 
A remarkably small share of the 15 surveyed enterprises, only three firms [3, 9, 14], thought 
that developing new products to allow entry into new markets was very important. The 
remaining twelve enterprises found this proposal uninteresting.  
Five enterprises [10, 11, 12, 13, 15] found the proposal to improve work productivity through 
recruitment of new personnel with a modern education to be very interesting. However, eight 
enterprises [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] found this proposal uninteresting.  
Seven enterprises [2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11] found the proposal to improve work productivity 
through education of the existing personnel to be uninteresting. Another five respondents [1, 
6, 8, 10, 15] were indifferent.  
6 Assessment and Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Result of the Assessment 
Let us state the main result of our assessment right at the outset: Based on the analysis 
performed in the current report we cannot refute the hypothesis that the Russian economy is 
leaving the virtual economy and is increasingly functioning according to rules guiding 
business behavior in a market economy. However, this does not mean that the institutional 
set-up constituting the virtual economy has vanished altogether. On the contrary, several 
distinguishing traits of the virtual economy are still manifested in many walks of Russian 
economic life. But the main development tendency seems clear; the virtual economy is losing 
ground and will eventually disappear, even if it may influence economic behavior for a long 
time yet.  
The reasoning underpinning this result is briefly summarized below. The development of the 
Russian virtual economy was examined with the help of a number of indicators describing 
structural as well as behavioral changes in the economy, on the federal, regional (Arkhangelsk 
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Oblast) and the enterprise level (Arkhangelsk forest sector enterprises). It was argued that the 
general development tendencies that could be observed ought to be similar at all three levels. 
This was also substantiated in the analysis of the selected indicators. In this section, therefore, 
no explicit distinction will be made between the various levels. The behavior of the 
Arkhangelsk forest enterprises revealed through our survey investigations of 1998 and 2005 
will be compared with the general development depicted through the selected indicators.  
6.1.1 Indications of Increased Market Adaptation  
The rapid inflation following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Russian 
enterprises resort to non-monetary transactions. The demonetized share of the Russian 
economy grew to immense proportions, culminating in the second half of the 1990s. This 
development made enterprises’ mutual transactions largely non-transparent to outsiders, be 
they other enterprises, representatives of public authorities or ordinary citizens. The non-
transparency greatly facilitated the emergence and functioning of the virtual economy.  
Towards the end of the 1990s inflation was curbed, which led to a remonetization of the 
economy establishing a price formation system based on perceived supply and demand that 
forced enterprises to adopt more transparent and predictable modes of transacting. Barter 
trade, for instance, seems to have been largely abandoned (a tendency that was clearly 
illustrated in our survey investigation of Arkhangelsk forest enterprises). This is probably the 
change in Russian society that has been―and still is―contributing the most to the ongoing 
dismantling of the virtual economy.  
With the remonetized Russian economy wage and payment arrears also decreased. After the 
1998 financial crisis Russian enterprises started to make capital investments. But investments 
(like production output) had decreased dramatically during the first half of the decade and 
towards the mid 2010s total investments in Russia were still only around 40 percent of their 
1990 level. In the Arkhangelsk economy total investments had reached over 50 percent. 
However, the tendency is not equally clear for the Arkhangelsk forest sector. It could be noted 
that the number of forest enterprises in our Arkhangelsk survey that made investments 
actually declined between 1998 and 2005, the reason probably being that they still had idle 
capacity that could be used for increasing their production.  
At the regional level the development of the Russian forest sector is hampered by insufficient 
investments in roads for transporting timber from (often remote) harvesting sites to more 
centrally located processing industries. Institutional hurdles preventing state support of such 
road investments are nowadays discussed and creative solutions seem to be under way.  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was followed by a rapid and practically all-
encompassing privatization of state enterprises in Russia. When faced with an emerging 
strong competition a large part of the privatized enterprises were, however, forced to operate 
according to the informal rules defining the virtual economy. But privatization eventually also 
produced some desired effects in terms of improved corporate governance. Perhaps even more 
important was the fact that barriers, previously preventing the establishment of new 
enterprises, were dismantled resulting in a rapid growth of the number of enterprises. New 
small enterprises have come to play an ever more important role in the Russian economy. 
Today there is an increasing number of them, they tend to employ an increasing share of the 
workforce, and they invest and produce relatively more than larger enterprises. The increased 
number of enterprises means that most Russian citizens nowadays are in direct and frequent 
contact with private business (both as employees and as consumers) thereby acquiring an 
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understanding of the principles underlying the functioning of a market economy. Thus, they 
tend to discard the “mental models” that were produced by the previous command economy 
and they are increasingly developing an adequate understanding of the emerging market 
system. This is an important change contributing to the dismantling of the virtual economy.  
The turbulence created by the transition in Russia leading to a deep economic crisis had, as it 
seems, basically no negative effect on education. The changes might have made life 
somewhat more difficult for old established educational institutions, but it stimulated the 
establishment of new institutions and forced the older ones to reorganize to better 
accommodate the demands raised by the new social order and meet a hardening competition 
on the “educational market.” Education is a powerful agent of social change and economic 
development. Throughout the transition student enrollments and graduations in Russia 
indicate that authorities and citizens alike continue to appreciate the value of higher 
education. The observed tendency constitutes support for the further development of the 
emerging Russian market system. The fact that the study of business administration 
(management) attracts an increasing interest is another sign of “market behavior” manifesting 
itself―previously enterprise managers were typically engineers rather than economists.  
As could be expected, with the elimination of some of the features characterizing the virtual 
economy and the gradual introduction of an institutional set-up supporting a more efficient 
market behavior, production volumes once again started to grow in the second half of the 
1990s. Capacity utilization increased. However, still ten years later output volumes had not 
(yet) reached their pre-transition levels. Employment followed much the same pattern, with 
initially decreasing and subsequently―after 1998―increasing employment rates. In 
combination with the fact that the Russian economy was also affected by structural 
changes―the private sector produced an increased share of total output, the service sector 
grew at the expense of industry, both labor productivity and incomes improved radically, 
etc.―the output and employment increases may be seen to indicate that Russian enterprises 
were gradually abandoning the virtual economy.  
Fifteen Arkhangelsk Forest Sector Enterprises Revisited  
Looking again at 15 of the 25 forest sector enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast that took part in 
our 1998 survey of forest enterprises, in eight Russian regions it was found that several 
features of the development during the last seven years indicate that the surveyed enterprises 
are indeed increasingly being guided by rules governing business behavior in a market 
economy. Following Gaddy and Ickes’ (2002) reasoning on Russian enterprises’ investment 
behavior that might favor measures intended either to make enterprises’ operations more 
market efficient (investing in capital that would reduce d, their “distance to the market”) or to 
improve their relations to the political power (increasing r, their “relational capital”) it was 
found that the general behavior among the 15 firms that were revisited in the new 2005 survey 
had changed since 1998 to increasingly favor investments in capital improving market 
efficiency (d).  
The three enterprises in our survey that changed their command of d and r in the most 
favorable direction between 1998 and 2005―that is, the enterprises that favored investments 
in d at the expense of r thereby obtaining resources allowing them to act in a more market 
efficient way, could be distinguished from the three that kept a comparatively inefficient mix 
of d and r capital, through the following characteristics:  
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• None of the three most swiftly market adapting enterprises were state owned. They 
were instead private companies having passed the stage of insider ownership now 
mainly being owned by juridical persons.  
• They invested in equipment and skills making their activities more market efficient.  
• Their interactions with suppliers and customers had become more institutionalized 
(long-term contracts for purchases and sales, harvesting from leased lands) ensuring a 
secure input supply. This also reduced their problems with violations of business 
agreements. 
• They had new managers appointed in the last few years. 
Looking at all of the 15 Arkhangelsk forest sector enterprises that were revisited in 2005 we 
found several development tendencies indicating that they had changed their behavior to 
increasingly act in accordance with rules governing a market economy:  
• Many enterprises had been incorporated into large holding companies. 
• No one used barter trade any more. 
• All had some relations to the banking system (typically using banks to arrange 
payments). 
• While most enterprises had decreasing output volumes until around 1998, almost all of 
them increased their production after this year.  
• More enterprises had increasing productivity and decreasing employment in the period 
1998–2004 compared to the preceding five year period.  
• While many enterprises reported problems with the implementation of business 
agreements in the period 1993–1998, almost no enterprise reported such problems in 
the period after 1998. 
• In 1998, about half of the interviewed enterprises reported having problems with wood 
supply. No enterprise reported having such problems in 2005. Thus, market relations 
seem to have started making an impact resulting in the re-establishment of inter-
enterprise delivery networks.  
• As for managers’ attitudes to and understanding of the emerging Russian market 
system, our interviews indicated that very few thought it important to try to influence 
politicians to improve conditions for business. Surprisingly few (less than 1/3) 
complained about the tax legislation and implementation. Two thirds stressed the 
importance of capital investments (noting the financial difficulties making actual 
investments insignificant) and the necessity to restructure enterprises’ activities to 
become more efficient in the new market environment. All this indicates that 
managers have a rather good understanding of the requirements of the emerging 
market economy and are disposed to take efficiency improving measures given the 
opportunity. 
6.1.2 Some Observed Tendencies That Are Difficult to Interpret 
Some development tendencies that are more ambiguous to interpret should also be noted. 
While population characteristics are generally considered important for economic 
development, it is difficult to assess the relation between changes in various population 
variables and changes in the Russian virtual economy. The declining total population of 
Arkhangelsk Oblast might be the result of a number of factors. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that the entire settlement pattern and the comparatively large population of 
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Arkhangelsk Oblast, which was a result of the deliberate development policies pursued during 
the Soviet era, would be affected by the dismantling of the command economy during the 
1990s. It was argued above that an economic development guided by market principles would 
probably have led to a radically different settlement and population pattern in Russia. The 
decline in population numbers that could be witnessed in the 1990s might thus be seen as a 
result of the emerging market forces exerting their influence on resource allocation. But it 
might also be seen merely as a consequence of the general turmoil caused by the transition. 
Whatever the interpretation, we should note that the development of the economically 
dependent demographic variables (life expectancy, infant mortality, etc.) indicates that the 
economy of Arkhangelsk Oblast has not (yet) significantly improved to make a very positive 
impact on these variables. Compared with the situation in a modern market economy (like 
Sweden) it is obvious that the scope for improvements is still very high.  
Institutions regulating enterprises’ smooth and orderly entry into and exit from the market are 
extremely essential for the efficient functioning of a market economy. Market entry barriers 
seem to have been largely dismantled in Russia, but the rules governing market exit (close-
downs, bankruptcies) are still not functioning well despite several revisions of the legislation 
on insolvency. The legislation is still being reformed, but, reportedly, much remains yet to be 
done before the legislation becomes efficient. Still many enterprises are able to survive 
despite the fact that they are unprofitable. Until quite recently (before the last upgrade of the 
bankruptcy legislation in 2002) unlawful behavior was common among larger, richer firms in 
their attempts at taking over less financially sustainable enterprises (so-called hostile 
takeovers). Reports have it that bribes, pressure on the local legislature, regional 
administration officials, etc., were quite common in these processes. A cautious assessment 
might be that the reformation of the bankruptcy legislation (if it continues according to 
current plans) will be contributing to the elimination of the Russian virtual economy, by 
(hopefully) increasing transparency of bankruptcy proceedings and ensuring law-abiding and 
fair regulation of the redistribution of property rights.  
As indicated in our previous discussion, the Russian banking system has never been efficient 
in the market economic sense of providing financial services to enterprises. Banking in Russia 
always had other main objectives. However, the banking system is currently being reformed 
after the crises it went through in the late 1990s, the purpose being to make its services better 
able to support the development of Russian business life. The provision of efficient banking 
services is especially important for the further expansion of the SME sector that is considered 
crucial for the long-term development of the Russian market economy. There are signs that 
the Russian banking sector is slowly opening up allowing foreign banks to enter the market. 
This ongoing development will, if it is allowed to continue, bring in actors on the Russian 
banking market that will provide efficient financial services simultaneously bringing along a 
better risk assessment competence (which is still rare in Russia). Thus, the current 
development of the banking sector will no doubt contribute to the further dismantling of the 
Russian virtual economy.  
Holding companies have come to play an increasing role in Russian business life in the last 5–
10 years. The effects of this expansion on the virtual economy are, however, somewhat 
ambiguous. Through finance provided by the holdings their subsidiaries can invest more than 
other enterprises. At the same time management is largely “relieved” from the task of 
economic management and planning, a task that is instead reserved for the management of the 
holding company, a development that tends to maintain old mental models among the 
managers as well as employees of these subsidiaries. This prevents enterprise leaders from 
engaging in business management and tends to keep their focus on engineering rather than 
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economics. As one observer (Clarke, 2004) has noted, this development means in fact a 
reversal to Soviet management practices. This could of course not be said to further the 
dismantling of the Russian virtual economy.  
Developments Among Our Fifteen Arkhangelsk Forest 
Sector Enterprises Illustrating This Ambiguity 
Looking once again at the answers provided by the managers of 15 Arkhangelsk forest sector 
enterprises we find concrete illustrations of some of the ambiguities indicated above.  
• Very few of our 15 enterprises made investments or exported some of their produce. Close 
to half of the interviewed enterprise representatives stated that obsolete technology (due to 
lack of capital) was the single most binding restriction on their activity. Increased 
investments and exports would have meant that financial markets were able to provide the 
necessary funding and that business relations were being expanded in response to demand 
emanating from beyond the regional borders. That would have indicated that normal 
market relations were being introduced and the development might then have constituted a 
clear-cut support for the hypothesis that the virtual economy was being dismantled. 
• It could also be noted that surprisingly few of the interviewed Arkhangelsk managers (2 of 
15) mentioned lack of entrepreneurial tradition and management competence as important 
problems for the development of their business. Product development and difficulties with 
finding new markets were recognized as a problem by merely one respondent in our 2005 
survey. Two respondents mentioned problems with current business practices. More 
emphasis would probably have been laid on these problems if managers’ old “mental 
models” had been discarded altogether and replaced by a more advanced understanding of 
the workings of a market economy.  
• Very few enterprises reported belonging to a business association. Engaging in such 
associations would be useful in a situation where the state is unable to provide efficient 
business services (Pyle, 2006). A more widespread engagement in business associations 
could have been seen as an indication of a market adapted business behavior.  
6.1.3 Remaining Problems 
Finally, we should also note some features of current Russian business behavior that are 
hardly compatible with normal institutions governing behavior in a market economy, features 
that rather indicate that the rules governing behavior in the Russian virtual economy are still 
in effect.  
The non-transparency characterizing the workings of the virtual economy efficiently hides 
much “murky business”. We have already noted the unlawful behavior often displayed in 
bankruptcy proceedings where, for instance, an economically strong enterprise can force a 
company into bankruptcy by acquiring its debts and demand immediate payment, a behavior 
that sometimes is sanctioned by corrupt officials in the regional administrations or in 
arbitration courts. The powerful large financial industrial groups (led by the so-called 
oligarchs) have been accused of “bending the law” in the broadening of their operations and 
expansion into the regions of Russia. The development has been noted and certain measures 
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are under way to curb the unlawful maneuvering, but problems still seem to be quite 
pertinent.60  
At the root of much of these problems lies the inability of the state to fully guarantee property 
rights. Business owners who are threatened by hostile takeovers by a FIG have been forced to 
seek alliances with another FIG to defend its property rather than referring the conflict to the 
legal authorities of the state (Latynina, 2002; Kenneth, 2006).  
The problem with insecure property rights is also a crucial factor behind the continued 
practice of non-transparent redistribution of natural resource rents. As was briefly noted 
above, Gaddy and Ickes (2005) have explained the principles of this redistribution practice by 
which inefficient and sometimes entirely unprofitable Russian enterprises are able to continue 
their activity without restructuring. While probably more of the rent distribution is transparent 
today than a few years ago, there is still a portion of it that remains non-transparent and 
officially unaccounted for. The practice of supporting inefficient enterprises helps to maintain 
the Russian virtual economy. It can be seen as a substitute for the direct transfers to 
enterprises distributed via the state budget during Soviet times. Today, the large natural 
resource extracting industries (oil and gas) in effect helps the state to avoid the potentially 
serious social problems that would arise if all of these inefficient enterprises―firms that are 
largely operating in the Russian virtual economy―were to be forced into bankruptcy all at 
once. They do this, so the authors maintain, in an effort to make their property rights more 
secure. The state “pays” for these services by not interfering in the operation of the “donor 
enterprises.” This is the rationale of the system, according to Gaddy and Ickes (2005).  
Assuming that this analysis of the non-transparent redistribution of resource rents is accurate 
and that the practice is of the significance claimed by Gaddy and Ickes, the Russian virtual 
economy cannot be entirely eliminated, and a certain misallocation of resources will continue. 
In order to come to grips with this problem Gaddy and Ickes (and others, see for example 
Ahrend and Tompson, 2005; Ahrend, 2006) advocate a thorough reformation of the Russian 
energy sector.  
6.2 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
On the basis of the previous analysis we come to the following conclusion: In the last 7–8 
years Russian enterprises have in fact been increasingly acting in accordance with institutions 
governing business behavior in a market economy. A tentative corollary of this development 
is that the virtual economy is gradually being dismantled.  
This does not mean, however, that it is now time to entirely discard the notion of the virtual 
economy and its implications. As long as the non-transparent redistribution of resource rents 
continues, as Gaddy and Ickes (2005) have indicated, the virtual economy continues to exert a 
negative influence on resource allocation in the Russian economy. From a market efficiency 
point of view, resources continue to be sub-optimally allocated. This means that policies 
aiming at final elimination of the causes and effects of the virtual economy should have high 
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priority. The fight for the complete dismantling of the virtual economy and, for that matter, 
for the final passing of the transition period in Russia, is still likely to last several years. How 
long it will take to reach a more mature stage of the market economy largely depends upon 
the public policies pursued.  
From a strictly economic point of view there are ample good reasons to introduce efficiency 
improving policies. Clearly the turmoil created by the transition process has prevented foreign 
investors from heavily engaging in the Russian economy, despite potentially large and fast 
profits. Risks have simply been considered too high. Another reason for the low foreign 
interest is the fact that many Russian industrial enterprises being privatized in the early 1990s 
were in fact not viable in the emerging market environment. As elaborated above, this has to 
do with the peculiar structure and geographical location pattern of the industry that was an 
outcome of the operation of the Soviet command economy. Foreign investors who 
nevertheless entered the Russian market were often met with fierce resistance from domestic 
actors using their political clout to prevent foreign capital to gain access and make a 
significant impact. This “isolationist” behavior was made possible through the dominance of 
the virtual economy, with its characteristic alliance between economic and political actors, 
who had too much to lose with the introduction of proper market economic principles to guide 
actors’ behavior.61  
This also means, as pointed out by Gaddy and Ickes (2002), that incentives for Russian 
policymakers to work for the reformation of the system and a definitive dismantling of the 
virtual economy are ambiguous, since by advocating necessary reforms they do not only risk 
losing their influence over the economy, but also to become unpopular among Russian 
citizens/voters who realize that they will be forced to cope with the (frictional) problems that 
are likely to be an (unintended) consequence of the reform measures taken. The declared 
intentions and the actual policy decisions taken by the highest political authorities, in 
particular the Duma and the President, are therefore of great importance for the continued 
reformation of the Russian economy. However, even with a clear commitment from the 
highest authorities, the reformation process aiming at the ultimate elimination of the Russian 
virtual economy may take considerable time. The resistance to reform can be expected to be 
strong among many actors in the Russian economy, especially among owners and managers 
of enterprises still operating in the virtual economy. It is therefore difficult to estimate the 
time it will take for the Russian virtual economy to be definitely dismantled.  
However, considering the kind of change that is necessary for achieving this goal it is obvious 
that a fairly long time―several years, perhaps even decades―will be required. While actors’ 
behavior might in principle change rather fast, the basic underlying structural problems that 
have to be solved for the Russian economy to attain market efficiency will require a long time 
to cope with, irrespective of the speed by which necessary institutional changes are 
introduced. At the bottom of the problem lies the existing production structure (the production 
orientation as well as its geographical location) inherited from the Soviet era. As noted above 
(cf. Section 2.1), the current production structure is badly compatible with the efficient 
functioning of a market economy. The geographical location of industry resulting from Soviet 
investment policy is highly suboptimal in a market economic perspective. There are in Russia 
today many very large enterprises located in the vicinity of a natural resource deposit often in 
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remote and sparsely populated areas. These enterprises tend to be highly undiversified 
(focusing on the extraction of a specific natural resource) and they are often the major 
employer in the communities where they are located. In fact the resource deposit may well be 
the sole reason for the establishment of the enterprise and the whole community (so-called 
“town-forming” enterprises).  
With the introduction of market economic principles to guide business investment behavior in 
Russia a tremendous pressure will emerge for changing the existing suboptimal economic 
structure (both in terms of its the geographical location and production orientation). Changes 
in this structure occur partly as a result of a process of self-organization in the economy, and 
partly as a result of public intervention. Both processes are amenable to policymaking aimed 
at modifying existing and/or introducing new institutions (rules-in-use) to govern the behavior 
of economic actors. On the one hand, policies should be developed with the purpose of 
facilitating (smoothing) the self-organization of the Russian economy to make it better 
adapted to meet the demands of an efficient market system. These would be policies 
introducing improved institutions – institutions that are adequate for the efficient functioning 
of a market economy―to guide business behavior. On the other hand, more direct 
(public/state) interventions are probably also necessary to facilitate, stimulate or even to force 
necessary changes in the Russian economic structure. Such changes might include the 
allocation of budget resources for the closing down of old or opening up of new production 
establishments, improving various aspects of the infrastructure, etc. These interventions 
should also preferably be prescribed by well-elaborated policies. In this context, institutional 
change might entail the introduction of efficient rules to guide the elaboration of such 
intervention policies.  
The discussion in this and previous reports from the IIASA study of institutional hurdles 
hampering the development of an efficient market economy in the Russian forest sector (cf., 
for instance, Carlsson, 2000; Carlsson et al., 2001; Olsson, 2004b; Nilsson, 2005; Olsson, 
2006) has many possible policy implications, some of which were already listed in Section 
2.3.  
In conclusion, the following policy recommendations pertaining to the improved functioning 
of the Russian economy at large should be especially emphasized.  
Policies facilitating (smoothing) the self-organization of the economy: 
• Enterprise ownership should be made more transparent. Property rights should be 
made more secure. This fundamental task is basically the responsibility of the federal 
government, something that can be achieved through changes in formal institutions 
(various legislative acts) and by improving the enforcement of existing and new 
legislation thereby increasing the level of trust in Russian society.  
• The banking sector should (continue to) be reformed so that it can fulfill its function of 
providing risk capital for investments that would make Russian enterprises more 
efficient and better able to meet market competition. This requires, among other 
things, an improvement in bank officials’ risk assessment competence. Opening the 
banking sector to foreign competition would be a way to achieve these ends.  
• The transfers from natural resource producers to other sectors in the Russian society 
should be made entirely transparent. This way it would be possible to assess the social 
costs of subsidizing currently inefficient producers. Public policies aiming at the 
eventual elimination of inefficient producers should be elaborated and implemented.  
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• Public policies aiming at the elimination of the causes of corruption should be 
elaborated and implemented.  
Policies for improving the economic structure entailing direct public/state interventions:  
• Efforts to correct the market inefficient geographical location of production in Russia 
should be guided by a federal policy for regional development. Such a regional policy 
should be elaborated in cooperation with the regions affected identifying realistic and 
implementable goals and measures to attain these goals under the efficiency 
restrictions imposed by the market economy and restrictions imposed by national 
security considerations.  
• One ingredient in such a policy for a market efficient regional development―actually 
one of the means for attaining the goal of improving the economic structure―could be 
a set of measures to stimulate and support an increased geographical and occupational 
labor mobility. 
• Another ingredient of such a policy could be measures to direct and support private 
and public investments in infrastructure required to facilitate the realization of the 
regional development goals.  
A crucial problem for all policy implementation is that people who are affected by the 
changes suggested by the policy must find the design process and the intended outcome of the 
policy to be well-considered, realistic, and fair. If they do, the policy will acquire legitimacy 
and policy implementation will have a greater chance of success. In the Russian context, the 
forms for elaborating public policies could be expected to be especially important. To gain 
legitimacy it would seem necessary to very clearly denounce the policy elaboration and 
implementation methods used in the command economy and instead introduce modern 
participatory policy formulation approaches. Furthermore, since redistribution is a pertinent 
issue in most of the policies that might be envisaged to improve the Russian market economy, 
equity issues must be duly considered for policies to gain necessary popular sanction and 
support. If this is overlooked policy implementation will necessarily suffer. The conclusion is 
obvious: stakeholder participation should therefore be allowed and encouraged to ensure 
efficiency in policy elaboration and implementation.  
References 
Ahrend, Rudiger (2006). Russia’s Post-crisis Growth: Its Sources and Prospects for 
Continuation. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 1–24. 
Ahrend, Rudiger and William Tompson (2005). Fifteen Years of Economic Reform in Russia: 
What Has Been Achieved? What Remains to Be Done? (Economics Department 
Working Papers No. 430). Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
Arkhangelsk Oblast (1997). Razvitie i reformirovanie lesopromyshlennogo kompleksa 
Arkhangelskoi oblasti: Podprogramma No. 1 (Development and Reformation of the 
Forest Industrial Complex of Arkhangelsk Oblast: Subprogram No. 1), Arkhangelsk: 
Arkhangelsk Regional Administration.  
Åslund, Anders (1999). Russia’s Virtual Economy: A Comment. Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics, Vol. XXXX, No. 2, pp. 98–102. 
 71 
Åslund, Anders and Nazgul Jenish (2006). The Eurasian Growth Paradox. Working Paper 
WP 06-5, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., June.  
Aukutsionek, Sergei (1998). Industrial Barter in Russia. Communist Economies and Economic 
Transformation, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 179–188. 
Barnes, Andrew (2003). Russia’s New Business Groups and State Power. Post-Soviet Affairs, 
Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 154–186. 
Bernstam, Michael S. and Andrei Sitnikov (2001). Ersatz Banks. In: R. Lawrence and 
Marshall Pomer Klein (eds.), The New Russia; Transition Gone Awry, pp. 221–232.  
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1995). Privatizing Russia. MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass. and London.  
Braguinsky, Serguey and Grigory Yavlinsky (2000). Incentives and Institutions; The 
Transition to a Market Economy in Russia. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey. 
Carlsson, Lars (2000). Towards a Sustainable Russian Forest Sector. Natural Resources 
Forum, Vol. 21, pp. 31–37.  
Carlsson, Lars, Nils-Gustav Lundgren, Mats-Olov Olsson and Mikhail Yu Varakin (1999). 
Institutions and the Emergence of Markets, Transition in the Arkhangelsk Forest Sector. 
Interim Report RR-99-021, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria, June. 
Carlsson, Lars, Nils-Gustav Lundgren and Mats-Olov Olsson (2001). The Russian Detour: 
Real Transition in a Virtual Economy? Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 841–
867. 
CBRF (2006). Bulletin of Banking Statistics. Regional Supplement, No. 2 (22). The Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation, Moscow.  
Chang, Gene Hsin (1999). Observations on the Nature of Russia’s Virtual Economy. Post-
Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. XXXX, No. 2, pp. 114–120. 
Chowdhury, Abdur (2003). Banking Reform in Russia: Winds of Change? Policy Reform, 
Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 89–103. 
Clarke, Simon (1998). Trade Unions and the Non-Payment of Wages in Russia. International 
Journal of Manpower, Vol. 19, No. 1/2, pp. 68–94.  
Clarke, Simon (2004). A Very Soviet Form of Capitalism? The Management of Holding 
Companies in Russia. Post-Communist Economies, Vol 16, No. 4, pp. 405–422. 
Commander, Simon, Irina Dolinskaya and Christian Mumssen (2002). Determinants of Barter 
in Russia: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 67, pp. 
275–307. 
Cox, Terry (1996). From Perestroika to Privatisation; The Politics of Property Change in 
Russian Society 1985–1991. Avebury, Aldershot. 
Cuthbert, Michael, Victoria Bortkevicha, Logan Wright, Mark Hyde, Nicolas Frome and 
Gabrielle Ruiz (2005). Bankruptcy Proceedings in the Russian Federation. Clifford 
Chance LLP, London. 
Desai, Padma and Todd Idson (2000). Work without Wages: Russia’s Nonpayment Crisis. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
 72 
Desai, Raj and Itzhak Goldberg (2000). Stakeholders, Governance, and the Russian Enterprise 
Dilemma. Finance and Development; A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, Vol. 37, No. 2, 
pp. 14–18. 
Dynkin, Alexandr A. (2003). Krupnyi rossiiskii biznes i problemy modernizatsii (Big Russian 
Business and Problems of Modernization). Paper presented at the Nauchnyi seminar pod 
rukovodstvom E.G. Iasina ekonoicheskaia politika v usloviiakh perekhodnogo perioda 
(Scientific Seminar facilitated by E.G. Yasin on Economic Policy in the Transition 
Period), Moscow, 29 January. 
Earle, John S. and Klara Z. Sabirianova (2002). How Late to Pay? Understanding Wage 
Arrears in Russia. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 661–707. 
Ericson, Richard E. (1999). Comments on an Accounting Model of Russia’s Virtual 
Economy. Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. XXXX, No. 2, pp. 103–109. 
Ericson, Richard E. (2000). The Post-Soviet Economic System: An Industrial Feudalism? In: 
Tuomas Komulainen and Ilkka Korhonen (eds.), Russian Crisis and its Effects. Series 
B, Kikimora Publications, Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki, pp. 133–136. 
Ericson, Richard E. (2002). The Russian Economy. Discussion Paper No. 0102-07, 
Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York.  
Facts and Perspectives (2003). Facts and Perspectives. A compilation of regional information 
about Sweden based on official data from Statistics Sweden. (Data retrieved on 25 
May–5 June 2003, from http://www.regionfakta.com/.) 
Fuchs, Michael J., Ed. (2002). Building Trust: Developing the Russian Financial Sector. The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Gaddy, Clifford and Barry W. Ickes (1998a). To Restructure or Not to Restructure, Informal 
Activities and Enterprise Behavior in Transition. Unpublished manuscript, May. 
(Retrieved 22 March 2000, from http://econ.la.psu.edu/~bickes/informal.pdf.) 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (1998b). Beyond a Bailout: Time to Face Reality 
About Russia’s “Virtual Economy.” Unpublished Paper, June. The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C. (Retrieved 21 June 2005, from http://www.brookings.edu/ 
views/ articles/gaddy/199806.htm.) 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (1998c). Russia’s Virtual Economy. Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October, pp. 53–67.  
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (1999a). Getting Realistic About Russia: No Time for 
Illusions, Brookings Review, Winter. (Retrievable from http://www.brookings.org/press/ 
review/win99/gaddy2.pdf.) 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (1999b). Stability and Disorder: An Evolutionary 
Analysis of Russia’s Virtual Economy. Working Paper Number 276, William Davidson 
Institute, University of Michigan Business School. (Retrieved 17 May 2001, from 
http://eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/wp276.pdf. Changed link last checked 5 
October 2006: http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp276.pdf.) 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (1999c). An Accounting Model of the Virtual 
Economy in Russia. Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. XXXX, No. 2, pp. 
79–97. 
 73 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (2001). The Virtual Economy and Economic 
Recovery in Russia. Transition Newsletter, Vol. 12, No.1, February–March. (A copy of 
the article can be retrieved from http://www.brookings.org/views/articles/gaddy/virtual_ 
2001.htm.) 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (2002). Russia’s Virtual Economy. Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (2005). Resource Rents and the Russian Economy. 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 46, No. 8, pp. 559–583. 
Gaddy, Clifford, Barry Ickes, Andrei Mazharov and Andrei Volgin (2000). Russia’s “Virtual 
Economy”: An Update For Investors. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 
USA, March. 
Goldman, Marshall I. (1998). The Cashless Society. Current History, Vol. 97, No. 621, pp. 
319–324. 
Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (1996). Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie oblasti za 1996 god 
(Socioeconomic situation of the region in 1996). Goskomstat Rossii, Arkhangel’skii 
oblastnoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Arkhangelsk. 
Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (1997). Arkhangel’skoi oblasti – 60 let; Kratkii statisticheskii 
sbornik (Arkhangelsk Oblast 60 Years Old; Short Statistical Collection). Goskomstat 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Arkhangel’skii oblastnoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki, 
Arkhangelsk. 
Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (2003). Lesnaia, derevoobrabatyvayushchaia i tsellyulozno-
bumazhnaia promyshlennost’ Arkhangel’skoi oblasti 1996–2002 gody (The Forest, 
Wood Processing and Pulp and Paper Industry of Arkhangelsk Oblast 1996–2002). 
State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat Rossii); 
Arkhangelsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics (Arkhangel’skii oblkomstat), 
Arkhangelsk. 
Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (2004). Arkhangelskaya oblast' v tsifrakh; ofitsial'noe izdanie 
(Arkhangelsk Oblast in Figures; Official Edition, 2004. Federal’naia sluzhba 
gosudarstvennoi statistiki (Rosstat), Territorial’nyi organ federal’noi sluzhby 
gosudarstvennoi statistiki po Arkhangel’skoi oblasti, Arkhangelsk. 
Goskomstat Rossii (1996a). Rossia v tsifrakh; Ofitsial’noe izdanie, 1996 (Russia in Figures; 
Official Edition, 1996). Finansy i statistika, Moscow.  
Goskomstat Rossii (1996b). Promyshlennost’ Rossii; Ofitsial’noe izdanie (Industry in Russia; 
Official edition). Goskomstat Rossii, Moscow.  
Goskomstat Rossii (2004). Regiony Rossii; Osnovnye kharakteristiki sub”ektov Rossiskoi 
federatsii; Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie pokazateli. Ofitsial’noe izdanie, 2003 (Regions of 
Russia; Basic Characteristics of the Subjects of the Russian Federation; Socioeconomic 
Indicators. Official edition, 2003). Goskomstat Rossii, Moscow (CD ROM).  
Granberg, Alexander (2000). Regional Development and Regional Policy in the New Russia. 
In: Hans Westlund, Alexander Granberg and Folke Snickars (eds.), Regional 
Development in Russia: Past Policies and Future Prospects, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 123–165. 
Grevtsov, Aleksander (2005). Postroim dorogu―pomozhem otrasli (Let’s build a road―let’s 
help the sector). Lesnye novosti, 30 August. 
 74 
Guriev, Sergei and Barry W. Ickes (2000). Barter in Russia. In: Paul Seabright (ed.), The 
Vanishing Ruble: Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-Soviet 
Societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 147–175. 
Guriev, Sergei and Dmitri Kvassov (2004). Barter for Price Discrimination. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 22, pp. 329–350. 
Guriev, Sergei and Andrei Rachinsky (2004). Ownership Concentration in Russian Industry 
(Revised version of the authors’ background paper for the World Bank’s Country 
Economic Memorandum (CEM) for Russia 2004). 
Hanson, Philip (2002). Barriers to Long-Run Growth in Russia. Economy and Society, Vol. 
31, No. 1, February, pp. 62–84. 
Hanson, Philip (2003a). The Russian Economic Recovery: Do Four Years of Growth Tell Us 
that the Fundamentals have Changed? Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 365–
382.  
Hanson, Philip (2003b). The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of 
the USSR from 1945. Longman, Harlow. 
Heleniak, Timothy (2001). Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia. 
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall.  
Hendley, Kathryn, Barry W. Ickes and Randi Ryterman (1998). Remonetizing the Russian 
Economy. In: Harry G. Broadman (ed.), Russian Enterprise Reform: Policies to Further 
the Transition, Discussion Paper No. 400, The World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 101–
120. 
Ivanova, Lyudmila and Vigdis Nygaard (1999). Institutions and the Emergence of 
Markets―Transition in the Murmansk Forest Sector. Interim Report IR-99-071, 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, December. 
Ivanter, Aleksandr (2005). Ne v dver’, tak v okno (If not through the door, then through the 
window). Ekspert, No. 28 (475), July.  
Javeline, Debra (2003). Protest and the Politics of Blame; The Russian Response to Unpaid 
Wages. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
Kenneth, Christopher (2006). Oligarchs could be jailed over illegal acquisitions of assets. The 
Russia Journal Magazine, 24 March. (Retrieved on 26 April 2006, from 
http://www.therussiajournal.com/?p=99.)  
Kim, Byung-Yeon and Jukka Pirttilä (2004). Money, Barter, and Inflation in Russia. Journal 
of Comparative Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 297–314. 
Klein, Lawrence R. and Marshall Pomer, Eds. (2001). The New Russia; Transition Gone 
Awry. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Komistat (2000). Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie pokazateli respublik i oblastei Severnogo i 
Severo-Zapadnogo raionov, Kaliningranskoi i Kirovskoi oblastei v 1990-1999gg. 
Sbornik (Socioeconomic indicators for the republics and counties of the Northern and 
North-Western regions, the Kaliningrad and Kirvosk Counties in 1990–1999. Data 
Compilation). Goskomstat Respubliki Komi, Syktyvkar. 
Latynina, Yulia (2002). Forestry Industry: Ripe for Carving Up. Moscow Times, 17 July.  
 75 
Makarov, V. and G. Kleiner (2000). Barter in Russia; An Institutional Stage. Problems of 
Economic Transition, Vol. 42, Issue 11, pp. 51–79. (Translated from Russian, original 
title: “Barter v Rossii: institutsional’nyi etap,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 4, 1999, pp. 79–
101.) 
Minpromenergo (2005). O sostaianii i perspektivakh razvitiia lesopromyshlennogo 
kompleksa. Doklad zamestitelia ministra Ivana Materova na 8-m s"ezde 
lesopromyshlennikov i lesoeksporterov 20 maia 2005 (On the situation and future 
development of the forest industrial complex. Statement by deputy minister Ivan 
Materov on the 8th congress of forest industrialists and forest exporters, 20 May 2005.). 
Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and Energetics). 
Nilsson, Sten (2005). Experiences of Policy Reforms of the Forest Sector in Transition and 
Other Countries. Forest Policy and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 831–847.  
North, Douglass C. (2005). Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J. 
Nove, Alec (1986). The Soviet Economic System (Third edition). Allen and Unwin, Boston. 
Okhmatovskiy, Ilya (2005). Sources of Capital and Structures of Influence; Banks in the 
Russian Corporate Network. International Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 427–457. 
Olsson, Mats-Olov (2004a). Institutional Change in the Russian Forest Sector: Stakeholder 
Participation in Forest Policy Formulation in Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk. 
Interim Report IR-04-030, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria, July. 
Olsson, Mats-Olov (2004b). Barriers to Change? Understanding the Institutional Hurdles in 
the Russian Forest Sector. Licentiate Thesis (2004:79). Luleå University of Technology, 
Luleå.  
Olsson, Mats-Olov (2006). Systemic Interventions to Promote Institutional Change in the 
Russian Forest Sector. Review of Policy Research, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 505–530. 
Ostrom, Elinor (2005). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. 
Phillips, Anthony (1999). Changing Characterizations of the Roots of Russia’s Problems. 
Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 3, March. (Retrieved 1 November 1999, 
from http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/99mar.htm.)  
Piipponen, Minna (1999). Transition in the Forest Sector of the Republic of Karelia, Russia. 
Fennia, Vol. 177, No. 2, pp. 185–233. 
Polterovich, Viktor M. (2001). Institutional Traps. In: R. Lawrence and Marshall Pomer Klein 
(eds.), The New Russia; Transition Gone Awry, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 
93–116. 
Pyle, William (2006). Collective Action and Post-Communist Enterprise: The Economic 
Logic of Russia’s Business Associations. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 491–
521. 
Round, John (2005). Rescaling Russia’s Geography: The Challenges of Depopulating the 
Northern Periphery. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 5, pp. 705–727. 
Rozhinskiy, Ivan (2006). Russian Banking―State vs. Foreigners. BOFIT Russia Review, 8 
May. 
 76 
Russia in Figures (2003). Rossiia v tsifrakh; Regional’nyi sbornik (Russia in Figures; 
Regional Handbook). Interactive on-line database containing information based on 
official statistical material about all Russian regions. “Practical Science Database”, 
Moscow. (Available on the Internet from http://www.sci.aha.ru/cgi-bin/regbase.pl.) 
Shestoperovyi, A.M. (2005). Dinamika razvitiia malogo predprinimatel’stva v regionakh 
rossii v 2004 gody (Development Dynamics of Small Business in Russia’s Regions 
2004.) NISIPP, Moscow. (Retrieved 21 March 2006, from http://smb.economy.gov.ru/ 
statistics/dynamics/dyn_2004.)  
Sholomitskaya, Anastasia (2005). Razvitie LPK tormozitsia bezdorozh’em (The development 
of the forest sector is hampered by the lack of roads). Biznes-klass, Arkhangel’sk, 16 
October. (Retrieved 1 February 2005, from http://www.wood.ru/ru/index.php3?reg 
=landpag=loa252.) 
Simachev, Iu. (2003). The Institution of Bankruptcy in Russia; Demand, Basic Trends, and 
Problems of Development. Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 46, No. 8, pp. 32–
65. 
Slay, Ben (1999). A Comment on Russia’s ‘Virtual Economy’. Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics, Vol. XXXX, No. 2, pp. 110–113. 
Smol’yakova, Tat’yana (2005). Gosudarstvo poshlo v les; Ono reshilo stroit’ dorogi i izmenit’ 
tsenevuyu politiku (The State went to the forest; It decided to construct roads and 
change its price policy). Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 September. (Retrieved 19 September 
2005, from http://www.rg.ru/2005/09/16/les.html.  
Statistics of Russian Education. Internet resource containing official data on Russian 
education at federal and regional level. Data retrieved from http://stat.edu.ru.  
Tompson, William (1999). The Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing? Unraveling the 
Workings of Russia’s ‘Virtual Economy’. Economy and Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 
256–280. 
Tompson, William (2000). Financial Backwardness in Contemporary Perspective: Prospects 
for the Development of Financial Intermediation in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 
52, No. 4, pp. 605–625. 
Tompson, William (2004a). Banking Reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 410, OECD Publishing. 
(doi:10.1787/346560635401). 
Tompson, William (2004b). Reforming Russian Bankruptcy Law. Briefing Note (REP BN 
04/03). Russia and Eurasia Program, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London, August.  
Tompson, William (2005). The Political Implications of Russia’s Resource-Based Economy. 
Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 335–359. 
Tushunov, D. (2005). Borrowing by Russian Businesses. Problems of Economic Transition, 
Vol. 48, No. 5, September. (Translated from Russian, original title: “Kreditnaia 
aktivnost’ rossiskikh predpriiatii,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 7, 2003, pp. 78–88.) 
Woodruff, David M. (1999). It’s Value That’s Virtual: Bartles, Rubles, and the Place of 
Gazprom in the Russian Economy. Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 130–148, 
April–June. 
 77 
World Bank (2005). From Transition to Development (No. 32308-RU). Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management Unit; Europe and Central Asia Region, The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Yakovlev, Andrei (2000). Barter in the Russian Economy: Classifications and Implications. 
Evidence from Case Study Analyses. Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 
279–291. 
Zhuravskaia, E. and K. Sonin (2005). The Economics and Politics of Russian Bankruptcies. 
Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 47, No. 11, pp. 70–94. 
 
 
 78 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Questionnaire Form Used in the Survey of 15 Forest 
Enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast, April–June 2005 
SECTION A: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTERPRISE 
1) Name of the enterprise (incl. legal status)?  
2) What year was the enterprise established?  
Have any major changes taken place in the status of the enterprise during the last 6–7 years?  
3) Give a short description of the enterprise. (The answer should contain the following type of 
information: general activities of the enterprise; organization and management structure; name 
and experience of leading personnel; how and in what way the enterprise has developed.) 
4) Type of enterprise? State main activity! (More than one alternative may be chosen.)   Forest owner/possessor/forest service   Harvesting enterprise   Sawmill   Pulp and paper   Other processing industry   Consultant   Other type, describe  
5) What are your main products?   Today (end of 2004)  
6) What is the actual production volume of the enterprise? (In physical units and in rubles)  Volume (end of 2004)  __________, rubles: ______________ 
7) Who is the legal owner of this enterprise?   The state, specify:   Private person/persons, namely:   The enterprise is a corporation owned by other companies, namely   Other, namely:  
Were there any changes in the ownership of the enterprise during the last 6–7 years?   No.  Yes, describe which changes (and what consequences these changes have produced):  
8) Number of employees? (Counted as full time personnel)   Workers, today (end of 2004):   Administration/management staff, today (end of 2004):  
9) Do you currently have any engagements and responsibilities related to activities other than 
“production”? (Describe each engagement briefly)  Housing   Provision of consumer goods   Schools   Health care  Child care  Other  
10) Do you currently make any investments in your enterprise?   No.  Yes, describe content and scale  
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If yes, how are these investments financed?   Money is borrowed from (name of the provider of resources):   Other arrangement, namely:  
11) Describe your relations to the “banking system”? Can you borrow money, from whom and on 
what terms?  
SECTION B: INPUT SIDE OF THE ENTERPRISE 
12) From whom do you acquire timber/wood?  
Name of providers in order of importance, (as a percentage of total volume), name all 
PROVIDER 1:___________________________________           % of total volume: __________  Regional/local provider    Provider within the federation    Provider in FSU      Import (from which country):   
PROVIDER 2: ___________________________________          % of total volume: __________  Regional/local provider    Provider within the federation    Provider in FSU       Import (from which country):   
PROVIDER 3: ___________________________________          % of total volume: __________  Regional/local provider    Provider within the federation    Provider in FSU       Import (from which country):   
PROVIDER 4: ___________________________________          % of total volume: __________  Regional/local provider    Provider within the federation    Provider in FSU       Import (from which country):   
Etc. 
13) On what terms is the timber/wood normally acquired? Indicate whether or not contracted long-
term deliveries are used, if the wood is acquired from a) the enterprise’s leased forest lands, b) 
through purchases from the state (leskhozes) at preset stumpage fees, c) through auction, or d) by 
some other type of arrangement. Are arrangements the same for different providers? (cf. question 
no. 12) 
14) Do you have any alternative supplier(s)?  Yes      No 
Clarify the answer:   
15) Can you acquire a sufficient amount of wood ?  Yes    No, what is the explanation?  
16) How is the timber/wood paid for?   Payment upon delivery    Payment before delivery   Other arrangement, namely  
17)  How are payments arranged?   Via bank; name of this bank:   Payments are done by the enterprise itself   Other construction, namely:   If barter is used, estimate its share of total payments:  % 
 What was the corresponding share five years ago?  % 
18)  What will happen if either part breaks the purchase agreement or does not fulfill its duties? 
What measures are taken to rectify the situation? Are these measures possible to implement? 
19) Do you regard violations of purchase agreements as a problem?   Yes, a big problem    Yes, but a small problem   Not really a problem 
20)  Describe how a typical purchase transaction is performed. (Give a description, try to be detailed, 
who is contacted, how long does the procedure take, who is involved, are contracts written, etc?) 
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SECTION C: OUTPUT SIDE OF THE ENTERPRISE 
21) To whom do you sell your ‘products’?  Name and type of customers in order of importance (as 
a percentage of total volume), name all 
CUSTOMER 1:___________________________________          % of total volume: __________  Regional/local customer    Customer within the federation    Customer in FSU      Export       Via sales organization, namely: _________________________________________ 
CUSTOMER 2: ___________________________________         % of total volume: __________  Regional/local customer    Customer within the federation    Customer in FSU      Export       Via sales organization, namely: ___________________________________________ 
CUSTOMER 3: ___________________________________         % of total volume: __________  Regional/local customer    Customer within the federation    Customer in FSU      Export       Via sales organization, namely: _______________________________________ 
CUSTOMER 4: ___________________________________         % of total volume: __________  Regional/local customer    Customer within the federation    Customer in FSU      Export       Via sales organization, namely: _____________________________________________ 
Etc. 
22) Can you describe how a typical sales transaction is performed? (Give a description, try to be 
detailed, who is contacted, how long does the procedure take, who is involved, are contracts 
written, etc?) 
23) What will happen if either part breaks the sales agreement or does not fulfill its duties? Describe  
What measures are taken to rectify the situation? Are these measures possible to implement? 
24) Do you regard violations of sales agreements as a problem?   Yes a big problem    Yes, but a small problem   Not really a problem  
25) How do you get paid for your products?   Cash or equivalent upon delivery    Cash or equivalent paid before delivery    Other arrangement, namely:  
26) How are payments arranged?   Via bank; name of this bank:   Payments are done by the enterprise itself   Other construction, namely:    If barter is used, estimate its share of total payments:  % 
 What was the corresponding share five years ago?  % 
SECTION D: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS   
27) Are there rules or regulations that apply to your enterprise which you regard as an obstacle for 
your activities?     No   Yes, describe: 
28) Are there other problems which you regard as obstacles for a successful business?    No, only minor.   Yes, the following (mark the problems you find most pertinent):   Technology:  machinery, maintenance  Entrepreneurial tradition, lack of competence (skills)  Forest legislation, in particular 
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 Other business legislation, such as   Law enforcement  Product development, finding new markets  Financial problems, lack of capital  Current business practices, such as   Other problems, such as  
29)  What is the single most binding “restriction” on the activity of your enterprise?  Describe   
30) Generally speaking, do you find the formal legislation regulating Russian forest enterprises 
adequate and efficient?    Yes   No, explain why. 
31) If it would be possible to change anything related to the Russian forest sector, what would you 
change? (First, second, etc., in order of priority)  
32) Is this enterprise member of any branch organization or equivalent?   No   Yes, namely:  
a) When did the enterprise join this organization?  
b) Why did the enterprise join this organization?  
c) What benefits does the membership produce?  
33) Estimate how large a share of the enterprise’s taxes that is actually paid in cash? How large a 
share is paid in kind (or paid through various tax off-sets)? What were the corresponding 
numbers five years ago?  Percentage cash today:  %    Percentage in kind today:  %  Percentage cash five years ago:  %   Percentage in kind five years ago:   % 
34) What do you think is the most important activity on which management should focus in its 
efforts to make the enterprise more prosperous. Grade the importance of each one of the 
suggested alternatives by stating a number between 1 and 5, where 1 is not important and 5 is 
very important:   Improve efficiency of production through organizational changes  Improve efficiency of production through investments in new technology  Develop new products to allow entry into new markets  Improve work productivity through recruitment of new personnel with a modern education  Improve work productivity through education of the current workforce  Influence politics/politicians to create a better environment for business  Influence politics/politicians to acquire special priveleges for the enterprise   Other suggestion, namely  
35) How would you characterize your company’s current dependence upon the following structures 
compared to the situation 5–6 years ago:  
1. Public forest sector authorities:  Not relevant   More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
2. Other public authorities/services:  Not relevant   More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
3. Other forest enterprises in the region:  Not relevant   More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
4. Other forest enterprises in Russia:  Not relevant   More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
5. Foreign companies:  Not relevant   More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
6. Banks:   Not relevant  More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
7. Forest organizations and companies in Moscow:  Not relevant  More dependent;      Less dependent;      No change 
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36) What can enterprises do to influence political life in Arkhangelsk in order to improve conditions 
for all actors in the regional forest sector?  
What does your enterprise actually do? 
37) Is any board member or representative of the company management an elected member of the 
Regional Duma?   No   Yes. Who is this member? (Who are these members?) (Position in the company)?  
Has their political activity produced any benefits for the enterprise? Describe:   
38) Estimate the share (%) of the enterprise’s employees who are trade union members?   Percentage today :        %   Percentage five years ago:   % 
Which trade unions do they belong to? 
39) Has enterprise management’s interaction with trade unions changed in character during the last 
15 years? If so, how? Give a brief description?  
40) Are environmental organizations taking an active interest in the activities of your enterprise?   No    Yes. How? (Examples?) 
41) Other comments of relevance? (Invite comments concerning other problems that have not been 
discussed above, especially regarding a) what is working well, relative progress, the prospects of 
a sustainable yield and harvesting, etc. b) problems with wage and tax arrears, order situation, 
etc. Here it should also be indicated to what extent the activities of the enterprise affect the 
environment in a negative way and how this might affect its future existence.)   
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Appendix B: List of Publications from IIASA’s Study “Institutions and 
the Emergence of Markets―Transition in the Russian 
Forest Sector” 
Most of the listed publications can be downloaded free of charge via 
http://www.didaktekon.se/mats/ii-publ.htm. 
IIASA Interim Reports—Case Studies in Eight Russian Regions:  
  Initial Studies:  
Carlsson, Lars (1997). Prerequisites for the Evolution of Markets. An Institutional Analysis of the 
Russian Forest Sector. In Sten Nilsson (ed.), Dialogue on Sustainable Development of 
the Russian Forest Sector, Vol. 1, IIASA Interim Report (IR-97-009). Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, April, pp. 143–145.  
Carlsson, Lars and Mats-Olov Olsson, eds. (1998). Initial Analyses of the Institutional 
Framework of the Russian Forest Sector. IIASA Interim Report (IR-98-027). Laxenburg, 
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, June.  
Malmlöf, Tomas (1998). The Institutional Framework of the Russian Forest Sector―A Historical 
Background. In: IR-98-027 (See link above!)  
Lehmbruch, Barbara (1998). Ministerial Spin-Offs and Economic Transformation in the Russian 
Timber Industry, 1992–1996. In: IR-98-027 (See link above!)  
Mashkina, Olga (1998). Measuring Attitudinal Diversity through Q-analysis―An Illustration of a 
Research Approach. In: IR-98-027 (See link above!)  
  Tomsk Oblast:  
Carlsson, Lars and Mats-Olov Olsson (1998). Institutions and the Emergence of Markets, 
Transition in the Tomsk Forest Sector. IIASA, Interim Report (IR-98-084). Laxenburg, 
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, October. (Also available in 
Russian.)  
Carlsson, Lars, Nils-Gustav Lundgren and Mats-Olov Olsson (1999). Forest Enterprises in 
Transition — Business Behavior in the Tomsk Forest Sector. IIASA Interim Report (IR-99-
010). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. (Also 
available in Russian.)  
  Arkhangelsk Oblast:  
Carlsson, Lars, Nils-Gustav Lundgren, Mats-Olov Olsson and Mikhail Yu. Varakin. (1999). 
Institutions and the Emergence of Markets, Transition in the Arkhangelsk Forest Sector. 
IIASA Interim Report (IR-99-021). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis. (Also available in Russian.)  
  Khabarovsk Krai:  
Efremov, Dmitry F., Lars Carlsson, Mats-Olov Olsson and Alexander S. Sheingauz (1999). 
Institutional Change in the Forest Sector of Khabarovsk Krai. IIASA Interim Report (IR-99-
068). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
Mabel, Marian (2000). The Flexible Domestic State: Institutional Transformation and Political 
Economic Control in the Khabarovsk Krai Forestry Sector. Interim Report (IR-00-037). 
Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
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  Moscow Oblast:  
Kleinhof, Andris E., Lars Carlsson and Mats-Olov Olsson (1999). The Forest Sector in Moscow 
Oblast. IIASA Interim Report (IR-99-069). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis. (Also available in Russian).  
  The Karelian Republic:  
Piipponen, Minna (1999). Transition in the Forest Sector of the Republic of Karelia. Interim 
Report (IR-99-070). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis. (This IR is also available in Russian.)  
  Murmansk Oblast:  
Ivanova, Lyudmila and Vigdis Nygaard (1999). Institutions and the Emergence of Markets 
Transition in the Murmansk Forest Sector. Interim Report (IR-99-071). Laxenburg, 
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, December. (This IR is also 
available in Russian.)  
Jacobsen, Birgit (1999). Auctions Without Competition—The Case of Timber Sales in the 
Murmansk Region. Interim Report (IR-99-072). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis.  
  Irkutsk Oblast:  
Blam, Yuri, Lars Carlsson and Mats-Olov Olsson (1999). Institutions and the Emergence of 
Markets—Transition in the Irkutsk Forest Sector. IIASA Interim Report (IR-00-017). 
Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
  Krasnoyarsk Krai:  
Sokolova, Nastassia (2000). Institutions and the Emergence of Markets—Transition in the 
Krasnoyarsk Forest Sector. Interim Report (IR-00-028). Laxenburg, Austria: International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. (This IR is also available in Russian.)  
  Summary Reports:  
Carlsson, Lars, Nils-Gustav Lundgren, and Mats- Olov Olsson (2000). Why Is the Russian Bear 
Still Asleep after Ten Years of Transition? IIASA Interim Report (IR-00-019). Laxenburg, 
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, March.  
Policy Exercises:  
Olsson, Mats-Olov (2001). Participatory Forest Policy Development—Experiences from a IIASA 
Policy Exercise in Tomsk, Russia. IIASA Interim Report (IR-01-061). Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, December.  
Olsson, Mats-Olov (2004). Institutional Change in the Russian Forest Sector: Stakeholder 
Participation in Forest Policy Formulation in Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk. IIASA 
Interim Report (IR-04-030). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, July.  
IIASA Interim Reports on Other Institutional Issues:  
Fell, Astrid (1999). On the Establishment of Trust in the Russian Forest Sector. Interim Report 
(IR-99-054). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
Pappila, Minna (1999). The Russian Forest Sector and Legislation in Transition. Interim Report 
(IR-99-058). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
 85 
Kallas, Aigar (2000). The Estonian Forest Sector in Transition: Institutions at Work. Interim 
Report (IR-00-073). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis.  
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00-042). Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
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